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Christopher  (1988)  defines  a  supply  chain,  as  “the  network  of  organizations  involved, 
through upstream and downstream linkages, in the different processes and activities that produce 
value in the form of products and services in the eyes of the ultimate customer”. Furthermore, 
logistics can be defined as the total process of moving goods from a supplier of raw materials to an 
ultimate customer in the most timely and cost-efficient manner. Supply chains have become an 
important and complex component of the economy. For example in the year 2000, logistics costs in 
the Netherlands amounted to € 49.7 billion, or 12.4% of the gross domestic product (NDL, 2005).  
An  efficient  organization  of  logistics  operations  is  crucial  for  both  companies  and  the 
economy as a whole. It is reckoned that companies that have been able to establish a competitive 
advantage in the last decade are typically those companies where logistics management has a high 
priority (Groothedde, 2005). 
 
 
1.1  TRENDS IN THE LOGISTICS SECTOR 
In recent years the European logistics playing field has been going through considerable 
changes. In this section the trends having the strongest impact on logistics are discussed. They are: 
1)  Globalisation  and  increased  competition,  2)  One-stop-shopping  and  heightened  customer 
expectations,  3)  Increasing  costs  of  road  network  usage,  4)  Information  and  communication 
technology,  and  5)  Environmental  management.  The  discussions  below  are  partly  based  on 
Cruijssen and Verweij (2006). 
 
Globalisation and increased competition. The sector of logistics service providers (LSPs) is 
traditionally characterised by a large number of small, often family-owned companies. Together 
these companies constitute a considerable market share. As an illustration, Eurostat figures (E.R. 9) 
show that there are as much as 46,000 road transport companies in Germany, 39,000 in France, and 
37,500 in the United Kingdom. Meanwhile however, the fast globalisation of the world economies 
is  starting  to  impose  new  and  stronger  requirements  on  LSPs.  The  fading  trade  barriers  and 
simplified customs procedures have led to strong  geographical specialisation of production. In 
addition, considerably lower labour wages in Asia, as compared to Europe and North America, 
have caused a shift of production of commodities to the Far East. This has strongly intensified 
transport from and to Asia. As an illustration, the number of containers imported from China via 
the port of Rotterdam has grown explosively from 300,000 in 2000 to 1,100,000 in 2005. Other 
European  and  North-American  ports  show  similar  statistics.  Western  European  countries  in Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  2 
particular, also have to cope with the consequences of the expansion of the European Union (EU). 
On May 1
st 2004, ten new countries with a combined population of almost 75 million joined the 
EU. These countries, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland,  Slovakia  and  Slovenia,  generally  have  lower labour prices than  the 15  incumbent  EU 
countries and as a result more production is relocated towards the new southeastern borders of the 
EU. 
This  globalisation  of  production  has  caused  supply  chains  to  stretch  and  become  less 
predictable. This makes it more difficult for the many small LSPs to fulfil the requirements of their 
customers. Often only the large global LSPs have the skills and capabilities to generate the critical 
mass of transport flows that is needed to stay cost efficient in the stretched supply chains and meet 
the demands of their (multinational) customers. The small LSPs in contrast experience intensifying 
competition, because of the expansion of these large global players. This puts severe pressure on 
profit margins, resulting in bankruptcies and the market concentration in the transport industry that 
is witnessed in recent years. As an illustration of these difficult market conditions for smaller LSPs, 
Eurostat  figures (E.R.  9) show  that  after an  increase  in the  1990s, the  number  of  active  road 
transport  companies  has  been  strongly  declining  over  the  last  five  years  in  the  three  largest 













Figure 1-1. Number of road transport companies (source: Eurostat, E.R. 9) 
 
One-stop-shopping  and  heightened  customer  expectations.  In  modern  supply  chains, 
customers expect goods to be delivered in the right amount, at the right time, to the right place, in 
perfect condition and at the lowest price. Moreover, customers are increasingly searching for LSPs 
that can offer them the full package of logistics services. Figure 1-2 provides an overview of the 
logistics functions that were still handled separately in the 1960s. Over the last decades, customers 
have been outsourcing whole packages of these activities to LSPs. This means that besides basic 
transport and/or warehousing, LSPs should now also be able to offer for example reverse logistics Chapter 1: Introduction 
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Figure 1-2. The evolution of logistics service integration 1960-2000 (based on: E.R. 24) 
 
Besides these extra services, shippers also expect superior quality and timeliness of service. 
From a logistical point of view, the manufacturing trends of Just-in-Time, agility, postponement, 
and Efficient Consumer Response are aimed at a reduction of inventory costs. These concepts give 
rise  to  more  frequent  and  smaller  shipments  with  narrower  time  windows,  which  complicates 
LSPs’  operations  considerably.  Mentzer  et  al.  (1999)  review  the  literature  on  logistics  service 
quality and develop a logistics service quality scale. This scale consists of nine dimensions that are 
considered  to  be  the  main  determinants  of  logistics  service  quality:  1)  Information  quality,  2) 
Ordering procedures, 3) Ordering release quantities, 4) Timeliness, 5) Order accuracy, 6) Order 
quality, 7) Order condition, 8) Order discrepancy handling, and 9) Personnel contact quality. In 
order to stay competitive in today’s competitive industry, LSPs must score properly on all of these 
factors. 
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Increasing costs of road network usage. Sending shipments from A to B via the European 
road network has become more expensive over the last years. This has three major causes. Firstly, 
for example in the Netherlands, the price of one litre of diesel has risen from € 0.33 in 1986 to € 
0.90 in 2006 (E.R. 26). Since fuel cost may constitute up to 30% of total running costs of a 
transport company, this cost increase is seriously jeopardizing these companies’ profitability. A 
second  factor  that  increases  the  cost  of  road  transport  is  the  introduction  of  road  pricing 
mechanisms, such as the German Maut system. As of September 2003, trucks heavier than 12 
tonnes are charged a lump sum fee if they use the German highways. Besides these extra direct 
costs, the introduction entails supplementary costs for a transport company in the form of the 
purchase and installation of an On-Board-Unit and extra administration costs. This results in a 
significant cost increase for transport tasks to be carried out in, from, or to Germany. Finally, the 
cost level of using the road system is also increased because trucks need more time to travel from A 
to B as a result of heavy congestion. As an illustration, a single-way trip from London to Leeds 
took 186 minutes in 2002, but in 2006 already 213 minutes, representing an increase of 14.5% 
(McKinnon, 2004a). These longer transport times are exemplary for the whole of Western Europe. 
They have direct cost consequences, such as increased fuel and labour costs, but also indirect costs 
because the unpredictability of traffic jams hampers the LSP’s planning and makes compliance 
with delivery time windows more difficult. Although hard to measure, Goodwin (2004) estimates 
that for the United Kingdom, annual costs of congestion amount to € 45 billion. It is expected that 
ceteris paribus road traffic will grow faster than road capacity, and therefore innovative ideas are 
necessary to avoid a total blockage of the road system in the coming years.  
Whether the customer or the LSP will carry the burden of the increased costs of using the 
road system, depends on their respective market and bargaining power. In most supply chains 
however, the strongest power lies with the customer (i.e., the shipper), so that the LSP is the most 
likely party to incur the increased costs. For example in the food retail industry, which will be 
considered  in  more  detail  in  Chapter  8  and  Chapter  9,  retailers  are  in  the  position  to  dictate 
conditions to their product suppliers and service providers. Fearne (1994) argues that one of the 
reasons for this is that retailers provide a service that benefits the other firms further up the supply 
chain. Thus, most firms recognise the need to do their business in such a way that the needs of the 
retailer are met. 
 
Information  and  Communication  Technology.  The  increased  possibilities  offered  by  ICT 
have been a trend for decades and are still one of the key factors influencing the structure and 
performance of supply chains (Fisher, 1997). Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) for example 
enables  a  better  control  of  logistics  processes  and  allows  customers  to  track  and  trace  their 
shipments in real-time. Other technological innovations that assist LSPs are onboard computers, 
route planning software, navigation systems, and cellular phones.  Chapter 1: Introduction 
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ICT also facilitates intensified data sharing between supply chain partners (Cruijssen, 2003). 
Many types of data can be shared to boost supply chain performance, such as inventory levels at 
production facilities (Gavirneni, 2001), sales data (Lee et al., 2000), production schedules (Lee and 
Whang, 2000), manufacturing capacities (D’Amours et al., 1998), and performance metrics (e.g. 
Lee and Whang, 2000). The growing presence of for example Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) 
systems  makes that a lot of this information is readily available. Moreover, the advent of the 
Internet has opened up new possibilities also for the small and medium sized companies (SMEs) 
who  mostly  cannot  afford  to implement  an  EDI  system  (Stefansson, 2002). This is  of  special 
importance to the transport sector, because there most of the companies are in fact SMEs. One 
important innovation that is facilitated by data sharing via the Internet is the concept of freight 
exchanges (McLaren et al., 2002; Cruijssen, 2003). An example of a freight exchange is Teleroute 
(E.R. 31). The basic idea is as follows. Forwarders submit their delivery orders in a computer 
system via the Internet and specify the quantity involved, the pickup date, the destination(s), etc. 
Carriers can browse this information by means of a number of search criteria. If a specific order 
interests a carrier, he contacts the shipper. By using a freight exchange, carriers can increase their 
load factors, mainly by acquiring suitable loads for backhauls if such a load is not yet available in 
their own order base. On the other hand, shippers can acquire transport capacity at a lower price 
than they are used to, because of the increased market transparency. 
 
Environmental  management.  Increasing  concerns  about  climate  change,  impacts  on  air 
quality, ground and water pollution, and perceptions of increased risks for health and safety of 
citizens from industrial activities have led to a significant increase in research at the intersection of 
environmental management and operations (Corbett and Kleindorfer, 2001). Poist (1989) already 
reckoned that logistics is especially well positioned to contribute to environmental and ecological 
control in terms of packaging issues, pollution control, and energy and resource conservation. In 
2000, transport accounted for 57% of global oil consumption (Fulton, 2004). Because of the strong 
public concerns about environmental issues, there exists a strong pressure on logistics companies to 
explicitly incorporate environmental management into their business processes. In transport, this 
can be done by putting soot filters into use or by purchasing trucks that are more fuel-efficient. This 
however introduces extra costs for the carriers for which they are not directly compensated. 
Another  way  in  which  logistics  managers  can  influence  environmental  damage,  lies  in 
tactical planning and logistics systems design. Facility location, the sourcing of raw materials, 
transport  mode  selection,  and  high  quality  route  planning  all  offer  opportunities  for  making 
logistics ‘greener’. 
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1.2  CHALLENGES FOR THE LOGISTICS SECTOR 
 
The trends discussed in the previous section impose challenges for the logistics sector. In the 
current section, challenges for shippers and LSPs are discussed separately. 
 
1.2.1  Challenges for Shippers 
Section 1.1 indicates that transport and logistics is evolving from a necessary, though low 
priority function to an important part of business that can enable companies to attain a competitive 
edge  over  their  competitors.  Because  profit  margins  are  shrinking  especially  in  the  transport-
intensive commodity producing sectors, efficient logistics management can be the decisive factor 
for  a  company’s  success,  since  competition  will  take  place  on  the  basis  of  costs,  service  and 
timeliness. 
 
Capability  Explanation 
Time compression  Reduced transport times can decrease the required level of inventory, especially 
safety  and  pipeline  inventory.  This  time  compression  can  be  achieved  by 
acquainting suppliers and LSPs with relevant information as fast and accurate as 
possible. 
Reliability  Supply chain partners depend on reliable deliveries for their own production and 
sales efforts (Morash and Clinton, 1997). Customer dissatisfaction, overstocking 
at retailers and uncommunicated promotional actions are sources of unreliability 
of the logistics process and are symptomatic for suboptimal supply chains (cf. 
LeBlanc, 2006). 
Standardisation  For  example  the  advent  of  EDI  and  standard  Enterprise  Resource  Planning 
(ERP) software has caused a strong integration and automation of many of the 
business practices associated with the production and distribution operations of 
companies.  This  facilitates  information  exchange  and  improves  visibility  and 
planning at the operational and tactical level of operation.  
Just-in-Time  A  Just-in-Time  (JIT)  inventory  strategy  can  be  implemented  to  improve  a 
company’s  profitability  by  reducing  in-process  inventory  and  its  associated 
costs.  Stock  levels  are  kept  low  so  that  savings  can  be  attained  on  both 
warehousing  and  inventory  costs.  For  a  successful  JIT  implementation,  the 
presence of high quality information systems containing reliable data is vital. 
Flexibility  In today’s constantly changing market places, the flexibility of a company to 
fulfil its customers’ requirements is often an important capability. Having the 
logistics skills to support last minute changes in order specifications is therefore 
a necessary condition for a company’s success. Here, ‘flexibility’ is an umbrella 
term for responsiveness, agility, and adaptivity. For a detailed discussion of these 
three separate logistics virtues, see Verweij and Cruijssen (2006). 
Customisation  Companies must be able to offer their customers tailored services, rather than a 
rigid  standard  package.  This  customisation  might  occur  in  both  product  and 
distribution characteristics. For example, a producer of soda drinks must be able 
to  supply  one  customer  by  shipping  large  volumes  to  its  distribution  centre, 
while for another customer Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) on store level is 
asked for.  
Table 1-1. Key logistics capabilities for shippers 
 Chapter 1: Introduction 
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In order to increase the efficiency of logistics processes, shippers have to make logistics an 
integral part of their business process. Only if the work of the internal departments of procurement, 
sales and manufacturing are in harmony with logistics, merchandise can be delivered to customers 
in the right amount, at the right time, to the right place, in perfect condition and against the lowest 
price.  Companies  that  are  successful  in  their  supply  chains  are  those  that  have  developed  the 
capabilities listed in Table 1-1. In the right-hand column, an explanation of the importance of each 
capability is provided. 
 
1.2.2  Challenges for Logistics Service Providers 
Whereas shippers must have the adaptive logistics organization that facilitates the increasing 
customer needs as described in the previous section, LSPs must be able to actually execute the 
tasks  that  arise  from  these  new  logistics  requirements.  Unfortunately,  LSPs  are  having  severe 
difficulties with these newly posed demands (see also Chapter 6). The shorter lead-times, narrower 
time  windows  and  smaller  quantities  demanded  by  shippers  have  caused  lower  load  factors, 
increased empty running, worsened profitability, and, as a final result, an increase in the number of 
bankruptcies. The situation is worst for those LSPs that are active in the more traditional forms of 
logistics services, such as storage and basic distribution. As an illustration, Figure 1-3 shows the 
declining profitability of Dutch road transport companies over the last 10 years. It turns out that 













Figure 1-3. Profitability of Dutch road transport companies, source: TLN (2006) 
 
The most prominent reason for this bad financial performance of LSPs is that they cannot 
transfer the increased operating costs to their customers. The Dutch transport and logistics industry 
association TLN reports that in the period 2000-2005, average operating costs increased by 16%, 
while the average price level of the logistics services only rose by 8% (TLN, 2006). The reason for 
this lies in the fact that the fragmented LSP sector is unable to take a stand against their large (often 
multinational) and thus powerful customers. This unbalanced market power creates the vicious Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  8 
circle for LSPs displayed in Figure 1-4. LSPs are characterised by low profit margins, a strong 
fragmentation and price competition. As a result, they do not have the time and monetary resources 
to develop new skills or undertake new projects to discern themselves from competitors and to 
better serve customers. Consequently, the sector remains traditional in the sense that no innovation 
or pro-active initiatives are undertaken to structurally improve the level of service. Therefore, the 
logistics services will remain commodity-like and competition will be focused on the lowest price, 
instead of superior quality. This induces even thinner profit margins and stronger competition, 
starting another iteration of the vicious circle. 
 










Figure 1-4. The vicious circle of LSPs (based on E.R. 7) 
 
The challenge  for  LSPs  is  of  course  to  break  out  of  this  vicious  circle  for example  by 
implementing  innovative  software,  logistics  concepts  or  business  models  that  strengthen  their 
bargaining  position  with  respect  to  their  customers.  In  other  words,  they  have  to  become  the 
customer’s partner instead of merely its supplier. Such cooperation between shippers and LSPs is 
in line with the development of LSPs from traditional carrier companies to fully-fledged partners 
that help shippers to structurally improve their logistics performance in an innovative way. This 




LSP type  Description 
(1PL)  In a 1PL concept, logistics activities are not outsourced, but performed in-house by the 
shipper. 
2PL  In the 2PL concept, a shipper outsources transport to a carrier company that is expected to 
perform a number of clear-cut tasks. The planning and organization remain in the hands of 
the shipper. 
3PL  A third party logistics service provider (3PL) allows shippers to outsource a whole package 
of logistics services. This LSP takes the responsibility for the planning and organization and 
in that role communicates with both the shipper and the receiver(s) of the goods. 
4PL  A 4PL concept represents a situation where even the management of logistics activities is 
outsourced. The 4PL focuses entirely on this management task and therefore generally does 
not own logistics assets. This concept becomes beneficial if the 4PL manages multiple 
supply chains amongst which synergies can be exploited. 
Table 1-2. Service based categorisation of LSPs 
 
 
1.3  INNOVATION IN LOGISTICS 
 
The logistics challenges for both shippers and LSPs outlined in the previous section call for 
innovative actions. Particularly the LSPs have to break the vicious circle depicted in Figure 1-4. 
Rogers  (1995)  defines  innovation  as  “an  idea,  practice  or  object  that  is  perceived  new  by  an 
individual or other unit of adoption”. Although there has been quite an explosion in the body of 
literature on innovation since 1980 (see Castellacci et al. (2005) for a recent review), this literature 
has mainly focussed on technical innovation in production environments. Unfortunately, logistics 
research has largely ignored the concept of innovation (Flint et al., 2005). This section introduces 
logistics innovation by discussing the possible types, the influence of organizational learning, the 
possible goals, and finally the speed of adoption. 
 
1.3.1  Types of Logistics Innovation 
‘Logistics innovation’ is defined as: creating logistics value out of new products or services, 
new processes, new transaction types, new relationships or new business models (cf. Verweij and 
Cruijssen, 2006). Logistics value can be either decreased logistics costs, or increased service to 
customers. The definition distinguishes five underlying innovation types that are further developed 
in Table 1-3. Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  10 
 
Type of logistics innovation  Explanation  Example 
Product-innovation   
(service-innovation) 
The accomplishment of new 
products or services. An 
indicator is the share of a 
company’s total budget that 
is spent on Research and 
Development (R&D). 
The introduction of real time tracking and 
tracing for parcel services. Customers can 
constantly track the whereabouts of their 
shipment and are notified in case of 
disruptions. 
     
Process-innovation  Changes in the way products 
or services are performed or 
produced. 
The introduction of a standard load carrier 
that is used by almost every carrier and 
shipper in an industry (e.g. the roll pallet 
in grocery retailing) can significantly 
improve efficiency of logistics processes. 
     
Transaction-innovation  New ways of selling 
products or services. 
If home delivery orders can be placed 
electronically via the Internet, more timely 
and reliable information becomes 
available, so that better delivery routes can 
be constructed. 
     
Relationship-innovation  The development of new 
relationships (vertical, 
horizontal or lateral, see 
Chapter 2). 
Horizontal cooperation between road 
transport companies by means of joint 
route planning (see Chapter 4) can 
considerably cut down transport costs. 
     
Business model-innovation  Changes in a company’s 
overall mode of operation. 
An LSP that disposes of his fleet and turns 
into a 4PL. 
Table 1-3. Five types of logistics innovation 
 
1.3.2  Organizational Learning 
Innovation is closely related to organizational learning. The latter facilitates the former and 
some organizations even consider learning to be a strategic resource that creates a differential 
competitive advantage (Sinkula, 1994). The organizational learning literature is diverse and spans 
multiple disciplines. However, Flint et al. (2005) found four general themes that are useful in the 
context of logistics innovation. 
Firstly,  learning  can  occur  at  various  levels  that  range  from  direct  responses  to  stimuli, 
pondering behaviour, and thinking about the process of learning itself. Low level learning would 
merely  be  a  response  to  a  customer’s  request,  whereas  higher  level  learning  would  involve 
contemplating ways of gaining insight into changes in customers’ desired logistics value, and ways 
of sharing these insights across the organization. Secondly, organizations often find it difficult to 
share tacit knowledge, such as knowledge that is embedded in experience but difficult to articulate, 
and  to  develop  this  into  explicit  knowledge.  If  organizations  have  difficulties  sharing  tacit 
knowledge, such as about changes they sense in their environments and customer behaviour, more 
far-reaching logistics innovations will often not materialize. Thirdly, Huber (1991) states that an Chapter 1: Introduction 
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organization learns if behaviour changes as a result of processing information. This suggests that 
LSPs should actively gather information on changing or unmet customers’ desired logistics value 
from whoever may have that information within or outside the organization. This is a necessary 
condition  for  logistics  innovation  to  take  place.  Finally,  there  is  evidence  that  organizational 
learning is highly idiosyncratic, meaning unique to each organization. Logistics companies may 
learn differently depending on their unique nature, the specific situations in which learning takes 
place,  and  the  cultures  in  which  the  companies  are  embedded.  This  means  that  innovations 
developed by two logistics companies may be entirely different even if inspired by similar market 
and customer trends. 
 
1.3.3  Goals of Innovation 
The  general  underlying  goal  of  each  innovating  firm  is  either  to  resist  or  to  beat  its 
competition. In practice, these goals take the shape of more specific derived goals formulated by 
the company’s (logistics) management. Table 1-4 discusses the goals most often observed in the 
logistics industry 
 
Goal  Explanation/Example 
Improved service  Customer satisfaction is vital in competitive environments, such as the 
logistics industry. An example is that orders by the same customer are 
consolidated into one shipment so that the customer’s dock is visited 
less often. 
Improved quality  Innovative systems can improve the quality level of logistics services. 
For example, trucks can be equipped with apparatus that signal any 
problems so that the number of breakdowns reduces and service 
becomes more reliable. 
Creation of new markets  Cooperation between road transport companies or warehousing firms 
(see e.g. Chapter 2) can significantly expand these companies’ 
geographical coverage. Besides new geographical markets, logistics 
innovation can also create or open up new functional markets. 
Market share increase  Innovative ideas tailored to a specific shipper’s needs can persuade 
this shipper to hire the LSP. 
Extension of service package  Installing an EDI connection with a number of key customers enables 
an LSP to offer additional services, such as inventory replenishment. 
Reduced resources and costs  Implementing a superior route planning tool makes it possible for 
planners to construct more efficient routes, so that the same number of 
shipments can be dealt with by less trucks. 
Reduced environmental damage  With the increased environmental concerns, there is growing 
recognition that issues of environmental pollution accompanying 
industrial development should be addressed simultaneously with the 
operational process of supply chain management, thus contributing to 
the development of so-called ‘green’ supply chains (Sheu et al., 2005). 
Conformance to regulations  It has become customary that city centres are open for trucks only 
during narrow time windows in the morning. Shippers and LSPs have 
to change their ordering and service routines in response to this. 
Table 1-4. Goals of innovation 
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1.3.4  Speed of Adoption 
With  regard  to  the  speed  of  adoption,  three  types  of  logistics  innovations  can  be 
distinguished (Flint et al., 2005). One extreme case is an innovation that is entirely new to the 
logistics industry, such as the introduction of inter-modal containers. This innovation resulted in an 
industry-wide change, and is therefore referred to as a radical innovation. On the other extreme, 
there are incremental innovations, or innovations that have been around for a while and are adopted 
over time by logistics firms that redesign their processes. An example of an incremental innovation 
would be the implementation of a warehouse management system. In between these two extremes 
are so-called middle space innovations (Kahn, 2001), such as the development of an improved 
customer relationship management system. 
In the generally low-tech logistics sector, incremental innovation is most common, because 
of the lower risk involved and the easier implementation trajectory. As indicated in Section 1.2.2, 
this is a result of the industry’s strong cost-focus, which makes it hard for companies to get round 
their day-to-day operational woes and worries and take a bird’s eye view and critically assess their 
core inefficiencies. Loosely speaking, incremental innovation can help to resist competition and 
protect market shares, but to beat competition and strongly increase market shares, more radical 
innovation  is  called  for. Germain  (1996)  found  a positive  correlation  between  the costs  of  an 
innovation and its radicalness. Especially when the innovation must come from an LSP, this is a 
serious impediment for radical innovations, because, as illustrated in Section 1.2.2, their margins 
are often very thin. In order to still be able to develop or implement innovative projects, a possible 
solution might be for LSPs to turn to horizontal cooperation. 
 
 
1.4  HORIZONTAL COOPERATION IN TRANSPORT AND LOGISTICS 
 
Horizontal cooperation is a relationship-innovation that, when managed appropriately (see 
e.g. Verstrepen et al., 2006), is quite cheap and can help LSPs and logistics departments of other 
companies to take a stand against the severe pressure on logistics efficiency resulting from the 
developments described in Section 1.1. We limit the scope to horizontal cooperation on logistics 
activities  on  the  landside.  Therefore,  for  the  purpose  of  this  thesis  horizontal  cooperation  in 
transport and logistics is defined as follows: 
 
Horizontal cooperation in transport and logistics is active cooperation between two or more firms 
that operate on the same level of the supply chain and perform a comparable logistics function on 
the landside. 
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Furthermore, in the context of horizontal cooperation it is of little importance whether the 
cooperators are LSPs or shippers. Key is that the cooperating companies have direct control over 
the planning and execution of the logistics activities under consideration. 
Horizontal cooperation in transport and logistics is the subject of this thesis. A detailed 
discussion of amongst others the available academic literature, practical examples, opportunities, 




1.5  RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Having sketched the most relevant trends in logistics, the challenges for shippers and LSPs, 
the need for innovation and the concept of horizontal cooperation, the current section describes the 
research design employed. The thesis is practice oriented in the sense that most of the results are 
based on real-life datasets. In case studies conducted, the most important goal was always to learn 
lessons that are applicable in other cases or industries as well. On the other hand, in chapters that 
have a more theoretical point of departure (e.g. Chapter 4), efforts are made to draw conclusions 
that are directly applicable in practice. 
 
1.5.1  Main Objective 
The fast growing presence and importance of horizontal cooperation in the contemporary 
logistics industry (see Chapter 3) calls for a stronger basis in formal literature, which has largely 
ignored the topic until now. Therefore, the main objective of this thesis is to identify the relevant 
research components and to instigate academic exploration of the topic. Hopefully, the developed 
insights and results encourage academics to further develop this interesting topic, and logistics 
managers to consider horizontal cooperation as a new solution to the challenges that their operation 
is confronted with. 
 
1.5.2  Research Questions 
The main objective is further developed by means of the following five specific research 
questions that will be addressed: 
(Q1)  What  are  the  expected  cost  savings  of  horizontal  cooperation  through  joint  route 
planning? 
(Q2)  To  what  extent  do  logistics  practitioners  consider  horizontal  cooperation  a  viable 
business approach? 
(Q3)  Is  there  a  relation  between  a  company’s  (financial)  characteristics  and  its  attitude 
towards horizontal cooperation? Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  14 
(Q4)  Do regional differences exist between LSPs’ attitudes towards horizontal cooperation? 
(Q5)  Which logistics concepts can be used to enable horizontal cooperation? 
   
In the remainder of this thesis, these research questions will be answered more or less in the 
order in which they are presented above (see Figure 1-5 in Section 1.6 below). 
 
1.5.3  Methodology 
Research on horizontal cooperation in transport and logistics is still in its infancy and has 
links to fields ranging from psychology and sociology to operations research and mathematics, 
although it is admitted that the sociological and psychological aspects of horizontal cooperation 
will only be discussed obliquely in this thesis. 
The consequence of this wide range is that many different research techniques are used in 
this thesis. These include case study analysis, surveys, exploratory factor analysis, regression, game 
theory,  vehicle  routing  heuristics,  and  facility  location  heuristics.  Depending  on  the  research 
question under consideration, the most suitable technique is chosen. 
 
 
1.6  OUTLINE 
 
Figure 1-5 gives the outline of the thesis. The abbreviations Q1-Q5 refer to the research 
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Figure 1-5. Outline of the thesis (HC=Horizontal cooperation in transport and logistics) 
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The remainder of this  thesis consists of four major parts. To start PART I, Chapter 2 surveys 
the relevant literature. Although the field itself is underdeveloped, valuable lessons can be learned 
from related existing literature. Once this academic basis is laid, Chapter 3 takes on a practical 
perspective by developing a typology of horizontal cooperation initiatives encountered in practice. 
Finally, in Chapter 4 the savings from horizontal cooperation in the form of joint route planning in 
a  road  transport  setting  will  be  estimated.  In  a  sense,  this  is  the  ‘purest’  form  of  horizontal 
cooperation in transport and logistics as considered in this thesis. 
PART II is the empirical part and also consists of three chapters. Chapter 5 provides the 
basis  in  the  form  of  a  large-scale  survey  in  Flanders  that  measures  LSPs’  attitudes  towards 
opportunities and impediments for horizontal cooperation. Chapter 6 then uses the outcomes of this 
survey in search for significant relations between company characteristics and attitudes towards 
horizontal cooperation. To finish PART II, Chapter 7 introduces a similar survey organized in the 
Netherlands and makes a comparative analysis between the two regions. 
PART III shows how innovative logistics concepts can facilitate horizontal cooperation. The 
three chapters of this part are devoted to Factory Gate Pricing (Chapter 8), Insinking (Chapter 9) 
and Joint Hub Network Development (Chapter 10). 
In  the  last  part  of  this  thesis,  PART  IV,  conclusions  and  recommendations  for  further 
research are formulated. Here, also research questions Q1-Q5 will be revisited collectively. 
The thesis is structured in such a way that individual chapters can be read in isolation as 
well. Every chapter starts which a brief introduction of items developed in previous chapters that 
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Having  introduced  the  common  trends  and  challenges  that  logistics  companies  face,  in  the 
following chapters the subject of this thesis is introduced: horizontal cooperation in transport and 
logistics. This discussion consists of three parts. First, a broad literature review of horizontal 
cooperation in transport and logistics and related fields is provided. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first time such an overview is made. Second, horizontal cooperation is regarded from a 
practical  perspective.  Based  on  cases  encountered  in  practice  and  the  lessons  learned  from 
literature,  a  typology  for  horizontal  cooperation  initiatives  is  constructed.  Finally,  Chapter  4 
zooms in on a basic form of horizontal cooperation, joint route planning, to estimate the potential 
savings and their sensitivity to various market characteristics. At the end of PART I the subject of 
this thesis will be clearly defined and positioned. Moreover, the underlying motive of attaining 
synergy will be illustrated and quantified. 
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2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1993, eight competing medium-sized Dutch producers of sweets and candy came to an 
agreement of intensive cooperation designed to increase the efficiency of their delivery processes. 
Together, they supplied 250 drop-off points (e.g. retail distribution centres), the majority of which 
received goods from more than one of the eight producers on a daily basis. A Logistics Service 
Provider (LSP) was hired to consolidate and deliver the shipments from these eight companies to 
their customers. The prime goal of the cooperation was to cut transport costs, but at the same time 
customer  service  was  increased  because  the  consolidated  shipments  reduced  the  number  of 
deliveries, which in turn reduced unloading and handling costs. Moreover, customers were able to 
access a broader product assortment more easily. This cooperation, called Zoetwaren Distributie 
Nederland (ZDN: Dutch Sweets Distribution) has proved quite successful and still exists today. 
As  will  be  shown  in  the  next  chapter,  initiatives  such  as  ZDN  are  encountered  more 
frequently in practice. The shortening of product life cycles, fierce competition in global markets 
and the heightened expectations of customers have caused companies’ profit margins to shrink. As 
a result, there exists a strong incentive to decrease the costs of non-value adding activities, such as 
basic distribution and warehousing. Burgers et al. (1993) argue that organizational inertia makes it 
difficult for firms to internally develop or purchase the capabilities required to deal with rapidly 
changing  demand  conditions.  Moreover,  the  accumulating  number  of  mergers  and  acquisitions 
within  the  logistics  industry  provides  an  impetus  for  companies  to  re-optimise  their  logistics 
processes. Consequently, the logistics market is undergoing a fundamental reorganization and since 
the potential of internal logistics optimisation is almost completely exploited, attention has shifted 
to better managing external relations in the supply chain (Skjoett-Larsen, 2000).  
When redesigning logistics processes, one of the most fundamental choices that companies 
face is whether to i) outsource, ii) keep logistics execution in-house, or iii) seek cooperation with 
comparable companies to exploit synergies (Razzaque and Sheng, 1998). In production terms, this 
is called the make/buy/ally decision. Since today’s demanding customers expect their goods to be 
delivered to the right place, at he right time, in the right amount, in perfect condition and all at the 
lowest price, companies often experience difficulties in satisfying these demands individually or by 
means  of  dyadic  outsourcing  relationships  with  LSPs. This  has resulted in the  third  option  of 
closely cooperating with other companies becoming more and more viable. Cooperation can occur 
in many ways. Commonly, a cooperative supply chain is characterised by its structure: vertical, 
horizontal, and lateral (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002).  Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  20 
Firstly, Supply chain management is the term describing vertical cooperation, a topic that 
boasts an abundant amount of formal literature. Simchi-Levi et al. (2000) define supply chain 
management as “the set of approaches utilized to efficiently integrate suppliers, manufacturers, 
warehouses, and stores, so that merchandise is produced and distributed in the right quantities, to 
the right locations, and at the right time, in order to minimise system wide costs while satisfying 
service level requirements”. This definition indicates that supply chain management is aimed at 
installing  beneficial  cooperations  and  seamless  linkages  between  parties  operating  at  different 
levels of the supply chain to avoid unnecessary logistics costs, or ‘waste’. The key drivers of such 
costs  savings  are  inventory  and  transport  reductions,  logistics  facilities  or  equipment 
rationalisation,  and  better  information  usage.  Examples  of  vertical  cooperation  are  Vendor 
Managed  Inventory  (VMI),  Efficient  Consumer  Response  (ECR),  and  Collaborative,  Planning, 
Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR).  
Secondly, the European Union (2001) defines horizontal cooperation as “concerted practices 
between companies operating at the same level(s) in the market”. These can be either competing or 
unrelated companies that share private information, facilities or resources to reduce costs and/or 
improve  service.  Some  examples  of  horizontal  cooperation  in  logistics  are  Manufacturers 
Consolidation Centres (MCCs), joint route planning, and purchasing groups. Chapter 3 examines 
more types of horizontal cooperation in detail. Because of the dominant bargaining positions of 
some  parties  active  on  adjacent  levels  of  the  supply  chain,  it  can  be  argued  that  horizontal 
cooperation can only occur if it is tolerated by some degree of (implicit) vertical cooperation. 
However, this vertical cooperation may better be described as ‘vertical approval’ by the dominant 
party,  because  the  tolerating  or  facilitating  company  does  not  play  an  active  role  in  the  core 
activities of the cooperation. In this thesis, such an active role is required to be considered a full 
member of the cooperation (cf. the definition of horizontal cooperation in transport and logistics in 
Section 1.4). Vertical approval can however be very important for the chances of success of a 
horizontal  cooperation.  This  is  because  differences  in  bargaining  positions  mostly  manifest 
themselves along vertical links in supply chains, rather than on horizontal links. For example in the 
food retail industry, retailers have a dominant bargaining power over their suppliers (cf. Chapter 8). 
Therefore,  vertical  approval  by  the  retailer  is  essential  when  suppliers  consider  starting  up  a 
horizontal  cooperation,  such  as  the  joint  route  planning  cooperation  that  will  be  described  in 
Chapter 4. An example of vertical approval facilitating horizontal cooperation is a retailer settling 
for a somewhat lower service level to enable suppliers or LSPs to optimise the costs of their 
delivery processes by means of joint route planning. If on the other hand the dominant retailers 
themselves  engage  in  horizontal  cooperation,  which  is  for  example  the  case  in  the  Insinking 
concept of Chapter 9, vertical approval is unnecessary. Chapter 2: Literature 
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Finally,  Simatupang  and  Sridharan  (2002)  define  a  lateral  cooperation  as  a  cooperation 
aimed at gaining more flexibility by actively combining and sharing capabilities in both vertical 
and horizontal manners. The goal of lateral cooperations is to synchronise shippers and LSPs of 
multiple companies in an effective logistics network.  
Whereas much has been written about both vertical cooperation in supply chains and lateral 
cooperation in supply networks, the literature on horizontal cooperation in transport and logistics is 
still in its infancy, especially where operational consequences are concerned. However, this type of 
cooperation is becoming more and more relevant in practice. The empirical research that will be 
discussed in Chapter 5 has indicated that generally LSPs consider horizontal cooperation to be an 
interesting approach to decrease cost, improve service or protect market positions. As a result, 
many  horizontal  cooperation  initiatives  are  developing.  In  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands,  the 
European logistics centre of gravity, there are over 50 formally articulated horizontal logistics 
cooperations, having varying success. This practical relevance has provided the impetus for the 
review of available literature on horizontal cooperation and closely related fields in this chapter. As 
mentioned  in  Chapter  1,  horizontal  cooperation  is  also  very  interesting  from  a  theoretical 
perspective, because it can be approached by various disciplines, offering a forum for, amongst 
others, economists, operations researchers and psychologists. The purpose of this chapter is to 
provide the starting point for intensified future research on the topic of horizontal cooperation. 
Literature has lacked such a broad review until now. Many of the elements that come up here will 
be elaborated on in later chapters. 
This chapter is hereafter organized as follows. In  Section 2.2, the concept of horizontal 
cooperation  is  discussed  in  detail  by  reviewing  the  literature  and  identifying  various 
categorisations. Then,  three  sections  are  devoted  to factors  that  influence  the establishment  of 
horizontal cooperations. These are, respectively, opportunities (Section 2.3), impediments (Section 
2.4), and facilitators (Section 2.5). Finally, Section 2.6 concludes. 
 
 
2.2  HORIZONTAL COOPERATION 
 
Horizontal  cooperation  is  about  identifying  and  exploiting  win-win  situations  between 
companies active at the same level of the supply chain in order to increase performance. These 
companies can be suppliers, manufacturers, retailers, receivers (customers), or LSPs. Horizontal 
cooperation  requires  inter-firm  coordination,  a  concept  that  is  well  studied  in  organizational 
literature.  Inter-firm  networks  denote  complex  arrangements  of  cooperative,  rather  than 
competitive, relationships between legally independent, but economically dependent companies 
(Pfohl and Buse, 2000; Sydow et al., 1995). For a detailed discussion of inter-firm networks from 
an organizational theory perspective, see Grandori and Soda (1995) and Nooteboom (2004). Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  22 
 
2.2.1  Horizontal Relationships 
Horizontal cooperation can take place between competing companies and between unrelated 
companies. Bengtsson and Kock (1999) identify four types of horizontal relationships, each with a 
different degree of cooperation and competition. Firstly, Co-existence refers to a relationship that 
does  not  include  any  economic  exchanges  and  where  the  companies’  goals  are  stipulated 
independently. Secondly, there is Cooperation, where tight bonds exist between companies that 
define and pursue common goals. The third type of horizontal relationships is basic Competition. 
This relationship is characterised by an action-reaction pattern as companies rely on the same or 
comparable suppliers and target the same group of customers. Finally, there is the relationship of 
Co-opetition,  which  is  a  common  relationship  for  logistics  companies,  which  cooperate 
horizontally. In this type of relationship, goals are jointly stipulated if the competitors cooperate, 
but not in cases when they compete. Co-opetition is especially beneficial if cooperation takes place 
for non-core  activities,  while  competition remains unchanged for core  activities. The  non-core 
activities involving cooperation are preferably not visible to the customer (cf. 0). Bengtsson and 
Kock (2000) consider visibility for the customer as the most important characteristic in determining 
whether competition or cooperation should take place for a certain activity. For example, if there is 
cooperation between retailers for logistics activities, competition and differentiation can remain 
unchanged for other domains such as product prices and assortments. Co-opetition must not be 
seen as dangerous. Instead, top management should understand and communicate to organizational 
members  that  cooperation  and  competition  can  be  applied  simultaneously,  and  that  both  can 
contribute to achieving organizational goals (Bengtsson and Kock, 1999). More information on co-
opetition can be found in Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) and Zineldin (2004). Later on in this 
thesis, three enabling concepts for horizontal cooperation will be discussed, where the horizontal 
relationship can be characterized as co-opetition (see PART III). 
 
2.2.2  Types of Cooperation 
Various types and designations of cooperative horizontal supply chain relationships have 
been discussed in both professional and academic literature. Cooperation, collaboration, alliances, 
and partnershipping are all used to refer to concerted practices on horizontal supply chain links. 
However, a high level of ambiguity exists between the definitions and characteristics of these 
relationships.  Some  authors  explicitly  discriminate  between  these  appellations.  For  example, 
Mentzer et al. (2000) report that a focus group of twenty interviewed supply chain executives felt 
strongly  that  collaboration  entails  much  more  than  cooperation,  especially  in terms  of  sharing 
information, risks, knowledge and profits. Golicic et al. (2003) also interviewed a focus group to 
construct a descriptor of relationships in terms of ‘magnitude’ or ‘closeness’. Again one focus 
group member indicated that collaboration requires a higher level of closeness than cooperation, Chapter 2: Literature 
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the difference being that with collaboration there must be a willingness to take an active role in 
making  decisions  and  sharing  more  information.  Most  often  however,  the  terms  are  used 
interchangeably, or the boundary between them is vague. For theory to be validated and advanced, 
a construct must however have a single, clear definition. For managers, ambiguity in these terms 
will  lead  to  misconceived  expectations  (cf.  Golicic  et  al.,  2003).  There  is  a  large  degree  of 
consensus about which two types of relationships can be considered as the minimum and maximum 
levels of cooperation. These are, respectively, arm’s length relationships and integrated (merged) 
firms (see also the subsection below). In between these two extremes however, there exists a whole 
range of cooperation types and/or names that can be perceived as ‘fuzzy’ and lacking structure. To 
illustrate this, an anthology in provided below of sometimes overlapping relationships all of which 
are referred to as being ‘cooperative’: service agreements, joint ventures, cooperatives, consortia, 
cooperative agreements, licensing, industry standard groups, action sets, (non)equity agreements, 
collaboratives, mutually adaptives, bilateral governance, alliances, collaborative supply chains, 
supply networks, and partnerships. Although some authors provide separate descriptions of some 
of these types, generally accepted definitions and distinctions are still lacking. 
The next sections aim at structuring the cooperative relationships in between arm’s length 
cooperation and integration. From here on, to avoid Babel-like confusion, all these relationships 
will be summarised as cooperations. Moreover, a restriction is made to horizontal manifestations 
of cooperation. Three important dimensions categorize horizontal cooperations. These are: 1) level 
of integration, 2) centralisation, and 3) scope and intensity. 
 
Level of Integration 
Lambert  et  al.  (1999)  identify  three  types  of  cooperation  depending  on  the  level  of 
integration (see Figure 2-1). Although this categorisation was initially designed for vertical supply 
chain relationships, it can straightforwardly be translated to accommodate horizontal cooperation. 
This spectrum is completed on the left-hand side by Arm’s length cooperation, and on the right-
hand side by Horizontal integration, which are not considered to be genuine horizontal cooperation 
in the context of this thesis. 
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Figure 2-1. Horizontal cooperation and the level of integration (inspired by Lambert et al., 1999) 
 
In an arm’s length cooperation, communication is of an incidental nature and companies may 
cooperate over a long period of time, involving only a limited number of exchanges. There is no 
strong sense of joint commitment or joint operations. An example in the logistics industry is if one 
LSP  subcontracts  a  comparable  LSP  in  the  event  of  a  capacity  shortage.  This  horizontal 
subcontracting is discussed in detail by Spiegel (1993).  
One can only speak of real cooperation if “there is a tailored relationship based on mutual 
trust, openness, shared risk and shared rewards that yields a competitive advantage, resulting in 
business performance greater than would be achieved by firms individually” (Lambert et al., 1999). 
As illustrated in Figure 2-1, horizontal cooperation can be subdivided into three types. A Type I 
cooperation consists of mutually recognised partners that coordinate their activities and planning, 
though to a limited degree. The time horizon is short-term and the cooperation involves only a 
single  activity  or  division  of  each  partner  company.  Type  II  is  a  cooperation  in  which  the 
participants not merely coordinate, but also integrate part of their business planning. The horizon is 
of a long though finite length and multiple divisions or functions of the companies are involved. In 
Type III cooperations, the participants have integrated their operations to a significant level and 
each company regards the other(s) as an extension of itself. Typically, there is no fixed end date for 
such a cooperation. Type III cooperations are often referred to in literature as ‘strategic alliances’. 
Whereas the Type I and II cooperations are characterised by the absence of a formal contract, a 
horizontal strategic alliance is defined as a long-term (generally three years or more) explicit 
contractual agreement pertaining to an exchange and/or combination of some, but not all, of a 
firm’s resources  with one  or  more  competitors (Burgers  et  al.,  1993).  Strategic  alliances  have 
attracted considerable academic interest, see Todeva and Knoke (2005) for a review. They identify 
thirteen types of strategic alliances based on the level of integration and governance formalisation, 
ranging from market relations (lowest level) to hierarchical relations (highest level, such as mergers 
and  acquisitions).  This  again  indicates  that  there  exists  ambiguity  in  the  definition  and 
interpretation of the strategic alliance concept. The definition of Burgers et al. (1993) is used to 
emphasize  the  contractual  binding  and  stronger  sense  of  common  goals  and  challenges  as 
compared to Type I and II horizontal cooperations.  Chapter 2: Literature 
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The extreme case of horizontal cooperation is a merger between companies. Bower (2001) 
distinguishes five distinct types of horizontal mergers (see Table 2-1). 
 
Merger type  Motives 
Overcapacity merger  Aimed at restructuring an industry that is inefficient due 
to structural overcapacity. 
Product or Market extension merger  Used to gain access to new products or (geographical) 
markets. 
Geographic roll-up merger  Used to attain growth and efficiency gains in 
geographically fragmented markets. 
Research and Development (R&D) merger  Aimed at obtaining or transferring R&D knowledge. 
Industry convergence merger  Aimed at creating a whole new industry by joining 
powers of eroding industries. 
Table 2-1. Horizontal merger types according to Bower (2001) 
 
Although some authors regard a strategic alliance to be a suitable base for a merger between 
the partners (e.g. Nanda and Williamson, 1995), Hagedoorn and Sadowski (1999) argue that these 
transitions only rarely occur (2.6% of all strategic alliances). An elaborate study of horizontal 
acquisitions can be found in Häkkinen (2005). 
 
Scope and Intensity 
Zinn  and  Parasuraman  (1997)  introduce  a  typology  of  so-called  logistics-based  strategic 
alliances. Although in principle this typology is set up for vertical cooperation, it has a direct 
interpretation for horizontal cooperation as well. It is based on two dimensions, being the scope and 
the intensity of the relationship between the partners. Scope is defined as the range of services for 
which cooperation takes place, and intensity is defined as the extent of direct involvement that 
exists between partners. Possible indicators of intensity are the sum of assets invested and the 
number  of  working  hours  dedicated  to  maintaining  the  cooperation.  The  level  of  intensity  is 
proportional to the difficulty that a participant encounters if he should wish to replace one or more 
of his partners by other companies.  
Based  on  these  two  dimensions,  Zinn  and  Parasuraman  (1997)  classify  logistics-based 
strategic alliances into four general types as displayed in Figure 2-2. In their paper, the authors 
provide illustrative examples of each of these generic types, as well as a list of their respective 
advantages and disadvantages. 




























Figure 2-2. Classification based on scope and intensity, based on Zinn and Parasuraman (1997) 
 
2.2.3  Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics 
In the previous sections horizontal cooperation has been discussed in terms of general firms. 
This  section  will  focus  on  horizontal  cooperation  in  transport  and  logistics  in  particular.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, for the purpose of this thesis logistics horizontal cooperation is defined as: 
active cooperation between two or more firms that operate on the same level of the supply chain 
and perform a comparable logistics function on the landside. Whereas horizontal cooperation is 
well  documented  for  the  maritime  shipping  and  aviation  industry,  the  literature  on  horizontal 
cooperation in logistics and transport on the landside is fairly limited.  
In maritime shipping, conferences are a common concept. A conference is a cooperation of 
ocean carriers that offer their services on a specific transport line against collective tariffs and 
identical  service  levels  (van  Eekhout,  2001).  These  conferences  offer  advantages  such  as 
economies of scale as a result of larger volumes shipped and improved customer service (Shepperd 
and  Seidman,  2001).  Moreover,  conferences  prevent  price  wars  by  offering  rate  stability. 
Generally, shippers oppose conferences because they feel that the ability of carriers to effectively 
compete  is  greatly  reduced  by  membership  of  a  conference  (Clarke,  1997).  The  frequent 
investigations into this claim have for example resulted in a series of US government acts dating 
from as early as 1916 through 1998 (cf. Lewis and Vellenga, 2000).  
Horizontal cooperation also plays a dominant role in aviation. Some examples of airliner 
cooperation  are:  Skyteam  (9  airlines),  Star  Alliance  (16  airlines),  Qualifier  (11  airlines),  and 
OneWorld (8 airlines). Economically, there are of course strong incentives for airlines to operate 
dense  international  networks.  Growth  through  mergers  and  acquisitions  may  provide  a  strong 
expansion of a network. However, the granting of international traffic rights is largely confined to 
specific carriers substantially owned by individual countries. This has left cooperation between 
independent carriers as an effective compromise to international carriers, thus increasing the joint Chapter 2: Literature 
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market power (Fan et al., 2001). In addition to the increased customer service that is offered, 
aviation cooperations (in literature these cooperations are commonly referred to as ‘alliances’) 
enable higher load factors for aircrafts and more efficient back office organization. For further 
information on airline alliances, see e.g. Park (1997) and Oum et al. (2000). 
Although  horizontal  cooperation  in  aviation  and  maritime  shipping  share  some  of  the 
opportunities, impediments and facilitators (see below) with horizontal cooperation on the landside, 
the different playing fields make it hard to draw conclusions for landside logistics. For example, 
market power considerations (and the probability of collusive actions) are much more prevalent 
than in the generally competitive landside transport sector with its many players. Secondly, ocean 
and air transport are different from landside transport since assets are more capital intensive and 
average  hauls  are  much  longer.  Finally,  the  preferential  treatment  of  domestic  airliners  in  the 
granting of traffic rights, which is the dominant driver for horizontal cooperation in aviation, does 
not play a role in landside transport. Taking these important differences into account, we choose 
not to include a detailed analysis of horizontal cooperation in air and ocean transport in this thesis. 
More information on this topic can be found in the respective survey papers (see the discussions 
above). 
In  contrast  to  ocean  and  air  transport,  literature  on  horizontal  cooperation  in  landside 
logistics is quite scarce. Here the most relevant publications on horizontal cooperation in logistics 
on the landside are discussed in chronological order. Firstly, Caputo and Mininno (1999) discuss 
horizontal integration of logistics functions in the Italian grocery industry. Various policies that 
competing companies can adopt to reduce total logistics costs are examined, such as standardized 
pallets and cartons, multi-supplier warehouses, multi-distributor centres, co-ordinated routing and 
joint outsourcing. Erdmann (1999) also discusses this subject and constructs a model to estimate 
the synergy potential in the German consumer goods industry. In another contribution, Vos et al. 
(2002) elaborate on horizontal cooperation by defining three types of synergy: operational synergy, 
coordination synergy and network synergy. This typology is based on the scope of the cooperation 
(see Section 2.2.2). Operational synergy concerns only a single process or activity. Secondly, if the 
cooperation takes place across several activities and there exists harmonisation of these processes, 
coordination synergy is exploited. Finally, network synergy resembles a cooperative restructuring 
of a complete logistics network by multiple partners. This typology shows a strong analogy with 
the type I/II/III classification for general cooperation by Lambert et al. (1999), discussed in Section 
2.2.2. Bahrami (2002) refers to economies of scale in joint transport as cost sub-additivity, offering 
a real-life case study of two German consumer goods manufacturers (Henkel and Scharzkopf) that 
have merged their respective distribution activities. Three scenarios are compared: 1) the present 
situation without cooperation, 2) joint distribution within the current logistics structures, and 3) 
optimisation of the logistics structure based on the aggregate demand of both companies. The 
results indicate that scenario 2 saves 2.4% as compared to the base case in scenario 1, and scenario Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  28 
3 saves 9.8%. The author calls Scenario 2 ‘process innovation’ and scenario 3 is referred to as 
‘structure optimisation’. The fifth paper is by Hageback and Segerstedt (2004) who study joint 
transport in the small and remote municipality of Pajala in Northern Sweden. In order to stay 
competitive, the approximately twenty companies located in the region must cooperate to better fill 
arriving and departing trucks that connect Pajala with Sweden’s economic centre in the south of the 
country. The authors call this ‘co-distribution’ and state that this is vital both for the companies and 
the municipality of Pajala. Possible cost savings are estimated around 33%. The most important 
problem with launching co-distribution seems to be the unfamiliarity of the companies’ managers 
with innovative logistics concepts and sometimes even with the logistics market in general. Finally, 
Frisk  et  al.  (2006)  discuss  the  topic  of  horizontal  cooperation  in  the  Swedish  forestry  sector. 
Transport efficiency is crucial is this sector, because on average it corresponds to as much as one 
third of total production costs. The authors focus on the usage of cooperative game theory to 
allocate the costs of joint transport. These game-theoretic allocation rules are compared to practical 
rules of thumb. 
 
 
2.3  OPPORTUNITIES  OF  HORIZONTAL  COOPERATION  IN  TRANSPORT  AND 
LOGISTICS 
 
The overall driving force behind a cooperation is each participant’s expectation of a positive 
net present value of the project (Parkhe, 1993). By cooperating, partners can generate so-called 
relational  rents,  which  are  defined  by  Dyer  and  Sing  (1998)  as  “supernormal  profits  jointly 
generated in a relationship that cannot be generated by either firm in isolation and can only be 
created through the joint idiosyncratic contributions of the specific partners.” This relational rent 
can also be referred to as synergy. It is argued that cooperating firms can generate relational rents 
through relation-specific assets, knowledge-sharing routines, complementary resource endowments 
and effective governance. In a logistics context, relational rents can be ‘hard’ (e.g. economies of 
scale)  and  ‘soft’  (e.g.  learning).  Bartlett  and  Ghoshal  (2004)  mention  three  ways  in  which 
cooperating firms can reap these benefits. These are: i) pooling their resources and concentrating 
on  (core-)  activities,  ii)  sharing  and  leveraging  the  specific  strengths  and  capabilities  of 
participating firms, and iii) trading different or complementary resources to achieve mutual gains. 
As  mentioned  above,  literature  on  horizontal  cooperation  in  logistics  as  such  is  scarce. 
However, theoretical support for its opportunities (and its impediments) can be found in papers on 
more general types of cooperation in the organizational theory, marketing and logistics literature. 
Although these cooperations generally have a vertical (e.g. buyer-supplier) perspective, some of 
their  goals  have  an  interpretation  for  horizontal  cooperation  as  well.  This  section  presents  an 
overview of opportunities that may trigger potential partners to engage in horizontal cooperation. Chapter 2: Literature 
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They are divided into three groups: costs and productivity, customer service, and market position. 
In Table 2-2, relevant references for specific opportunities are provided. Note that given the vast 
amount of literature on general business cooperation, these references will not be exhaustive. 
 
2.3.1  Costs and Productivity 
As mentioned above, cooperation provides companies with a platform to access the skills 
and capabilities of their partners (Kogut, 1988; Westney, 1988; Hamel, 1991). In this way, they can 
improve their own operational processes by increasing the ability to control costs and to reduce the 
costs of the supply chain (Gibson et al., 2002). Moreover, cooperation on non-core activities offers 
the potential of joint purchases (e.g. of trucks, onboard computers and fuel) in order to reduce 
purchasing costs (Dyer and Singh, 1998). The fact that cooperation on non-core activities is less 
visible to the customers renders this kind of cooperation less complicated (cf. 0). 
 
2.3.2  Customer Service 
The impact of cooperative specialisation for productivity is well known. Best practice value 
chains are characterised by interfirm specialisation allowing individual firms to focus on a narrow 
range of activities and engage in complex interactions with other firms (e.g. Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972; Dyer, 1997). In doing so, cooperation not only offers benefits such as economies of scale, 
skilled labour force, high R&D level and access to superior technology, but also generates greater 
customer  value  added  at  lower  cost  (Zineldin  and  Bredenlöw,  2003).  Moreover,  cooperation 
enables companies to learn from each other’s skills and capabilities (Kogut, 1988; Westney, 1988; 
Hamel, 1991), which is another potential source of quality improvement at lower costs. 
 
2.3.3  Market Position 
The  sheer  size  of  the  volumes  involved  in  serving  large  industrial  shippers  sometimes 
prohibits LSPs from entering a tendering process on an individual basis. Horizontal cooperation is 
a useful tool to expand the available fleet, service range and geographic coverage, and, as a result, 
to increase the number of potential customers (Bleeke and Ernst, 1995). Moreover, it can provide a 
safeguard for companies in uncertain market conditions and enhance their competitive position or 
market power (Kogut, 1988). Finally, horizontal cooperation can be a very effective way of sharing 
the large investments needed for R&D projects. In this way, the uncertain payoff of these projects 
can be shared across the companies participating in the cooperation. Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  30 
 
Opportunities  Identified by 
   
Costs and productivity   
Cost reduction  Hennart (1991); Frankel and Whipple (1996); Erdmann (1999); 
Lambert et al. (1999); Mentzer et al. (2000); Simchi-Levi et al. 
(2000);  McLaren  et  al.  (2002);  Simatupang  and  Sridharan 
(2002); Esper and Williams (2003); Nooteboom (2004); Zineldin 
(2004); Todeva and Knoke (2005) 
Learning  and  internalisation  of  tacit, 
collective  and  embedded  knowledge 
and skills 
Contractor and Lorange (1988); Kogut (1988); Ohmae (1989); 
Hennart  (1991);  Hagedoorn  (1993);  Mentzer  et  al.  (2000); 
Simchi-Levi et al. (2000); Todeva and Knoke (2005) 
More skilled (or more efficient use of) 
labour force 
Mentzer  et  al.  (2000);  Simchi-Levi  et  al.  (2000);  Nooteboom 
(2004); Zineldin (2004) 
   
Customer service   
Complementary goods and services  Contractor  and  Lorange  (1988);  Barratt  (2004);  Nooteboom 
(2004); Todeva and Knoke (2005) 
Ability  to  comply  to  strict  customer 
requirements/Improved service 
Ohmae (1989); Bowersox (1990); Frankel and Whipple (1996); 
Lambert  et  al.  (1999);  Mentzer  et  al.  (2000);  McLaren  et  al. 
(2002); Simatupang and Sridharan (2002); Esper and Williams 
(2003); Zineldin (2004) 
Specialisation  Mentzer et al. (2000) 
   
Market position   
Penetrating new markets  Contractor and Lorange (1988); Ohmae (1989); Hennart (1991); 
Hagedoorn (1993); Fearne (1994); Erdmann (1999); Frankel and 
Whipple  (1996);  Lambert  et  al.  (1999);  Simchi-Levi  et  al. 
(2000); Nooteboom (2004); Zineldin (2004); Todeva and Knoke 
(2005) 
New product development/R&D  Contractor  and  Lorange  (1988);  Ohmae  (1989);  Hagedoorn 
(1993); Fearne (1994); Lambert et al. (1999); Zineldin (2004) 
Serving larger customers  Bowersox (1990); Simchi-Levi et al. (2000) 
Protecting market share  Bowersox  (1990);  Frankel  and  Whipple  (1996);  Erdmann 
(1999); Lambert et al. (1999) 
Faster speed to market  Lambert et al. (1999); Mentzer et al. (2000); Nooteboom (2004) 
   
Other   
Developing technical standards  Nooteboom (2004); Todeva and Knoke (2005) 
Accessing superior technology  Contractor  and  Lorange  (1988);  Frankel  and  Whipple  (1996); 
Lambert et al. (1999); Simchi-Levi et al. (2000); Zineldin (2004) 
Overcoming legal/regulatory barriers  Bowersox (1990); Hennart (1991); Nooteboom (2004); Todeva 
and Knoke (2005) 
Enhancing public image  Mentzer et al. (2000) 
Table 2-2. Opportunities of horizontal cooperation 
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Sometimes, there are limits to the extent to which companies are allowed to benefit from 
these opportunities. For example, Todeva and Knoke (2005) also mention a cartel as a form of 
cooperation.  Competition  law  does  however  not  allow  this  kind  of  (horizontal)  cooperation, 
because it restricts competition (see Vogelaar (2002) for a discussion of horizontal cooperation and 
European  Commission  (EC)  competition  law).  EC  competition  rules in  particular  prohibit  any 
agreements  between  undertakings  that  are  restrictive  of  competition. This  prohibition  not  only 
covers  the  most  explicit  and  manifestly  restrictive  agreements,  such  as  agreements  between 
competitors  to  set  prices,  to  share  customers/markets  or  to  limit  production,  but  also  any 
agreements  or  understandings  between  undertakings  that  might  produce  the  same  effect. 
Competition  might  be  restricted  if  the  horizontal  cooperation  involves  players  that  together 
constitute  a  market  share  of  over  10%.  Fortunately,  if  cooperation  takes  place  between  large 
industrial shippers this most often concerns non-core activities. If on the other hand, cooperation 
takes place between LSPs, the current major fragmentation in this sector (cf. Chapter 6) ensures 
that partners will generally not reach the critical 10% market share. 
It can be observed that different objectives give rise to different manifestations of horizontal 
cooperation. The nature and structure of these manifestations that are encountered in practice differ 
widely. They range from ad hoc freight exchanges between a limited number of partners to e.g. the 
joint operation of multimodal freight platforms. In Chapter 3 a typology is introduced in which 
thirteen practical manifestations of horizontal cooperation in transport and logistics are categorized. 
 
 
2.4  IMPEDIMENTS  FOR  HORIZONTAL  COOPERATION  IN  TRANSPORT  AND 
LOGISTICS 
 
The literature generally pays little attention to the woes and worries of close relationships. 
Instead, most publications focus on the (theoretic) advantages of cooperation and only report on 
successful case studies. Still, as many as 70% of all strategic alliances fail for one reason or another 
(Zineldin and Bredenlöw, 2003). 
Horizontal cooperation is often an uncertain undertaking in which it is difficult to plan the 
required activities or measure the realised output. Although having a trustworthy relationship is 
important, the risk of opportunism remains real (Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000; 
Tomkins, 2001). Opportunism, i.e., actions by the partner that do not comply with the spirit of the 
cooperation (Williamson, 1985; Das and Teng, 1998), is a typical example of relational risk. 
Impediments and threats to horizontal cooperation relate to four areas: partners, determining 
and  dividing  the  gains,  negotiation,  and  coordination  and  Information  &  Communication 
Technology (ICT). A selection of the most prominent impediments in these areas are reported in 
Table 2-3, accompanied by multiple references. Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  32 
 
2.4.1  Partners 
Analysing a potential partner’s strategic and organizational capabilities requires knowledge 
about  its  physical  assets,  as  well  as  about  its  intangible  assets  and  organizational  capabilities 
(Bartlett  and  Ghoshal,  2000).  This  makes  partner  selection  a  difficult  task.  The  search  costs 
involved with finding potential trading partners and evaluating their aptness and reliability can be a 
big hurdle for small and medium sized companies (Williamson, 1985; North, 1990; Hennart, 1993; 
Bleeke and Ernst, 1995). Furthermore, recent empirical research (Chalos and O’Connor, 2004) 
confirms that partner unreliability constitutes a major contribution to the managerial complexity of 
cooperation. 
 
2.4.2  Determining and Dividing the Gains 
The narrow scope of most cooperations prevents full understanding of the nature, extent, and 
distribution of risks or rewards that might accrue in the course of the cooperation’s evolution 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2000). The importance of a fair distribution of expected and unexpected 
costs is also stressed in Gibson et al. (2002). Mistrust about the fairness of the applied allocation 
rule for savings has caused  many horizontal logistics cooperation initiatives between shippers, 
and/or LSPs to marginalize or disintegrate. For example, in practical cases of cooperation by means 
of joint routing planning amongst LSPs, many allocation rules can be observed. Most often these 
are simple rules of thumb that distribute savings proportionally to a single indicator of either size or 
contribution to the synergy. Some examples are: 
•  Proportional to the total load shipped 
•  Proportional to the number of customers served 
•  Proportional to the logistics costs before the cooperation 
•  Proportional to the distance travelled for each shipper’s orders 
•  based on inter-drop distances of the constructed joint routes 
•  based on direct distances from depot to outlet 
•  Proportional to the number of orders 
 
Because  these  rules  are  easy  and  transparent  and  since  each  embodies  a  construct  that 
arguably represents the importance of an individual partner to the group, they are likely to appeal to 
practitioners  initially.  However,  when  using  a  single  construct,  the  others  are  obviously 
disregarded. In the long run, some participants will inevitably become frustrated since their true 
share in the group’s success is undervalued. For example, if gain sharing takes place according to 
the number of drop points of each participant, a certain LSP who delivers a large number of drop 
points in a small geographical region will get a large share of the benefits, while his de facto 
contribution to the attained synergy is negligible if the other participants serve only few drop points Chapter 2: Literature 
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in this area. Instead, to ensure a fair gain sharing mechanism, the marginal contributions of each 
LSP to the total gain have to be accurately quantified. These can then be allocated by means of 
concepts from cooperative game theory (see  Chapter 9 and Chapter 10). 
 
2.4.3  Negotiation 
Bleeke and Ernst (1995) explain how the evolvement of the relative bargaining power of 
partners is the key to understanding whether or not a cooperation is likely to lead to a takeover. 
Relative bargaining power depends on three factors: the initial strengths and weaknesses of the 
partners, how these strengths and weaknesses change over time, and the potential for competitive 
conflict. Negotiation processes should always result in a win-win situation. Fierce negotiations with 
little value to be shared will not support the cooperation for a longer period. A positive attitude 
during the negotiations will have an important beneficial impact on the cooperation’s longer-term 
success. 
 
2.4.4  Coordination and Information & Communication Technology 
The vast majority of the companies active in logistics execution are small and medium sized 
companies (SMEs). As SMEs tend to lag behind in implementation of ICT systems (Stefansson, 
2002;  Gunasekaran  and  Ngai,  2004),  this  can  hamper  those  forms  of  cooperation  that  require 
intensive (order) data exchange. ICT is mainly an issue for horizontal cooperation agreements of a 
medium intensity. Low intensity initiatives often do not require specific ICT investments and high 
intensity  initiatives  are  likely  to  generate  sufficient  revenue  to  pay  back  the  required  ICT 
investments. 
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Impediments  Identified by 
   
Partners   
Difference in interests, opportunistic behaviour  Stern  and  Heskett  (1969);  Mentzer  et  al.  (2000); 
Simatupang and Sridharan (2002) 
Difficulty  in  finding  partners  with  whom  to 
cooperate 
Williamson (1985); North (1990); Hennart (1993); 
Bleeke  and  Ernst  (1995);  Sabath  and  Fontanella 
(2002) 
Difficulty in finding a trusted party/person to lead 
the cooperation 
Mentzer et al. (2000) 
Differences in operating procedures  Bowersox  (1990);  Elmuti  and  Kathawala  (2001); 
Simatupang and Sridharan (2002) 
   
Determining and dividing the gains   
Difficulty in determining the (monetary) benefits  Razzaque  and  Sheng  (1998);  Zineldin  and 
Bredenlöw (2003) 
Difficulty  in  establishing  a  fair  allocation  of  the 
benefits 
Lambert et al. (1999); Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000); 
Mentzer  et  al.  (2000);  Gibson  et  al.  (2002); 
Zineldin and Bredenlöw (2003) 
   
Negotiation   
Disagreement over the domain of decisions  Stern and Heskett (1969); Barratt (2004) 
Unequal  bargaining  positions  (e.g.  due  to  size 
differences) 
Contractor and Lorange (1988); Bleeke and Ernst 
(1995); Zineldin and Bredenlöw (2003); Häkkinen 
et al. (2004) 
   
Coordination and ICT   
High indispensable ICT costs  McLaren  et  al.  (2002);  Stefansson  (2002); 
Gunasekaran and Ngai (2003) 
High additional coordinating and controlling costs  Contractor  and  Lorange  (1988);  Mentzer  et  al. 
(2000);  McLaren  et  al.  (2002);  Zineldin  and 
Bredenlöw (2003) 
Loss of control  Razzaque and Sheng (1998); Lambert et al. (1999); 
Elmuti  and  Kathawala  (2001);  Zineldin  and 
Bredenlöw (2003) 
Table 2-3. Impediments and threats for horizontal cooperation 
 
 
2.5  FACILITATORS  OF  HORIZONTAL  COOPERATION  IN  TRANSPORT  AND 
LOGISTICS 
 
Even when companies have recognised that horizontal cooperation is a promising direction 
of thought and a project has been started, these same companies may not fully understand how to 
manage or maintain their cooperation. The transition to cooperation is often difficult because it 
involves changes in mind-set, culture and behaviour (Whipple and Frankel, 2000). The potential of Chapter 2: Literature 
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horizontal  cooperation  is  difficult  to  judge  by  merely  performing  a  cost-benefit  analysis  or 
weighing the opportunities and impediments discussed in the previous two sections. Instead, there 
are many ‘soft’ factors that may play a crucial role in the success of a cooperation. These soft 
factors are here referred to as the facilitators for horizontal cooperation. This section discusses four 
groups of facilitators that are of crucial importance. These groups are labelled information sharing, 
incentive alignment, relationship management and contracts, and information and communication 
technology. Once again, the individual facilitators incorporated in one of these groups are gathered 
in a table (Table 2-4), together with useful references. 
 
2.5.1  Information Sharing 
In a horizontal cooperation, there is a clear need for the exchange of appropriate and reliable 
information about for example the extent to which each member benefits. The sharing of logistics 
information is important from a costs perspective because it can replace unnecessary costs for 
transport or storage of goods (Lee and Whang, 2001). Generally, information can be subdivided 
into two categories: proprietary and shared information. Proprietary information is necessary for a 
company  to  manage  its  internal  processes  and  should  only  be  accessible to a  company’s  own 
employees. The shared information should however be available to all participants in a cooperation 
(Stefansson, 2002). If partners do not share these data, they will lack knowledge about each other’s 
plan and intentions, and their activities will thus therefore not be adequately harmonized. This will 
result in suboptimal benefit to the cooperation (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002).  
Information types that can be shared include transport orders (e.g. Chapter 4 of this thesis), 
inventory levels at production facilities (e.g. Gavirneni, 2001), sales data (e.g. Lee et al., 2000), 
production schedules (e.g. Lee and Whang, 2000), manufacturing capacities (e.g. D’Amours et al., 
1999), and performance metrics (e.g. Lee and Whang, 2000). 
 
2.5.2  Incentive Alignment 
As with virtually every business decision, entering a horizontal cooperation is also founded 
on the belief by a company’s management that this individual company will benefit from it. The 
obvious result is that in a cooperation there are multiple companies striving to optimise their own 
profit. However, actions and decisions by one member will often result in costs or benefits to other 
participants as well. This phenomenon is referred to as externalities, spillovers or neighbourhood 
effects (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002). It is important to remember throughout the cooperation 
that the core reason for each company to join will always be of a selfish nature. However, in order 
for the cooperation to succeed, partners must act harmoniously to achieve joint goals, i.e., there 
must be a strong sense of having shared costs, risks and benefits. Incentive alignment aims at 
providing a mechanism for (re)alignment of the benefits and burdens so that responsibility for the 
attainment of overall profitability is internalized to the individual participants. Simatupang and Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  36 
Sridharan (2002) identify three types of incentive alignment strategies that can be used to motivate 
different members to align their behaviour with the overall goal of the cooperation: 
1.  Rewarding productive behaviour: rewarding observable actions that lead to a common goal, 
rather than rewarding the attainment of the goal itself. 
2.  Pay-for-performance:  use  performance  metrics  to  evaluate  the  achievements  of  individual 
partners on important objectives of the cooperation. 
3.  Equitable compensation: joint goals are set and the created gains are allocated to the partners 
based on an ex ante agreed gain sharing mechanism. 
 
The two most important concepts associated with aligning individual and joint goals are 
commitment and trust. Trust is a vital facilitator for cooperation. Relying on a partner that in 
principle has other objectives is a risky undertaking, and therefore trust is necessary to reach a 
useful level of cooperation. Commitment is closely related to trust and refers to the bond between 
companies in a cooperation. Rindfleish (2000) discusses the differences in trust between vertical 
and  horizontal  cooperations.  The  main  observation  is  that  resource-dependence  is  lower  for 
horizontal cooperations, because these partners do not depend on each other to acquire necessary 
inputs.  Moreover,  the  competitive  element  in  horizontal  cooperation  increases  the  threat  of 
opportunism and lowers the level of trust, because one participant may use information gathered in 
the cooperation to improve its market position at the expense of other participants. Therefore, it is 
argued that trust alone is not a suitable governance mechanism for horizontal cooperation. Instead 
it is advisable to construct a set of cooperation rules, i.e., partially replacing trust with control as a 
governance mechanism. An elaborate discussion of both trust and control in cooperations can be 
found in Das and Teng (1998). There are some situation-specific factors that may increase mutual 
trust in horizontal cooperation, such as the presence of shared customers (cf. Lambert et al., 1999). 
Finally, horizontal cooperations are likely to show more institutional and interpersonal connections 
(e.g. social contacts, sector associations etc.) than vertical cooperations. These connections can 
make up for the difficulties produced by initially low levels of trust, commitment and dependence. 
 
2.5.3  Relationship Management and Contracts 
The third group of facilitators for horizontal cooperation is summarised under the name 
‘Relationship management and contracts’. On a high-level, two manners of formal relationship 
management can be distinguished. The first is a ‘strict’ contract, the second is a more ‘open’ 
contract structure. 
Todeva and Knoke (2005) state that an open contract is more suitable in the pursuit of a 
collective  goal,  because  this  process  typically  depends  on  unanticipated  future  conditions  that 
cannot explicitly and exhaustively be captured in formal contractual agreements. Therefore, an 
open contract is probably the best form to structure a horizontal cooperation. According to Lambert Chapter 2: Literature 
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et al. (1996), the strongest cooperations generally have the shortest and least specific agreements or 
even no written agreement at all. A one or two-page document, outlining the basic philosophy and 
vision for the cooperation is generally all that is needed when the parties are truly committed to 
make the cooperation a success. Writing down all practical agreements for cooperation may even 
turn out to be a weak point in practical cases of horizontal cooperation (Verstrepen et al., 2006). 
Horizontal cooperation initiatives often grow ‘from the inside’ or as a small-scale experiment. 
Thus, the parties involved often consider the set-up of a binding juridical framework to be a burden 
instead of an aid or necessity. Afterwards however, the lack of a written agreement for cooperation 
can sometimes lead to problems in the event of unanticipated growth or conflict situations, or if the 
cooperation comes to an end. The set-up of a charter of cooperation to formally shape only the 
core aspects of the horizontal cooperation can therefore be a suitable compromise. The aim of such 
a charter is to determine the basic ‘rules of the game’ and vision for the future. It confirms the 
mutual trust and commitment, and as such forms the mortar of the cooperation. Its components 
need to be revised regularly along with the evolution of the cooperative agreement and the common 
vision (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). 
In addition to contractual issues, it is very helpful for efficient relationship management if 
the companies engaged in a horizontal cooperation show a certain level of mutuality, symmetry, 
and strategic fit. Mutuality means that the management of one participating company is able to put 
themselves in another participant’s shoes. Secondly, partners can be considered symmetric if they 
have  comparable  market  shares,  financial  strength,  productivity,  reputation  and/or  level  of 
technological sophistication (Lambert et al., 1996). Finally, strategic fit between partners exists if 
the organizational structures and strategies are well suited to each other. 
 
2.5.4  Information and Communication Technology 
In order to reach the longer term opportunities of horizontal cooperation, in the short run the 
costs for efficient communication between partners must be low enough. Over the last years, new 
technologies  have  greatly  enhanced  inter-company  communication.  Some  examples  of  new 
facilitating  technologies  are:  TCP/IP,  standard  Enterprise  Resource  Planning  (ERP)  systems, 
Electronic  Data  Interchange  (EDI),  eXtensible  Markup  Language  (XML),  object-oriented 
programming  environments,  wireless  communications  and  the  Internet.  Besides  technically 
enabling cooperation, these technologies also reduce transaction costs and transactions risks, and 
therefore  support  an  enduring  success  of  a  cooperation  (Esper  and  Williams,  2003).  A  more 
detailed discussion of different technologies and concepts that foster cooperation is provided by 
McLaren et al. (2002). Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  38 
 
Facilitators  Identified by 
   
Information sharing   
Integration of information  Moss-Kanter (1994); Mentzer et al. (2000); Whipple and Frankel 
(2000); McLaren et al. (2002); Simatupang and Sridharan (2002); 
Barratt (2004); Zineldin (2004) 
Sharing of performance data  Gibson  et  al.  (2002);  McLaren  et  al.  (2002);  Barratt  (2004); 
Zineldin (2004) 
Transparency, ‘open book’ policy  Bowersox (1990); Mentzer et al. (2000); Gibson et al. (2002); 
Barratt (2004) 
   
Incentive alignment   
Trust  Bowersox (1990); Mentzer et al. (2000); Whipple and Frankel 
(2000);  Zineldin  and  Bredenlöw  (2003);  Barratt  (2004); 
Hadjikhani and Thilenius (2005); Todeva and Knoke (2005) 
Common interest and commitment  Moss-Kanter  (1994);  Mentzer  et  al.  (2000);  Simatupang  and 
Sridharan  (2002);  Zineldin  (2004);  Hadjikhani  and  Thilenius 
(2005) 
Mutual help and interdependence  Bowersox (1990); Moss-Kanter (1994); Kumar and van Dissel 
(1996);  Mentzer  et  al.  (2000);  Gibson  et  al.  (2002);  Zineldin 
(2004) 
Shared customer(s)  Lambert et al. (1999) 
Integrity and a cooperative culture  Moss-Kanter  (1994);  Gibson  et  al.  (2002);  Barratt  (2004); 
Zineldin (2004) 
   
Relationship management and contracts 
Comparable  partners,  compatibility, 
strategic fit 
Moss-Kanter (1994); Lambert et al. (1999); Whipple and Frankel 
(2000); Gibson et al. (2002); Zineldin (2004) 
Clear expectations  Bowersox (1990); Mentzer et al. (2000); Whipple and Frankel 
(2000); Zineldin (2004) 
Leadership  Mentzer et al. (2000); Todeva and Knoke (2005) 
‘Open’ contract  Moss-Kanter (1994); Mentzer et al. (2000); Gibson et al. (2002) 
Conflict resolution management  Gibson et al. (2002); Zineldin (2004); Todeva and Knoke (2005) 
Prior cooperative experience  Lambert et al. (1999); Todeva and Knoke (2005) 
   
Information and communication technology 
Message  based  systems  (fax,  email, 
sms, EDI, XML) 
Kumar and van Dissel (1996); McLaren et al. (2002); Esper and 
Williams (2003) 
Market based systems (hubs, portals, 
auctions) 
McLaren et al. (2002); Granot and Sošić (2005) 
Collaborative planning based systems 
(CPFR, CTM) 
Kumar and van Dissel (1996); McLaren et al. (2002); Esper and 
Williams (2003) 
   
Other   
Physical proximity  Lambert et al. (1999) 
Table 2-4. Facilitators of horizontal cooperation 




2.6  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide a starting point for future research on horizontal 
cooperation in transport and logistics by reviewing relevant existing academic literature. The great 
economic  significance  of  this  sector  and  the  apparent  problems  it  is  facing,  contribute  to  the 
importance  of  concepts  such  as  horizontal  cooperation.  It  is  widely  reckoned  that  increased 
economies of scale are necessary to prevent the rising transport costs, increasing congestion and 
emissions from becoming an even larger burden to welfare than they are at present. Horizontal 
cooperation seems to be an interesting line of thought in attaining this increased scale. In the 
heavily  congested  European  logistics  centre  of  gravity  (Belgium  and  the  Netherlands)  many 
horizontal  cooperation  initiatives  of  various  types  have  already  been  initiated.  Yet,  existing 
literature lacks a general typology to guide practitioners in setting up horizontal cooperations and in 
any case not all forms of horizontal cooperation are applicable to any given sector or company. As 
such, the horizontal cooperation that currently exists may not be as effective as it could be. To fill 
this gap, a tentative typology for horizontal cooperation initiatives will be developed in the next 
chapter. 
It  remains  to  be  seen  if  horizontal  cooperation  is  an  intermediate  step  towards  market 
concentration by means of horizontal mergers, or an organizational structure that is also sustainable 
in the long run. Hopefully, the described opportunities, impediments and facilitators will both help 
practitioners to better gauge the potential of horizontal cooperation to their businesses, and inspire 
researchers to contribute to this fruitful and relevant field. 
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As stated in Chapter 1, the most frequently cited problems of Logistics Service Providers 
(LSPs) and logistics departments of shippers are low capacity utilisation, empty haulage, a negative 
public  image  and  declining  profit  margins.  The  main  causes  for  these  problems  are  the  stiff 
competition in global markets, high fixed costs, rising petrol and labour prices, the proliferation of 
products  with  shorter  life  cycles  and  the  increasing  expectations  of  customers.  In  practice, 
horizontal cooperation has proven to be a particularly useful option for both shippers and LSPs to 
cope with these difficult circumstances and to amend their efficiency and competitiveness. Through 
close  cooperation,  the  partnering  logistics  companies  aim  at  increasing  productivity,  e.g.  by 
optimising truck capacity utilisation, reducing empty mileage and cutting costs of supporting (non-
core) activities to increase the competitiveness of their logistics networks. 
The theoretical rationale for cooperation has extensively been discussed in Chapter 2. We 
now  take  a  practical  perspective.  It  turns  out  that  in  practice  a  plethora  of  different  types  of 
horizontal  cooperations  can  be  found.  This  chapter  therefore  develops  a  typology  for  these 
manifestations. It starts with an examination of some typical examples encountered practice. 
 
 
3.1  CONCEPTS ENCOUNTERED IN PRACTICE 
 
This  section  describes  the  characteristics  of  manifestations  of  horizontal  cooperation 
encountered in practice. Where possible, examples of successful cases from practice are provided. 
The  restriction  to  successful  cases  is  made  for  two  main  reasons.  Firstly,  success  stories  best 
illustrate the potential of a concept. Secondly, some pragmatism was needed because unsuccessful 
cases tend to be short-lived and usually little information about them is communicated by the 
stakeholders. Therefore, it is hard to find these cases and discover why they failed. 
Most of the described concepts for horizontal cooperation can be applied by both shippers 
and LSPs. Others are only meaningful for cooperating LSPs. In that case, this will be indicated 
explicitly in the discussion of the concept. Also, it should be noted cooperation types may overlap. 
This then results in hybrid forms of horizontal cooperation. 
 
Lobbying group 
A lobbying group steps up for the common interest of companies active in a certain logistics 
sector. Obviously, logistics companies have to cope with the influences of many external decision 
makers. Lobbying groups aim at influencing these decision makers to their interest. For example, Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  42 
regulations  introduced  by  European  or  national  governments  can  have  far-reaching  (financial) 
consequences for logistics companies (e.g. tax deductions of investments in onboard computers and 
blind spot mirrors, compulsory soot filters, and regulation on working hours for drivers, emission 
levels, weight of trucks, etc.). Furthermore, a positive image of the sector is important for attracting 
high quality personnel. Generally, the logistics sector has a low-tech image and therefore it is not a 
very popular working environment for academic high-potentials. In addition, the thin margins make 
it difficult for logistics companies to offer new employees competitive salaries. In response to these 
difficulties, some European governments sponsor initiatives to upgrade logistics skills. An example 
is the British Skills for Logistics (E.R. 27) programme. 
Road  Spirit  is  a  lobbying  group  cooperation  of  ten  independent  Belgian  road  transport 
companies. Its goal is to enhance the public image of the transport and logistics sector. This is done 
by being present at exhibitions, organizing conferences, and initiating campaigns to promote the 
logistics  sector  for  students  and  young  professionals  by  listing  and  describing  the  ten  most 
rewarding logistics jobs. Road Spirit aspires to raise the quality of employees and to take road 
transport to the next level. 
 
Maintenance group 
Especially for road transport companies, maintenance is a very important supporting activity. 
Maintenance of a fleet of trucks requires special knowledge and capabilities that might not be 
present in-house at an LSP (or at a shipper that performs transport on his own account). Performing 
good and regular maintenance by skilled workers can prevent costly breakdowns of trucks and also 
enhance  the  reliability  of  services.  It  is  possible  to  outsource  these  activities,  but  through  a 
maintenance  group,  the  aggregate  fleet  can  be  of  a  size  that  justifies  the  installation  of  a 
cooperative maintenance facility. Other examples of maintenance activities that can be performed 
more efficiently in a horizontal cooperation are the cleaning of (office) facilities, fuel tanks, or 
technical equipment. For a maintenance group to succeed, geographical proximity of the partners is 
a necessity. 
An example of a maintenance group can be found in the field of humanitarian logistics. In 
third world regions where natural and man-made disasters threaten the ethnic population, many aid 
organizations are active simultaneously. These can be either governmental, United Nations (UN), 
or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The Fleet Forum (E.R. 12) is a cooperation of 40 
international aid organizations that aims at attaining synergy in humanitarian logistics. It originates 
from a joint initiative of World Vision International, the International Federation of the Red Cross, 
and the World Food Program, and is supported by the Dutch LSP TNT. The Forum’s goal is to 
support the logistics activities during the participants’ missions in any appropriate way. In 2006, 
the Fleet Forum launched a project to install a joint maintenance facility under the governance of 
the UN in Malawi. Especially in developing countries such as Malawi the road infrastructure can Chapter 3: A Practical Framework 
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be of a very low quality. This accelerates wastage and therefore good maintenance is key for 
ensuring  ongoing  reliable  service.  An  explorative  study  (van  der  Burgt,  2006)  estimates  that 
introducing a maintenance group can reduce aggregate maintenance costs by at least 20%. 
 
Purchasing group 
Cooperative  purchasing  is  defined  as  the  sharing  or  bundling  of  purchasing  related 
information,  experiences,  processes,  resources  or  volumes  to  improve  the  performance  of  all 
participating organizations (Schotanus, 2005). Despite the considerable cost savings potential, this 
type  of  horizontal  cooperation  is  underutilised  in  the  logistics  sector.  The  most  important 
advantages  are:  lower  prices,  stronger  negotiation  positions,  reduced  workload  for  purchasing 
divisions, and the possibility to specialise in the procurement of specific goods or services. Some 
disadvantages are the loss of control and visibility and the (possible) need to switch suppliers. 
Schotanus (2005) discusses a case study of a purchasing group within the UN. In the original 
situation, each of the larger UN agencies has its own procurement entities. Many of the agencies 
also  have  delegated  authority  to  their  respective  country  offices.  Obviously,  there  are  many 
common goods and services that are purchased by most of the UN agencies. For that reason the UN 
is  continuously  looking  for  cooperative  purchasing  opportunities. This  is  done  for  instance  by 
facilitating e-procurement solutions for cooperative purchasing of UN member organizations (see 
E.R. 37) or collecting long-term agreements from individual agencies and making them available 
UN-wide.  Cooperative  purchasing  initiatives  are  considered  to  be  an  important  source  of  cost 
savings in the UN system. More information on purchasing groups can be found in Gentry (1993). 
 
Chartering 
Horizontal cooperation by means of chartering occurs when one LSP structurally outsources 
certain  orders  to  an  independent  third  party  that  is  in  principle  a  competitor.  The  underlying 
motivation can be that this competitor has better know-how for certain tasks, has more specialised 
equipment or can perform the tasks against a considerably lower cost. For chartering cooperations 
once  is  no  custom:  incidental  chartering  because  of  undercapacity  does  not  qualify  as  a  true 
cooperation. 
An example of horizontal cooperation through chartering is when a large LSP such as DHL 
structurally outsources the execution of a shuttle service on a single transport link of their network 
to a small transport company. 
 
Warehouse sharing 
Warehousing  facilities  are  very  expensive,  especially  if  they  contain  modern technology 
such as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) or automated stacking machines. Moreover, the 
location of warehouses is of great importance for the efficiency of transport processes. By means of Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  44 
warehouse sharing, shippers and LSPs can reduce their warehousing costs (such as investments, 
conditioning,  guarding,  handling  etc.).  Mostly,  warehouse-sharing  initiatives  are  long-term 
horizontal  cooperations  because  they  require  the  merging  of  logistics  processes  and  joint 
investments. 
In 2005, the Belgian LSP H. Essers initiated a network of shared warehouses of 14 European 
transport and warehousing companies. The other participants are Heppner (France), Zufall and 
Cretschmar (Germany), Chemlog (a cooperation of six German warehousing companies), Weiss 
(Austria), Wim Bosman (the Netherlands), Sifte Berti (Italy) and Ranjel (Portugal). These parties 
have already been cooperating with each other on a smaller scale for many years before. Now they 
have intensified their cooperation in the sense that every partner can use each other’s warehousing 
facilities when appropriate. In this way the cooperation encompasses a total of 1.6 million m
2 of 
storage capacity. The network enables the partners to operate on a pan-European scale more easily. 
 
Freight sharing 
Freight  sharing  occurs  when  companies  exchange  transport  orders  to  better  utilise  truck 
capacities  or  to  benefit  from  a  partner’s  better-developed  logistics  network  in  a  certain 
geographical region. Each company has an individual set of shipments to be performed. By means 
of horizontal cooperation, partners can partition the total set of shipments in such a way that more 
efficient routes can be composed. Chapter 4 provides a detailed discussion of the expected cost 
savings of freight sharing and joint route planning. Freight sharing can take place among a limited 
number  of fixed  and  known  partners, but  there  also  exist  online  freight  exchanges  where  any 
transport  company  can  search  for  suitable  loads  to  fill  up  empty  truck  space  or  to  acquire 
backloads. The opportunities of freight sharing to decrease the number of kilometres driven and 
thereby  avoiding  external  costs  due  to  congestion  and  emissions,  generally  creates  strong 
government  support  for these  initiatives.  As  a  result,  many  European  countries  have  launched 
subsidy  programmes.  Examples  are  the  Dutch  Transportbesparing  (E.R.  35)  or  the  Irish 
LogisticsXP (E.R. 17) programme. 
Examples of online freight exchanges are Teleroute (E.R. 30, discussed in Section 1.1) and 
BidSmart  (E.R.  25).  The  latter  is  an  Internet  bidding  tool  developed  by  Schneider  Logistics. 
BidSmart enables LSPs to browse logistics needs of shippers and to bid on individual lanes or 
groups of lanes that suit their current clientele and network. Also, the LSPs can enter their tariffs, 
consolidate shipments and analyse bidding results. 
An example of a freight sharing cooperation consisting of a fixed number of known partners 
is Distribouw (E.R. 6). This is a cooperation of four geographically dispersed Dutch LSPs active in 
the building materials sector. By means of freight sharing and bundling, the partners are able to 
serve their customers more timely and at a lower cost. The strong demand for just-in-time delivery 
at the construction sites is the main driver for the cooperation. The smaller shipments resulting Chapter 3: A Practical Framework 
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from this make it hard for individual LSPs to fill their trucks to an acceptable level. By means of 
freight sharing, Distribouw partners can offer their customers guaranteed delivery within 72 hours, 
something that would not be achievable individually. Another example of freight sharing is the 
case  of  joint  route  planning  between  Douwe  Egberts,  Unipro  and  Masterfoods  that  will  be 
discussed in Section 4.3. 
 
Knowledge centre 
A knowledge centre is a type of horizontal cooperation that aims at intensifying knowledge 
exchange  between  companies.  This  can  for  example  be  accomplished  by  jointly  organising 
trainings,  company  visits,  working  groups,  conferences  or  exhibitions.  Most  often,  knowledge 
centres are regionally oriented and consist of a limited number of companies that have strong 
cultural or personal affiliations. However, sometimes knowledge centres are also larger and more 
internationally oriented. 
Road Spirit (see above) can be considered a knowledge centre. The fact that it is also a 
lobbying group makes Road Spirit an example of a hybrid form of horizontal cooperation. Another 
example is the French Astre cooperation (E.R. 1): a cooperation of around 130 transport companies 
that freely exchange knowledge via a protected intranet site. A third example of a knowledge centre 
is the Dutch Bouwvervoergroep (E.R. 3). This group consists of eight transport companies that are, 
like the participants in Distribouw, active in the building materials sector. Although the original 
driver for setting up the cooperation was to exchange orders to increase efficiency, the group 
currently functions as a knowledge centre. The subjects discussed include developments in the 
market, operational information, and freight rates (Verboven, 2005). 
 
Road assistance 
Road  assistance  is  an  easily  attainable  type  of  horizontal  cooperation  where  companies 
provide  mutual  support  in  case  of  truck  breakdowns.  Transport  companies  are  generally  not 
knowledgeable about e.g. towing services, roadside assistance, local fire brigades etc. in places 
outside their home region. Therefore, internationally organized horizontal cooperations can be of 
value. This is especially true in sectors with highly inflammable or otherwise hazardous goods, 
such  as  the  petrochemical  industry.  A  road  assistance  group  can  give  directions  in  case  of 
accidents, or provide backup drivers and material. Typically, road assistance groups are spin-offs of 
other cooperation types such as knowledge centres or purchasing groups. 
 
Co-branding 
Co-branding is a marketing term that finds its roots in the American food industry of the 
1960s. It is about developing and propagating a joint brand and market image. A well-known 
example is the cooperation of Heineken and Krups in the development of the beertender, a beer Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  46 
tapping system for use at home. In logistics, co-branding concerns a standardisation of service 
levels, processes, market approach, pricing etc. (Verstrepen, 2006).  
An example from the logistics industry is the above-mentioned French cooperation Astre 
(E.R. 1). Together, the participating LSPs have 8,500 employees, 14,000 trucks and 1.5 million m
2 
warehousing  space  at  their  disposal.  All  partners  explicitly  propagate  themselves  as  Astre-
members.  This  brand  name  clarifies  to  customers  that  this  Astre  company  1)  satisfies  Astre’s 
performance  criteria,  2)  offers  real-time  tracking  and  tracing  services,  3)  has  an  ISO  quality 
certification, and 4) satisfies certain ethical and quality requirements. 
 
Tendergroup 
In a tendergroup, participating LSPs share their resources to be able to tender on contracts 
that would be too large or complex for any of the partners to fulfil individually. If contracts are too 
large, then the aggregate  capacity  of transport  equipment  and/or  warehousing  facilities  can be 
(temporarily) merged to reach the required level of scale. Another rationale for tendergroups is that 
they allow disjoint geographical focus areas of LSPs to be merged to offer customers a single and 
intricate  logistics  network  in  a  wider  region.  In  cases  where  the  contract  is  too  complex  for 
companies to fulfil individually, then partners may share their respective know-how or capabilities 
to  offer  a  one-stop-shopping  service  to  the  customer  together  anyway.  To  summarise,  a 
tendergroup offers small and medium sized companies the ability to jointly compete against large 
and powerful LSPs or enable large companies to perform mega contracts. 
An  example  of  a  tendergroup  is  the  cooperation  between  New  Zealand  Post  and  DHL 
Express.  Together,  they  signed  a  deal  with  Air  New  Zealand  to  provide  all  domestic  and 
international postal and courier services for the Air New Zealand group. Although DHL Express 
has been providing services to a number of business units within Air New Zealand for some time, 
as part of the new agreement it will now deliver these services across the entire business. This 
extension of services is greatly facilitated by the cooperation with New Zealand Post (E.R. 36). 
 
Asset pooling 
In  many  industries,  demand  is  unstable  or  subject to  seasonal  influences. This  makes  it 
difficult for companies to fully utilise their assets. To save costs some standardised assets can be 
pooled between companies. In logistics, these assets can be (conditioned) trucks, forklift trucks, 
pallets, crates etc. 
McKinnon (2004b) discusses the possibilities of asset pooling in the petrochemical industry. 
This industry is dominated by a small number of large companies that operate very expensive 
transport  equipment  (trucks  cost  around  €  100,000).  The  European  PetroChemical  Association 
(EPCA, E.R. 8) facilitates brainstorm sessions about cooperation projects, one of them being the 
pooling of logistics resources. At present, different companies have their own pools of containers Chapter 3: A Practical Framework 
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and  handling  equipment.  These  must  be  separately  repositioned  and  maintained.  McKinnon 
(2004b) states that, if industry-wide horizontal cooperation by means of asset pooling would occur, 
this pool could be utilised much more efficiently. The total pool could then be downsized, cutting 
the level of capital investment. Furthermore, the operating cost per unit load could be reduced. This 




An intermodal group is a horizontal cooperation of LSPs that specialise in different transport 
modes. Two obvious combinations are road/rail and road/water. When transported volumes are 
large,  distances  are  long,  and/or  time  requirements  are  soft,  multimodal  transport  can  offer 
interesting cost saving opportunities. 
The concept of an intermodal group is illustrated by the Dutch Distrivaart initiative. In the 
Netherlands, 300 million pallets are shipped on a yearly basis. The Distrivaart project aims at 
constructing a nationwide network for the distribution of non-perishable palletised consumer goods 
via special pallet-ships on the inland waterways. In the envisioned end scenario, the Distrivaart 
network will consist of 40 pallet-ships and 17 distribution centres in the Netherlands, Belgium and 
the Ruhr area. This could then withdraw around 43 million pallets per year from the road network. 
Horizontal cooperation in this intermodal group takes place between the logistics departments of 
the participating producers and retailers, the LSP that subcontracts the inland navigation company 
and the road transport companies that are responsible for the parallel road network and the access 
and egress transport. More information on the Distrivaart project can be found in NDL (2003). 
 
Shared crossdock 
Transport  costs  for  individual  shipments  can  be  decreased  by  consolidating  them  into  a 
single shipment. One way to make this possible is for companies to install a shared crossdock. In 
such a facility, the many small incoming streams can be merged into larger outgoing streams. A 
critical success factor of a shared crossdock is the geographical overlap of the distribution areas of 
the partners. In most of the cases encountered in practice, the operations at the shared crossdock are 
outsourced to an LSP. 
The shared crossdock concept is a special case of asset pooling and was already illustrated 
by the Zoetwaren Distributie Nederland case described in Section 2.1. Another example is the 
cooperation  between  Kimberly  Clark  en  Lever  Fabergé  (Cruijssen  and  Verweij,  2006).  These 
companies have installed a crossdock facility to take advantage of their many shared customers. 
The  shipments  of  these  two  companies  are  especially  apt  for  consolidation  because  Kimberly 
Clark’s products are voluminous and cheap, while Lever Fabergé’s products are expensive and 
small. The consolidation processes are outsourced to an LSP. Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  48 
3.2  A TYPOLOGY OF HORIZONTAL COOPERATION IN PRACTICE 
 
The  previous  section  however  already  indicated  that  the  nature  and  structure  of  these 
cooperations tend to differ widely. As a means to classify and compare different types of horizontal 
cooperation arising in practice and to offer logisticians support in identifying the type of horizontal 
cooperation that best suits their situation, this section introduces a typology of horizontal logistics 
cooperation. Although more research is needed to make this typology exhaustive, this tentative 
typology  currently  incorporates  four  dimensions.  These  are:  Decision  level,  Competition, 
Combined assets, and Objectives. In the next four subsections, these dimensions and their role in 
the typology will be discussed. The dimensions have been identified based on both the constructs 
found  in  literature  review,  and  an  analysis  of  similarities  and  differences  between  the  many 
horizontal cooperation types encountered in practice. 
 
3.2.1  Decision Level 
This first dimension indicates the decision level of a cooperation, which can be operational, 
tactical or strategic. Operational cooperation relates to the daily operations within the logistics 
companies or divisions. It is practical in nature and can be described as ‘joint execution’ or ‘sharing 
of  operational  information’.  Tactical  cooperation  relates  to  achieving  mid-term  objectives  and 
involves  more  intensive  planning  and  investments.  It  can  be  described  as  ‘joint  organizing’, 
‘servicing  markets  together’  or  ‘sharing  logistics  resources’.  Strategic  cooperation  is  aimed  at 
achieving long-term company objectives. Strategic cooperation can be described as ‘joint learning’, 
‘joint  development  of  innovative  concepts’  and  ‘joint  investments’.  In  most  cases,  strategic 
cooperation  cannot  be  achieved  without  preceding  cooperation  at  the  tactical  level.  Similarly, 
tactical cooperation generally requires a well-established cooperation at the operational level. 
 
3.2.2  Competition 
The second dimension in the typology concerns competition. The definition of horizontal 
cooperation  in  transport  and  logistics  allows  that  participants  are  either  competitors  or  non-
competitors.  This  depends  on  whether  or  not  partners  compete  for  the  same  customers.  Non-
competitive  horizontal  cooperation  occurs  for  example  when  transport  companies  servicing 
different industries (e.g. tank transport, express services, removal services) set up a knowledge 
centre. If partners are servicing the same industries and are direct competitors, the cooperation can 
be referred to as competitive horizontal cooperation. 
 
3.2.3  Combined Assets 
All types of horizontal cooperation are based on the sharing of tangible or intangible assets. 
Based on the opportunities of horizontal cooperation listed in Section 2.3 the following six groups Chapter 3: A Practical Framework 
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of assets that can be combined to the benefit of all participants are identified. These are: Orders, 
Logistics facilities, Rolling stock, Market power, Supporting processes, and Expertise. The extent 
to which cooperations are aimed at combining these assets forms the basis of the third dimension of 
the typology.  
 
3.2.4  Objectives 
The final dimension is also based on the opportunities of horizontal cooperation (see Section 
2.3). Five underlying groups of objectives can be distilled from the list of opportunities. These are: 
Cost reduction, Growth, Innovation, Quick response, and Social relevance. Below each objective is 
discussed. 
Firstly, the most frequent objective of horizontal cooperation is cost reduction, either of core 
or non-core activities. Most short-term (operational) cooperation initiatives have cost reduction as 
their primary goal. 
A second possible objective of horizontal cooperation is growth. Through cooperation, LSPs 
or  logistics  departments  of  companies  can  for  example  establish  financial  growth  (increased 
turnover  or  profit)  or  geographically  extend  their  coverage  by  combining  their  (distribution) 
networks. Moreover, the bundled forces of LSPs make it possible to tender on large contracts that 
are normally only reserved for the bigger players. 
Thirdly, horizontal cooperation can be aimed at innovation. Innovative service concepts, 
interorganizational learning, and the introduction of new systems and technologies (e.g. RF tags) 
can  potentially  increase  the  quality  of  the  offered  logistics  services.  These  new  concepts  or 
technologies will in many cases be too labour or capital intensive to be introduced by a single 
company. Horizontal cooperation can be a solution to this problem. 
As for the fourth objective, horizontal cooperation is often the fastest way to reduce response 
times, obtain first mover advantages or successfully enter a new market. This is illustrated by the 
many logistics cooperations of Western European LSPs with partners in Eastern Europe and the Far 
East. An example of quick response made possible by a cooperative logistics concept, is when 
courier companies exchange orders to cut lead times down to levels that would be impossible to 
achieve individually. Most (horizontal) cooperations that aim at shortening response times also 
require active involvement of customers, so that these cooperations are in fact lateral cooperations. 
Reliable  order  forecasts  can  e.g.  be  helpful  for  companies  to  anticipate  and  reposition  trucks. 
Coordination and communication are important facilitators of cooperation (cf. Chapter 2 and Dyer 
and Singh, 1998). In an economy that strongly depends on information flows, obtaining the most 
accurate and real-time information offers the key to success (Gunn, 1994). Cooperation may enable 
a company to process information faster, for example by anticipating shifts in the market and 
responding before competitors do. The shortened response times and the improved ability to react 
to  changes  can  offer  the  partners  a  competitive  advantage.  To  realise  this,  the  organizational Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  50 
structures of the partners need to be harmonized, which also requires far-reaching ICT integration 
(Gunnarsson and Jonsson, 2003). 
Finally, horizontal cooperation can have a social goal. Transport, especially by road, has 
grown steadily during the last decade. For example, road transport in the former EU-15 increased 
from  1.12  billion ton-km  in  1995 to  1.38  billion ton-km  in  2002,  corresponding  to an annual 
growth of 2.9% (Eurostat, E.R. 9). The strong growth of freight (and also passenger) transport by 
road results in increased congestion of the European road network. It is clear that this leads to high 
social costs (caused by time losses, noise, air pollution etc.). Ceteris paribus, road traffic will 
further increase in the next decade, which will have a serious negative impact on the accessibility 
of European economic centres and on the European economy as a whole. A classic solution is 
modal shift towards more environment-friendly transport modes (rail and inland navigation), but 
although the potential of these solutions is significant for bulk trades, a large share of the (less-
than-truckload) freight market can only be serviced by road. Horizontal cooperation by exchanging 
loads and equipment between geographically dispersed partners can be an effective way to achieve 
a higher capacity utilisation. Load exchanges, central planning, shared distribution centres etc. all 
increase the efficiency of road transport and are a potential remedy for the increased demand for 
transport. Horizontal cooperation can thus be a means to slow down this increase in ton-kms, even 
without modal shift.  
 
3.2.5  Construction of the Typology 
The four dimensions developed in this section allow the construction of a typology aimed at 
situating and evaluating different forms of horizontal cooperation. This typology is summarised in 
Figure  3-1.  In  this  figure,  the  horizontal  cooperation  concepts  described  in  Section  3.1  are 
categorized. Note that the typology should be considered a starting point for an elaborate research 
on the dimensions of horizontal cooperation in practice. Figure 3-1 is a first assessment of the four 
dimensions that appeared during the literature review of Chapter 2 and interviews with eleven 
industry  experts  (see  Section  5.3.1)  that  were  held  in  preparation  for  the  empirical  research 
described in Chapter 5. The importance of each of the dimensions for a given type is tentatively 
indicated by means of a ‘moon’ pictogram. The interpretation of the different moon pictograms is 
given in Figure 3-2. The main goal of the dimensions and their classifications is to encourage 
further debate between both researchers and potential partners in a horizontal cooperation. Finally, 
Figure 3-1 can be used to position new forms of horizontal cooperation, such as the ones discussed 
in PART III of this thesis. 
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O/T/S C/NC OR LF RS MP SP E CR G I QR SR
Lobbying group S C
Maintenance group O C/NC
Purchasing group O C/NC
Chartering O/T C
Warehouse sharing O/T C/NC
Freight sharing O/T C
Knowledge centre S C
Road assistance O C
Co-branding S C/NC
Tendergroup T/S C
Asset pooling O/T C
Intermodal group S NC
Shared crossdock T C/NC
…
O Operational MP Market power
T Tactical SP Supporting processes
S Strategic E Expertise
C Competitive CR Cost reduction
NC Non-competitive G Growth
OR Orders I Innovation
LF Logistics facilities QR Quick response
RS Rolling stock SR Social relevance  
Figure 3-1. Typology of horizontal cooperation forms 
 
Pictogram  Interpretation 
 
This is a side effect of a horizontal cooperation type. 
 
This is a natural aspect of a horizontal cooperation type. 
 
This is important for a horizontal cooperation type. 
 
This is essential for a horizontal cooperation type. 
Figure 3-2. Interpretation of moon pictograms 
 
 
3.3  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter instigated a typology of horizontal cooperation types encountered in practice. 
This typology incorporates four dimensions (Decision level, Competition, Combined assets, and 
Objectives) and it aims at situating and evaluating different forms of horizontal cooperation. The 
typology is summarised in Figure 3-1. In this figure, a number of horizontal cooperation concepts Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  52 
are categorized. Descriptions of the most important characteristics of each of these concepts have 
been given in Section 3.1. This typology is however merely a starting point for future research on 
the dimensions of horizontal cooperation in practice. More research is needed in order to make it 
exhaustive and robust. 
At  this  point,  we  have  provided  an  overview  of  horizontal  cooperation in transport  and 
logistics, from both a theoretical and a practical point of view. To end PART I, the next chapter 
will quantify the monetary savings that can be attained through horizontal cooperation. This will be 
done for the most ‘basic’ form of horizontal cooperation in transport, i.e., freight sharing and joint 
route planning. 
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4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In Section 1.1 a number of important trends in logistics have been discussed. They illustrated 
that the logistics industry as a whole is under pressure. Amongst other things, fierce competition in 
global markets, the shortening of product life cycles, and the heightened expectations of customers 
are causing profit margins to shrink. As a result, companies show a strong tendency to decrease the 
costs of non-value adding activities, such as basic distribution. In addition, the increasing number 
of mergers and acquisitions give companies an excellent opportunity to rethink and rebuild their 
logistics  processes  (Eye  for  Transport,  2003).  As  a  consequence  of  these  developments,  the 
European logistics market is currently going through a structural reorganization. Furthermore, it 
seems that nowadays the potential of internal reorganization of logistics processes has been almost 
completely exploited, and attention is shifting from optimising internal logistics processes to better 
managing external relations in the supply chain (cf. Skjoett-Larsen, 2000).  
Therefore, a fundamental choice that companies face in redesigning their logistics processes 
is whether they i) keep the execution in-house, ii) outsource the logistics activities, or iii) seek 
cooperation  with  colleague  companies  to  exploit  synergies.  This  is  again  the  make/buy/ally 
decision introduced in Section 2.1. Combinations of these three possibilities may also prove a valid 
option. The present chapter considers companies opting for choices ii) or iii), i.e., outsourcing or 
horizontal cooperation. Horizontal cooperation is the main subject of this thesis and has already 
been examined elaborately in the previous two chapters. Below, the concept of outsourcing is 
briefly introduced. 
Razzaque and Sheng (1998) define outsourcing (or: third party logistics) as the provision of 
single or multiple logistics services by a vendor on a contractual basis. It has been estimated that 
about 40 percent of global logistics is outsourced (Wong et al., 2000), and increasingly many 
shippers consider it an attractive alternative to the traditional logistics service mode (Hong et al., 
2004). Razzaque and Sheng (1998) and Wilding and Juriado (2004) provide literature reviews on 
outsourcing, investigating which activities are typically outsourced and the main reasons for doing 
this.  The  top  five  reasons  found  for  outsourcing  relate  to  1)  costs  or  revenue,  2)  service,  3) 
operational  flexibility,  4)  business  focus,  5)  asset  utilisation  or  efficiency.  Logistics  Service 
Providers (LSPs) are able to achieve economies of scale by providing logistics services to a number 
of customers This makes cost or revenue related reasons the most important drivers for shippers Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  54 
wishing to outsource logistics processes. The most commonly outsourced processes are Transport 
and Shipment, Warehousing and Inventory, Information Systems and Value Added Services. 
Both outsourcing and horizontal cooperation aim at achieving synergy and economies of 
scale to increase the competitiveness of their logistics networks. Some examples of specific goals 
of the horizontal cooperation types discussed in Chapter 3 are: reducing purchasing costs (e.g. 
onboard computers, storage systems, fuel, etc.), saving on storage costs by using joint facilities, and 
saving on costs of non-core activities (e.g. safety trainings). All these cost savings can be estimated 
quite  easily  by  means  of basic  cost  calculations. This is  however not  the  case  for savings  on 
distribution costs that result from so-called joint route planning, i.e., horizontal cooperation that 
merges the distribution processes of the partnering companies to obtain scale economies. Here we 
define  the  synergy  value  as  the  (percent)  difference  between  distribution  costs  in  the  original 
situation where all entities perform their orders individually, and the costs of a system where all 
orders are collected and route schemes are set up simultaneously. 
The literature review in Chapter 2 has indicated that problems in quantifying the synergy 
value constitute a major impediment for horizontal cooperation. Therefore, the aim of the present 
chapter  is  to  build  intuition  on  and  to  actually  calculate  the  synergy  value  that  cooperating 
companies may expect from joint route planning. This remainder of the chapter is organized as 
follows: in the next section the research framework and the routing model employed are explained. 
Furthermore, results are given on the synergy value in a benchmark case. In Section 4.3, the results 
are put into perspective by comparing them to the synergy  values attained in a practical case 
concerning the distribution of frozen goods in the Dutch catering sector. Section 4.4 then describes 
a sensitivity analysis that is performed on six market characteristics of the benchmark case. Finally, 
in Section 4.5, some concluding remarks are made. 
 
 
4.2  JOINT ROUTE PLANNING 
 
Consider a system with multiple companies, each having a separate set of distribution orders. 
These distribution orders are requests for the delivery of goods from a single distribution centre to 
specified drop-off locations at customers’ sites. Such a situation both fits the case of outsourcing of 
warehousing and distribution processes to an LSP, and the case of horizontal cooperation between 
shippers or LSPs by means of a joint crossdock. An example of this type of horizontal cooperation 
(Lever Fabergé and Kimberly-Clark) has been discussed in Section 3.1. 
The results also offer a good approximation for the more general situation in which joint 
route planning is done by a group of companies whose truck depots are located ‘sufficiently close’ 
to each other. In this setting whether these companies are shippers, LSPs, or even receivers of 
goods is of little importance: it is enough that the companies have direct (planning) authority over Chapter 4: Joint Route Planning under Varying Market Conditions 
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the flows of goods. Who executes the orders is irrelevant from a synergy point of view. Therefore, 
in the remainder of this chapter the cooperating companies will be referred to as flow controlling 
entities (FCEs). 
 
4.2.1  Research Framework 
This section presents the framework that is employed for calculating the synergy value, i.e., 
comparing the sum of the distribution costs of individual FCEs with the distribution costs under 
joint route planning. This framework is based on the extended Solomon instance RC110_1 of the 
Vehicle  Routing  Problem  with  Time  Windows  (VRPTW:  Solomon,  1987;  Gehring  and 
Homberger, 2001). This specific problem instance and others can be found online (E.R. 23). 
The distribution network consists of a set of nodes in a plane, each node representing a drop-
off location. Furthermore, there is a single node in the centre of the plane, which represents the 
distribution centre. Each pair of nodes is connected by an arc. On these arcs, Euclidean distances 
are assumed. The travel time (expressed in minutes) between each pair of nodes is proportional to 
the Euclidean distances, and therefore based on a constant speed of 60 distance units per hour. 
Travel times are relevant for determining synergy values since the distribution orders have time 
windows and working days of drivers are of limited length. 
 In the original system without joint route planning, each customer belongs to a single FCE. 
This is implemented by successively assigning orders from the VRPTW instance to the FCEs, until 
the  pre-set  market  shares  in  terms  of  the  number  of  distribution  orders  have  been  reached. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that FCEs have a sufficiently large homogeneous fleet of trucks that 
start and end their trips at the distribution centre. These trucks have a capacity of 200 units and 
operate at a cost of € 1.42 per kilometre, and a € 274 fixed cost per truck. Unloading (or: service 
time) takes a fixed time of 10 minutes for each customer. 
 
4.2.2  Benchmark Case 
Problem instance RC110_1 is used to construct the benchmark case. This instance consists 
of 1,000 orders, the first 250 of which are selected for the benchmark case. The orders have an 
average size of 17.82, with a standard deviation of 8.08 units. In the benchmark case, there are 
three FCEs that engage in joint route planning, and their market shares are all equal. Finally, the 
time window widths equal 30 for all customers, and the distribution area is a square of 500x500. A 
more detailed description of the problem instances can be found in Solomon (1987) and Gehring 
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The developed benchmark scenario is summarised in Table 4-1. Seven characteristics are 
assumed to be significant for the synergy value: number of orders per FCE (1 and 2), average order 
size (3), standard deviation of order sizes (4), time window width (5), size of distribution area (6), 
and market shares of FCEs (7). The next section introduces the routing heuristic that is used to 
determine the synergy values. 
 
  Characteristic  Benchmark case values 
1  Number of orders  250 
2  Number of FCEs  3 
3  Average order size   17.82 
4  Standard deviation of order size  8.08 
5  Time window width  30 
6  Size of distribution area  500x500 
7  Market shares of FCEs  All equal 
Table 4-1. The benchmark scenario 
 
4.2.3  Routing Heuristic 
In  the  VRPTW,  the  objective  is  to  construct  routes  from  a  common  origin  to  multiple 
destination nodes. These routes are performed by identical trucks that start and end at the origin 
node and must be such that each destination node is visited exactly once, time windows are not 
violated, and the compound demand of the customers visited along a route does not exceed the 
truck’s capacity. 
The  customary  objective  function  for  the  VRPTW  is  of  a  step-wise  nature.  As  a  first 
criterion, the number of routes is minimised, and only then the distance travelled (some authors 
also minimise waiting time as a third criterion). In the current setting however, interest is in the 
minimum-cost solution based on the cost structure presented in Section 4.2.1. This renders the two-
stage objective function inappropriate because the minimum-cost solution is not necessarily the 
solution with the minimum number of routes. To accommodate this alternative objective function, 
we developed a new VRPTW heuristic. The heuristic starts with the construction of an initial 
solution, which it then attempts to improve upon. The initial construction heuristic is based on the 
modified application of Clarke and Wright’s (1964) savings heuristic by Liu and Shen (1999). The 
difference between the current heuristic and the original is that, when merging two routes A and B, 
not only positions at the start and end of route A are considered for insertion of route B, but also all 
other positions in route A. This means that in Figure 4-1, in addition to cases 1 and 2, also cases 3 
and 4 are considered. 










Figure 4-1. Modified savings construction algorithm 
 
Once the initial solution has been generated, the algorithm attempts to reduce the number of 
routes by looping through all routes, trying to insert the customers one-by-one into other routes. All 
routes are considered for elimination in a random order. The customers in the route selected for 
elimination are inserted in partial random order into other routes according to how critical they are. 
A customer’s criticality depends on his demand, time window width and distance from the depot, 
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i D   =  Demand of customer i  
i TW   =  Width of customer i ’s time window 
i Dist   =  Distance of customer i  from the depot 
i Crit   =  Criticality of customer i  
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If a route cannot be eliminated because not all customers could be reinserted into other 
routes, the successful insertions into other routes are undone. After the route elimination procedure, 
two  local  search  operators,  ICROSS  and  IOPT,  are  executed  iteratively  until  no  further 
improvement of costs can be found. ICROSS and IOPT are the same respectively as the well 
known CROSS (Taillard et al., 1997) and Or-opt (Or, 1976) operators, except that the relocation of 
segments is also attempted in inverted order. Both operators are described in detail in Bräysy et al. 
(2004). 
 
4.2.4  Benchmark Case Results 
For  the  benchmark  scenario  developed in  section 4.2.2,  the  synergy  value  is calculated. 
Because the algorithm starts with a random seed, 25 replications are performed and the average 



















Figure 4-2. Synergy value for the benchmark case 
 
 
  Original  Joint route planning  Improvements 
Costs  56,884.71  39,438.65  30.7% 
# Kilometres  29,778.87  20,595.67  30.8% 
Load factor  0.43  0.62  43.2% 
# Drops per route  4.72  6.76  43.2% 
# Trucks  53  37  30.2% 
Table 4-2: Details of benchmark case savings 
 
As expected, in this specific benchmark scenario, the FCEs benefit from joint route planning. 
The customer base to construct routes has after all been increased so that truck space can be used 
more efficiently. It turns out that a synergy value of 30.7% is possible as a result of joint route 
planning. Furthermore, the savings in kilometres driven and trucks used are also around 30%. The Chapter 4: Joint Route Planning under Varying Market Conditions 
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average load factor of trucks increases by 43.2% from 0.43 to 0.62. Note that these relatively low 
levels of truck space usage are a direct result of the structure of the RC110_1 problem instance 
under consideration, where time window constraints are more restrictive than capacity constraints. 
The absolute size of these benefits is of course highly idiosyncratic: it is easy to construct 
instances where savings are very high or very low. Therefore, the next section discusses a study of 
a real-life case to underpin the range of savings found in the benchmark case. 
 
 
4.3  JOINT ROUTE PLANNING IN PRACTICE 
 
This section illustrates joint route planning by means of a case study in the Dutch catering 
sector  (Groothedde,  2003).  In  2001,  three  Dutch  companies  (Douwe  Egberts,  Unipro  and 
Masterfoods) started a cooperation to increase the efficiency of their distribution networks for 
frozen  products.  All  three  companies  supply  frozen  products  to  catering  outlets  at  schools, 
companies,  hospitals,  government  organizations,  etc.  For  Douwe  Egberts,  these  products  are 
mainly coffee extracts, for Unipro bread and pastry, and for Masterfoods mostly ice cream. These 
products  are  delivered  by  means  of  expensive  temperature  controlled  trucks.  This  makes  that 
logistics costs constitute a relatively large share of the product price. Given the strong overlap of 
customers, 68% on average, the companies decided that joint distribution of their products was an 
interesting opportunity.  
The inventory was moved from three private distribution centres in Wolvega, Dongen and 
Beuningen, to a new purpose-build joint distribution centre in Utrecht, the geographical centre of 
the Netherlands. In addition, the warehousing and distribution activities were outsourced to LSP C. 
van Heezik. This shift to a centralised distribution system with joint route planning is illustrated in 
Figure 4-3. 




Figure 4-3: Case study: centralisation and joint route planning 
 
Actual routes for weekly order sets were used to compare key performance indicators of the 
ex-ante  and  ex-post  situations.  The  results  can  be  found  in  Table  4-3,  and  are  based  on  a 
homogeneous fleet consisting of trucks with a capacity of 26 units. The average drop size improves 
in the new situation, because Douwe Egberts, Unipro and Masterfoods have a number of joint 
customers. The orders of these customers are consolidated which improves the efficiency of the 
distribution  process.  Additionally,  savings  are  attained  because  the  customers  belonging  to 
different companies are located ‘close’ to each other so that their orders can be combined in one 
route. 
 
  Before  After  Improvements 
# Trucks  4245  2106  50.4% 
Drop size  2.52  3.5  38.9% 
Drops per year  21,225  15,161  28.6% 
Kilometres per year  1,460,000  1,010,000  30.8% 
Table 4-3. Results of introduction of central distribution centre 
 
For this case, joint route planning saves 30.8% of distance travelled. In the new situation 
load factors are very high (over 95%), resulting in a fleet reduction of 50%. The synergy value of 
30.8% in terms of kilometres driven in this specific case is well in line with the results of the 
benchmark  scenario  in  the  previous  section. This  is  however  not  a  general  rule. The  possible 
reduction  in  fleet  size  for  example  is  much  higher  here.  Furthermore,  there  are  several  other 
existing  cases  of joint route  planning,  where the savings  deviate  quite strongly  from  the 30% 
attained in the benchmark case. For example, Bahrami (2002) describes the merge of separate Chapter 4: Joint Route Planning under Varying Market Conditions 
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distribution networks pertaining to two producers of consumer goods (Henkel and Schwarzkopf) 
into one joint distribution network. There, distribution costs are estimated to fall by only 15.3% as 
a result of joint route planning. Furthermore, in later chapters of this thesis two additional case 
studies will be discussed. Chapter 8 discusses a case relating to the primary transport (i.e., from 
supplier  sites to  distribution  centres  of retailers)  of  grocery  products. Two cases of horizontal 
cooperation are discussed. Firstly, there can be joint route planning by the suppliers, if they deliver 
the  goods  to  the  retailers’  distribution  centre.  Secondly,  joint  route  planning  can  occur  at  the 
retailers, if they pick up the goods at the suppliers’ sites. The first constitutes a traditional situation 
whereas the second is an example of so-called Factory Gate Pricing. The reported savings of joint 
route  planning  are  27.1%  in  the  traditional  situation,  and  11.4%  in  the  Factory  Gate  Pricing 
situation. Finally, Chapter 9 will discuss a case of joint route planning in which four grocery retail 
chains cooperate by performing joint route planning for the distribution of their frozen goods to 
local supermarkets. The savings in distribution costs reported there amount to 20.3%. 
It can be concluded that synergy values in the cases mentioned in this section show quite a 
strong variability. It is however very important for potential partners to have a reliable estimate of 
potential savings, before they engage in joint route planning. Since it is not always possible for 
companies  to  make  a  detailed  estimate  of  the  distribution  costs  in  the  ex-ante  and  ex-post 
situations, the next section will develop intuition on the impact of scenario-specific characteristics 
on synergy values. This can be useful for partners wishing to obtain an indication of the maximum 
achievable savings quickly. These insights can intensify and speed up negotiations, and increase 
the probability of the actual start and prosperity of a cooperation. 
 
 
4.4  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
The above mentioned variability in synergy values is a direct consequence of operational 
(routing) characteristics of the sectors in which cooperation takes place. These characteristics were 
already listed in Table 4-1. In this section, various market situations are resembled by varying one 
characteristic at a time and fixing the others at their benchmark scenario value. Table 4-4 defines 
the range for each characteristic and the corresponding step sizes. Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  62 
 
Characteristic  Minimum  Maximum  Step size 
Number of orders per FCE  10  -  10 
Average order size   0.2  8  0.2 
Standard deviation of order size  0  4  0.1 
Time window width  0  20  0.5 
Size of distribution area  0.1  1  0.025 
Market shares of FCEs  0  1  0.025 
Table 4-4. Range of characteristics values 
 
In the following subsections the synergy values are plotted for each of the characteristics. 
Every data point in the plots corresponds to the average result of 25 runs of the VRPTW heuristic 
described in Section 4.2.3. The data point corresponding to the benchmark scenario is denoted by a 
larger grey dot. In each plot, the horizontal axis represents the values of the characteristic under 
consideration. The vertical axis represents the synergy values as the average per cent savings of 
joint route planning as compared to the benchmark scenario. 
 
4.4.1  Number of Orders per FCE 
Figure 4-4 shows the sensitivity of the synergy value with respect to the number of orders 
per FCE. The number of orders per FCE is increased in intermediate steps of 10, until the total 
reaches 1000. The maximum number of orders per FCE therefore varies from scenario to scenario 
depending on the number of FCEs. In general, synergy values tend to increase initially, and then, 
having attained the maximum level, decrease. The rationale behind this is that if there are very few 
orders available there is not enough scale for a strong efficiency improvement through joint route 
planning. Isolated drop-off locations have a high probability of remaining isolated also in the joint 
route planning scenario, even more so if time windows avoid efficient combinations in a single 
route.  On  the  other  hand,  when  the  number  of  orders  per  FCE  is  very  large,  each  individual 
company  has  better  economies  of  scale  and  is  able  to  carry  out  routes  more  efficiently. 
Theoretically, the synergy values will tend to zero if the number of orders per FCE runs to infinity. 
However, even when only two FCEs cooperate, each having a large individual orderset of 500 
orders, joint route planning still offers a good opportunity to reduce costs (synergy value is 17.8%).  
Figure 4-4 also indicates that in relative terms, joint route planning is more profitable for 
small transport companies than for larger ones. This is an important consideration in for example 
the Netherlands and Belgium, where fragmentation in the road transport industry is high. In these 
two  countries,  there  are  approximately  15,000  transport  companies,  which  means  1  per  1,800 
inhabitants. This issue will be revisited in Chapter 6 where the relation between the efficiency and 
size  of  a  transport  company  is  investigated.  Consolidation  through  joint  route  planning  could 
therefore prove a promising option. However, it may not be reasonable to expect a very large Chapter 4: Joint Route Planning under Varying Market Conditions 
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number of small FCEs to cooperate in joint route planning, since the transaction costs needed for 
setting up and maintaining such a cooperation will eventually outweigh the absolute cost savings 
FCEs can attain. An elaboration on the role of transaction costs however lies beyond the scope of 
this thesis. A discussion of various types of transaction costs in cooperative transport networks can 
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Figure 4-4. Sensitivity: number of orders per FCE 
 
4.4.2  Average Order Size 
Figure 4-5 depicts the influence of order size on the maximum achievable synergy values. 
The average demand of the orders is varied by multiplying the size of every order by a factor that is 
defined per scenario. Fractional demands are rounded to the nearest integer. In the benchmark case, 
the average demand is 18.82 and the multiplication factor is equal to 1. At the left-most part of 
Figure 4-5, the factor is 0.1, and capacity restrictions are virtually absent. In this case, time window 
restrictions are the only restriction in the route construction. With the maximum value however 
(right-most side of Figure 4-5), even average-sized orders cannot be combined in a single truck, 
making capacity restrictions most important. In that case the average order size equals 134, and 
most of the orders are larger than half a truck capacity, rendering opportunities for consolidation in 
a single truck rare. The interpretation for real world applications is that joint route planning is more 
profitable in sectors where orders are small (e.g. consumer electronics or fashion), than in sectors 
where the average order is large (e.g. wood or paper). 



























Figure 4-5: Sensitivity: average order size 
 
4.4.3  Standard Deviation of Order Size 
Figure 4-6 shows the relation between synergy values and the variability in order sizes. The 
standard deviation of the demand size is adjusted by multiplying an order’s deviation from the 
average order size by a scenario-dependent factor. In this process the minimum order size remains 
1, and the maximum order size 200. With the exception of these cut-offs, this standard deviation 
adjustment leaves the average demand size unaltered. It turns out that there is no apparent relation 
between order size variability and synergy value. Or, in other words, increased scale is no solution 
to the operational problems imposed by a strong variability in order sizes. 
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Figure 4-6: Sensitivity: standard deviation of order sizes 
 
4.4.4  Time Window Width 
In the benchmark case, all time windows have a half-width of 15. In order to study the 
impact  of  time  window  width  on  the  synergy  value  of  joint  route  planning,  the  half-width  is 
multiplied by a scenario-dependent factor. For example, a time window of [200, 230] and a factor 
of 2 result in an adjusted time window of [215-15*2, 215+15*2], or [185,245]. Each time the 
window is limited however by the earliest and latest possible time at which a truck can leave and 
enter the depot. Figure 4-7 reveals the results of this sensitivity analysis. It shows that synergy 
values are highest in a situation with time windows of ‘average’ width. 
The reason for this lies in the fact that if time windows are very narrow there is hardly any 
flexibility in building the routes and it is thus hard to capitalise on increased economies of scale. 
On the other hand, if time windows are very wide, the synergy value also tends to decrease. This is 
because FCEs can already build quite efficient routes individually, because many orders can be 
combined into a feasible route. This illustrates the strong impact of time window constraints on the 
solution value for VRPTWs. For example, on the left-most side of the graph, the value of 0 refers 
to time windows that are in fact single points in time  where service at a customer’s drop-off 
location  must  start.  In  that  case,  total  distribution  costs  under  joint  route  planning  amount  to 
55,588.28. If time windows are ‘wide’ (factor 8; time window width of 240), these costs are only 
28,768.55. This means that imposing these strict time windows results in a cost increase of 93.2% 
in comparison with the case of wide time windows. 


























Figure 4-7: Sensitivity: Time window width 
 
4.4.5  Size of Distribution Area 
The sixth characteristic that potentially influences the level of synergy is the size of the 
distribution area, since this has direct consequences for the average distance between drop-off 
locations. To vary the size of the distribution area, the distance of each drop-off location from the 
depot is multiplied by a scenario-defined factor, and its position relocated on the line that starts at 
the depot site and crosses the customer’s former position. For example, with a factor of 0.5, a 
customer that was located at coordinates [ ] 150 , 300 in the benchmark scenario, is relocated to: 
( ) ( ) [ ] [ ] 200 , 275 5 . 0 * 250 150 250 , 5 . 0 * 250 300 250 = − + − + . 
The results in Figure 4-8 show that the synergy value gradually increases as the average 
distance between customers increases. This suggests that joint route planning is more profitable in 
sectors where customers are located across a large region (e.g. Europe), than it is in sectors where 
customers are located quite close to each other (e.g. regional distribution). 
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Figure 4-8: Sensitivity: size of distribution area 
 
4.4.6  Market Shares of FCEs 
The last characteristic that is varied in order to study its impact on the synergy value is the 
distribution of market shares over the three FCEs present in the benchmark scenario. The market 
concentration is determined by the Gini coefficient. Although this measure originates from social 
welfare theory, it can be straightforwardly applied to describe the inequality of market shares of 
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In (4.5),  i x  is the market share of FCE i, and  x is the average market share. Without loss of 
generality, it is assumed that the market share of FCE i is smaller than the market share of FCE j, if 




= =   , it is possible 
to choose the Gini coefficient for the benchmark scenario with three FCEs and construct uniquely 























  (4.7) 
2 1 x x β =   (4.8) 
2
3 1 x x β =   (4.9) 
 
If the Gini coefficient is at the benchmark level of 0, there is perfect equality of market 
shares and the order set is distributed evenly over the FCEs. On the other hand, a Gini coefficient 
of 1 indicates that the total market is in the hands of only one FCE. Figure 4-9 shows that the 
synergy value decreases if the total order set is divided less evenly over the participating FCEs. 
This is explained by the fact that in a strongly concentrated market, the leading FCE will be able to 




























Figure 4-9: Sensitivity: Market concentration in terms of Gini coefficient 
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4.5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this chapter the concept of joint route planning is discussed. Joint route planning can 
essentially  be  achieved  in  two  ways:  outsourcing  or  horizontal  cooperation.  The  goal  of  both 
concepts is to attain larger economies of scale that help to cut down distribution costs. For example, 
in the benchmark scenario described in Section 4.2.2, the savings as a result of joint route planning 
are considerable: 30.7% of total distribution costs. Sensitivity analyses were conducted to gain 
insight into the main drivers for synergy, and how these affect the synergy value. The results 
indicate that joint route planning is most beneficial in situations where there are a large number of 
FCEs of a uniform and not too large size. Furthermore, the synergy value increases if order sizes 
are small compared to a standard truck’s capacity, time windows are narrow, and inter-customer 
distances are large. Finally, the variation in order sizes does not seem to play an important role. The 
results are easily interpreted and can be used by practitioners to develop intuition on synergy value, 
should there be no time or budget to go through all the calculations. This intuition allows for a 
rapid determination as to whether a group of FCEs has a strong synergy potential. 
For  this  analysis  a  basic  distribution  setting  was  chosen.  Further  research  is  needed  to 
understand the impact of joint route planning in more complex distribution systems. It would be 
useful  to  perform  an  investigation  into  how  the  results  of  the  analysis  are  influenced  by  the 
introduction of e.g. multiple depots or pick up and delivery orders.  
This  finishes  the  introductory  part  of  this  thesis.  In  PART  II,  empirical  research  on 



















The second part of this thesis focuses on the potential of horizontal cooperation in practice. This is 
measured by mapping the attitudes of Logistics Service Providers towards the opportunities and 
impediments for horizontal cooperation. The analysis is based on two questionnaire surveys held in 
Flanders and the Netherlands. Furthermore, by linking the questionnaire results to financial data 
of the responding companies, assessments are made about the impact of horizontal cooperation on 
for example company profitability. At the end of PART II, the relevance of the topic for the logistics 
industry will be clear. In addition, statements will be made about the differences and resemblances 
in the attitudes of Flemish and Dutch Logistics Service Providers towards horizontal cooperation. 
The resemblances serve as the starting point for the formulation of more general, non-regionally 
restricted statements about horizontal cooperation in transport and logistics. 
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5.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This  chapter  describes  the  first  large  scale  empirical  study  on  the  potential  benefits  of 
horizontal  cooperation  in  logistics,  as  well  as  on  the  major  impediments  for  starting  and 
maintaining logistics cooperations in practice. The views of Logistics Service Providers (LSPs) on 
these issues are tested by means of a number of propositions that are formulated based on the 
opportunities and impediments for horizontal cooperation identified in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 and 
also on eleven in-depth interviews (see Section 5.3.1) with knowledgeable Flemish LSPs. Not all 
opportunities and impediments that arose from the literature study in Chapter 2 are incorporated in 
the propositions of this chapter for two reasons. Firstly, not all of them have an unambiguous 
interpretation for logistics practitioners responding to a questionnaire on horizontal cooperation. 
For  example,  the  development  of  new  products  is  not  a  likely  goal  of  horizontal  cooperation 
between LSPs. Secondly, to safeguard an acceptable response rate, it was necessary to keep the 
questionnaire short and to focus on only those opportunities and impediments that are most relevant 
to horizontal cooperations between LSPs. The relevance of the propositions was cross-checked by 
means of some preparatory interviews with industry experts. 
The  remainder  of  the  chapter  is  structured  as  follows.  In  Section  5.2  the  research 
propositions are formulated for surveying a large sample of LSPs in Flanders, the main logistics 
region in Belgium. The survey itself is discussed in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 then reports on the 
results of a factor analytical study based on the gathered data. Section 5.5 concludes with the main 
results of this chapter and identifies directions for further research. 
 
 
5.2  RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS 
 
This section describes the research propositions regarding opportunities and impediments for 
horizontal cooperation, as  presented to a large number of managing directors of LSPs.  
 
5.2.1  Opportunities 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (2004) mention three high-level ways in which companies can benefit 
from cooperation. They can do so by i) pooling their resources and concentrating on core-activities, 
by ii) sharing and leveraging the specific strengths and capabilities of the other participating firms, 
and by iii) trading different or complementary resources to achieve mutual gains and eliminate the Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  74 
high  cost  of  duplication.  Kogut  (1988)  summarises  the  advantages  of  cooperation  in  terms  of 
reducing the transaction costs resulting from small number bargaining, enhancing the competitive 
position  of  the  partners,  and  fulfilling  the  partner’s  quest  for  organizational  knowledge  and 
learning. For a complete overview of the potential opportunities of horizontal cooperation, we refer 
to Section 2.3. The seven specific propositions formulated based on this overview are subdivided in 
three groups: Costs and productivity, Customer Service and Market position. They are summarised 
in Table 5-1. 
 
Code  Proposition 
Costs and Productivity 
O1  Horizontal cooperation increases the company’s productivity for core activities, e.g. decrease in 
empty hauling, better usage of storage facilities etc. 
O2  Horizontal cooperation reduces the costs of non-core activities, e.g. organizing safety trainings, 
joint fuel facilities, etc. 
O3  Horizontal cooperation reduces purchasing costs, e.g. trucks, onboard computers, fuel etc. 
Customer Service 
O4  LSPs can specialise while at the same time broadening their services. 
O5  LSPs  can  offer  better  quality  of  service  at  lower  costs,  e.g.  in  terms  of  speed,  frequency  of 
deliveries, geographical coverage, reliability of delivery times etc. 
Market Position 
O6  Horizontal cooperation enables individual LSPs to tender with large shippers on larger contracts.  
O7  Horizontal cooperation helps to protect the company’s market share. 
Table 5-1: Propositions about opportunities of horizontal cooperation 
 
5.2.2  Impediments 
When compared to the possible opportunities, literature pays little attention to the burdens 
and dark sides of logistics cooperation (Zineldin and Bredenlöw, 2003). Horizontal cooperation is 
often an uncertain undertaking in which it is difficult to plan the required activities or measure the 
realised output. Therefore, having a trustworthy relationship is vital (Van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Vosselman, 2000; Tomkins, 2001). A typical source of relational risk is opportunistic behaviour of 
the  partners  i.e.,  actions  by  a  partner  that  do  not  comply  with  the  spirit  of  the  cooperation 
(Williamson, 1985; Das and Teng, 1998). A more elaborate list of impediments can be found in 
Section 2.4. Here, nine specific propositions are developed relating to impediments for horizontal 
cooperation between LSPs in four areas: Partner selection, Determining and dividing the gains, 
Unequal negotiation positions of partners, and Information and Communication Technology. Table 




Code  Proposition 
Partner Selection 
I1  It  is  hard  to  find  commensurable  LSPs  with  whom  it  is  possible  to  cooperate  for  (non-)core 
activities. 
I2  It  is  hard  to  find  a  reliable  party  that  can  coordinate  the  cooperation  in  such  a  way  that  all 
participants are satisfied. 
Determining and Dividing the Gains 
I3  It is hard for the partners to determine the benefits or operational savings of horizontal cooperation 
beforehand. 
I4  Partners find it hard to ensure a fair allocation of the shared workload in advance. 
I5  A fair allocation of benefits to all the partners is essential for a successful cooperation. 
Unequal Negotiation Positions of Partners 
I6  When an LSP cooperates with commensurable companies, it becomes harder to distinguish itself. 
I7  Over time smaller companies in the cooperation may lose customers or get pushed out of the 
market completely. 
I8  When benefits cannot be shared in a perceived fair way, the larger players will always benefit 
most. 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
I9  Cooperation is greatly hampered by the required indispensable ICT-investments. 
Table 5-2: Propositions about impediments to horizontal cooperation 
 
This chapter aims at linking characteristics of logistics companies to their attitudes towards 
the proposed opportunities and impediments for horizontal cooperation. Since this is the first time 
propositions on this subject are submitted to a large set of LSPs, exploratory factor analysis is used 
to  identify  not  directly  observable  factors  within  the  sets  of  propositions  on  opportunities  or 
impediments. Based on the resulting factors, a number of hypotheses are developed. The results of 
the factor analysis and a number of hypotheses are presented in detail in Section 5.4. 
 
 
5.3  THE SURVEY 
 
A  questionnaire  with  the  16  propositions  on  horizontal  cooperation  was  submitted  to  a 
sample of Flemish LSPs. This questionnaire can be consulted online (see E.R. 33). 
Respondents  were  asked  to  evaluate  each  proposition  by  choosing  one  of  the  following 
options: (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neutral, (4) agree, (5) strongly agree. This section 
provides detailed information on the composition of the sample, the questionnaire, the respondents, 
and the in-depth interviews that were conducted to complement the survey. 
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5.3.1  Questionnaire and Interviews 
After  fine-tuning  the  questionnaire  by  means  of  five  pilot  interviews,  a  personalised 
questionnaire was sent to 1,537 Flemish LSPs. The survey was sent out on March 12th, 2004, and 
to increase the response rate a reminder was sent out after one week. Completed questionnaires 
came  in  between  March  15th  and  April  14th  2004.  In  total,  162  useful  questionnaires  were 
returned.  
Eleven in-depth interviews were then conducted to cross-check and fine-tune the findings 
from  the  survey.  Companies  for  these  in-depth  interviews  were  selected  from  the  set  of 
respondents. These companies were selected based on their clear answers to the open questions in 
the questionnaire. Besides, it was made sure that the in-depth interviews took place across multiple 
sectors. A list of the interviewed companies (either for a pilot interview or an in-depth interview) 
can be found via E.R. 33. 
 
5.3.2  Sample and Response 
The  BelFirst  database  (E.R.  2),  containing  the  annual  reports  of  250,000  companies  in 
Belgium,  was  used  to  construct  a  representative  sample  of  around  1,500  LSPs.  The  sample 
included LSPs with the following five NaceBel main activity codes: Freight transport by road, 
Inland water transport, Cargo handling and storage, Freight forwarding and Courier activities other 
than national post activities. In the remainder of this chapter, the latter category will be referred to 
as ’express carriers’.  
Kumar et al. (1993) provide suggestions on selecting key informants. To limit the workload 
for the often small sized logistics companies in the sample, it was decided to select a single key 
informant. To ensure that each respondent was sufficiently knowledgeable and that responses were 
not  tainted  by  informant  bias, the  questionnaire  was  personalised  by  addressing  the  managing 
director by name for each selected company.  
Table 5-3 summarises both the structure of the sample and the response rate. For each cell in 
the table, the first number refers to the number of companies in the sample and the second to the 
number of LSPs in the BelFirst database. The sample size was pre-set to approximately 1,500. 25% 
of the questionnaires were sent to large companies and 75% to small and medium sized companies. 
This  ensures  a  sufficient  representation  of  the  larger  companies  in  view  of  their  economic 
importance and at the same time offers the possibility to thoroughly survey small and medium 
sized LSPs. To limit the risk of a zero response rate in the smallest categories, questionnaires were 
sent to all companies in a category with no more than ten companies, resulting in a total of 1,537 
LSPs. 
Cases in which questionnaires were returned because the address was unknown, or returned 
blank  because  the  company  stopped  its  activities,  are  reported  in  column  8  (‘invalid’).  These 
respondents were removed from the sample to calculate the net response rates presented in column Chapter 5: Opportunities and Impediments 
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10 in Table 5-3. Unfortunately, low response rates of about 10% have become exemplary for large-
scale mail surveys (see e.g. Wisner, 2003). Note however, that the true response rates may be 
somewhat higher because not all companies that ceased to exist can be expected to return the 
questionnaire. 
 
NaceBel main  
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2  9  11% 
          Total  1,537 
(4,906) 
34  162  11% 
Table 5-3. Response rate and sample composition  
 
The net response rate is highest for companies that are mainly active in road transport, inland 
water  transport  and  express.  The  small  number  of  respondents  for  the  activities  Inland  water 
transport (6 respondents) and express carriers (9 respondents) however limit the representativeness 
of the results for these categories. The low response for the Freight forwarders could be due to a 
low interest in horizontal cooperation. The in-depth interviews (see Section 5.3.1) revealed that 
these  LSPs  prefer  vertical  cooperation.  Horizontal  cooperation,  e.g.  by  exchanging  loads,  is 
sometimes perceived as a threat to existing forwarding activities. The response rate for the LSPs in 
the category Cargo handling and storage is higher than the response rate for the freight forwarders, 
but is still quite low (8%). 
It was checked whether there exist significant differences between the characteristics of the 
LSPs that responded to the survey and those who did not, because a systematic difference would 
compromise the generalisability of the results (Flynn et al., 1990). The reliability of the data is 
therefore tested in two ways. First, the respondents are compared to non-respondents based on two 
characteristics: number of employees in full time equivalents and type of annual report (contracted 
or complete). T-tests did not show any significant difference between the two groups of LSPs. 
Second, because a reminder was sent out, the potential non-response bias is assessed by comparing 
early versus late respondents. Respondents are considered late if their form was received later than 
March  23rd  2004,  since  this  was  the  indicated  end-date  for  the  respondents  to  return  their Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  78 
questionnaires. Again, t-tests did not show any statistically significant difference between the early 
and late respondents, both with respect to their evaluation of the propositions and their company 
characteristics. Based on the above it can be concluded that non-response bias is not a serious 
concern for the analysis in Section 5.4. 
 
 
5.4  ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
Table  5-4  provides  an  overview  of  the  respondents’  evaluations  of  the  propositions  on 
opportunities and impediments for horizontal cooperation. Note that the propositions in Dutch (see 
E.R.  33)  are  formulated  in  such  a  way  that  the  respondents  evaluate  the  opportunities  and 
impediments for horizontal cooperation in their own company, rather than for the potential of the 
concept in general. 
The numbers suggest that the propositions on the potential benefits of horizontal cooperation 
are well supported by the respondents. For each proposition, the percentage of respondents that 
agrees is considerably higher than the percentage that disagrees. This observation also holds for the 
propositions on impediments for cooperation. 
 













O1  4.17  0.99  152  6.2  4.9  13.0  75.9 
O2  3.65  1.00  152  6.2  8.0  33.3  52.5 
O3  3.42  1.13  152  6.2  16.7  35.2  42.0 
O4  3.74  1.08  152  6.2  9.9  25.3  58.6 
O5  3.56  1.10  151  6.8  10.5  34.0  48.8 
O6  3.60  1.12  152  6.2  13.6  29.0  51.2 
O7  3.24  1.08  152  6.2  19.1  41.4  33.3 
I1  3.84  0.96  155  4.3  8.0  21.6  66.0 
I2  4.00  0.87  154  4.9  5.6  17.3  72.2 
I3  3.54  0.89  153  5.6  13.0  27.8  53.7 
I4  3.73  0.89  154  4.9  8.6  21.6  64.8 
I5  4.11  0.84  154  4.9  3.7  15.4  75.9 
I6  3.52  0.90  153  5.6  13.6  27.2  53.7 
I7  3.95  1.01  154  4.9  8.6  21.0  65.4 
I8  3.60  1.19  155  4.3  19.1  20.4  56.2 
I9  3.43  0.97  154  4.9  14.2  38.9  42.0 
Table 5-4: Evaluations of propositions on opportunities and impediments 
 
The numbers in Table 5-4 indicate that the most supported opportunity of cooperation is the 
possible increase in a company’s productivity on its core activities (O1). More than 75% of the 
respondents of the survey agrees with proposition O1, while less than 5% disagrees. The in-depth 
interviews revealed that decreases in empty mileage, better usage of storage facilities and increased 
load factors are the most common examples.  Chapter 5: Opportunities and Impediments 
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A large share of the respondents is neutral about the proposition that horizontal cooperation 
helps to protect market share (O7). Both the in-depth interviews and the literature (Becker et al., 
2004) affirmed that shippers do not expect LSPs to cooperate to provide them with a full service 
concept. Cooperation between LSPs is only encouraged if it brings the shippers significant cost 
reductions and as long as it does not jeopardise their negotiating position. This, together with the 
neutral evaluation of proposition O7, suggests that horizontal cooperation in logistics should be 
regarded as a means for LSPs to increase their productivity, rather than as a reaction to requests 
from the demand side. 
According to the respondents the most severe impediments for cooperation are the problems 
of finding a reliable party that can coordinate the cooperation in such a way that all participants are 
satisfied (I2) and the construction of fair allocation mechanisms for the attained savings (I5). The 
in-depth interviews revealed that LSPs can reduce or circumvent the latter problem in a pragmatic 
way. In the case of an (informal) freight exchange between road transport companies for example, 
the  company  that  submits  a  transport  order  to  the  exchange  could  charge  a  commission  to 
compensate for its efforts in acquiring the order. If none of the other partners in the cooperation 
decides to accept the order, the company that submitted the order in the pool has to fulfil the order 
itself. In this way, difficult issues on the determination and distribution of the savings generated 
within the cooperation can be avoided. Although this pragmatic solution sometimes works out in 
practice, it can be considered a little opportunistic. More consistent gain sharing methods will be 
discussed in Chapter 9 and Chapter 10. 
The impediment that received the least support concerns the required ICT-investments (I9). 
The in-depth interviews affirmed that ICT costs are only an issue for cooperations of a medium size 
and intensity. The administrative burden of handling the transactions of the cooperation may be too 
large to handle by phone or fax, but cannot justify investments in an Electronic Data Interchange 
(EDI) system or a sophisticated web-based exchange system because the cooperation lacks the 
critical mass. 
 
5.4.1  Factor Analysis 
This section describes how exploratory factor analysis is used to investigate whether the 
reactions to the sets of propositions on opportunities and impediments can be summarised in a 
smaller number of not directly observable factors. The principal components method is used to 
extract factors, and the varimax method is applied to rotate the component matrix in order to 
facilitate its interpretation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (Kaiser and Cerny, 1977) is used to 
evaluate the fit of the model. The resulting measure of sampling adequacy is 0.804, which indicates 
that the use of factor analysis on this dataset is appropriate. Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  80 
Three principal components with eigenvalues larger than one can be extracted that together 
account  for  57.2%  of  the  variance  in  the  data.  The  first  factor  comprises  all  seven  proposed 
opportunities of horizontal cooperation and is therefore called Opportunities. The second factor is 
classified as Partner Selection Impediments and consists of the propositions I1 and I2. The third 
factor,  Other  Impediments,  contains  the  seven  remaining  propositions  on  impediments  for 
horizontal cooperation. The results of the analysis are reported in Table 5-5. Unidimensionality of 
the  three factors  has  been  cross-checked  and  affirmed  by  subjecting  each  factor  to  a  separate 
exploratory factor analysis. 
 
  Factor Loadings 
Factor 
(% of Var.) 




O1: Horizontal cooperation increases the company’s 
productivity for core activities, e.g. decrease in empty 
hauling, better usage of storage facilities etc. 
0.735  -0.259  0.159 
  O2: Horizontal cooperation reduces the costs of non-core 
activities, e.g. organizing safety trainings, joint fuel 
facilities etc. 
0.769  -0.086  0.061 
  O3: Horizontal cooperation reduces purchasing costs, e.g. 
trucks, onboard computers, fuel etc. 
0.722  0.089  -0.015 
  O4: LSPs can specialise while at the same time broadening 
their services. 
0.787  0.170  -0.063 
  O5: Horizontal cooperation enables individual LSPs to 
tender with large shippers on larger contracts. 
0.727  0.102  -0.037 
  O6: LSPs can offer better quality of service at lower costs, 
e.g. in terms of speed, frequency of deliveries, geographical 
coverage, reliability of delivery times etc. 
0.766  0.057  0.002 
  O7: Horizontal cooperation helps to protect the company’s 
market share. 
0.531  0.391  -0.047 
         
I1: It is hard to find commensurable LSPs with whom it is 
possible to cooperate for (non-)core activities. 




I2: It is hard to find a reliable party that can coordinate the 
cooperation in such a way that all participants are satisfied. 
0.072  0.775  0.350 
         
I3: It is hard for the partners to determine the benefits or 
operational savings of horizontal cooperation beforehand. 
-0.157  0.227  0.718  Other 
Impediments 
(21.2%)  I4: Partners find it hard to ensure a fair allocation of the 
shared workload in advance. 
0.061  -0.039  0.705 
  I5: A fair allocation of benefits to all the partners is 
essential for a successful cooperation. 
0.247  0.361  0.507 
  I6: When an LSP cooperates with commensurable 
companies, it becomes harder to distinguish itself. 
-0.248  0.275  0.569 
  I7: Over time smaller companies in the cooperation may 
lose customers or get pushed out of the market completely. 
-0.042  0.097  0.816 
  I8: When benefits cannot be shared in a perceived fair way, 
the larger players will always benefit most. 
-0.036  0.230  0.706 
  I9: Cooperation is greatly hampered by the required 
indispensable ICT-investments. 
0.263  0.010  0.650 
         
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy: 0.804 
Bartlett Test of Sphericity: 922.280, Significance: 0.000 
Table 5-5: Results of Factor Analysis 
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5.4.2  Hypothesis Testing 
This section searches for the elements that determine the LSPs’ attitudes towards the three 
factors that emerged from the above factor analysis. Empirical investigations on the opportunities 
of horizontal cooperation and on the choice of a suitable partner have been undertaken in a broader 
context (e.g. Geringer, 1991; Nielsen, 2003; Beckman et al., 2004). These studies have identified a 
number of company criteria that may influence an LSP’s attitude towards cooperation. While most 
of these studies address vertical cooperation in an international context, a number of criteria that 
are applicable to both the national and the international context seem to recur. Financial status of 
the potential partner and its size appeared as two of the most important criteria for partner selection 
(Nielsen, 2003). Studies focusing on the search for economies of scale and access to technology or 
markets (Inkpen and Crossan, 1995), the comparison of the firm’s market power compared to 
industry  leaders  (Hamel  et  al.,  1989)  and  the  initial  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  the  partners 
(Bleeke and Ernst, 1995) confirm that financial status and size of the partners is relevant. The 
NaceBel database (E.R. 18) contains information on both characteristics, enabling the use of these 
data to assess their relation with the evaluations of the three factors by the respondents. 
In addition, whether firms already cooperate and how long they have been working with 
each other is also stressed as an influential factor in the literature (e.g. Heide and John, 1990). 
Consequently, the effect of existing cooperation on the respondents’ assessment of opportunities, 
partner selection impediments and other impediments is examined. 
For the value added and gross return on assets, the most recent year (2002) for which all 
respondents deposited their annual reports was used. In order to find significant relations between 
the developed factors and the company characteristics, three regression equations were constructed. 
In these equations, the three factors have been regressed on the explanatory variables cooperation, 
size and profitability: 
 
Opportunities   = 
11 12 13 Cooperation Size Profitability β β β + +   (5.1) 
Partner SelectionImpediments  = 
21 22 23 Cooperation Size Profitability β β β + +   (5.2) 
Other Impediments   = 
31 32 33 Cooperation Size Profitability β β β + +   (5.3) 
 
The  remainder  of  this  section  discusses  hypotheses  for  each  coefficient  in  the  above 
regression equations. Table 5-6 summarises the formulation of these hypotheses and provides the 
corresponding results. All hypotheses are tested at the 5% significance level. Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  82 
 







       
H1  EQ1  Cooperation does not influence the attitude of 
respondents towards opportunities. 
β11  0.108  0.193  Supported 
H2    Size does not influence the attitude of 
respondents towards opportunities. 
β12  0.084  0.308  Supported 
H3    Profitability does not influence the attitude of 
respondents towards opportunities. 
β13  -0.237  0.004  Rejected 
 
Partner Selection Impediments Hypotheses 
       
H4  EQ2  Cooperation does not influence the attitude of 
respondents towards partner selection 
impediments. 
β21  -0.138  0.103  Supported 
H5    Size does not influence the attitude of 
respondents towards partner selection 
impediments. 
β22  -0.052  0.532  Supported 
H6    Profitability does not influence the attitude of 
respondents towards partner selection 
impediments. 
β23  -0.216  0.010  Rejected 
 
Other Impediments Hypotheses 
       
H7  EQ3  Cooperation does not influence the attitude of 
respondents towards other impediments. 
β31  -0.067  0.437  Supported 
H8    Size does not influence the attitude of 
respondents towards other impediments. 
β32  -0.115  0.182  Supported 
H9    Profitability does not influence the attitude of 
respondents towards other impediments. 
β33  -0.011  0.898  Supported 
Table 5-6: Overview of hypotheses and results 
 
Opportunities Hypotheses 
Hypothesis (H1) states that cooperation does not influence the attitude of the respondents 
towards opportunities, or in other words: cooperators and non-cooperators value the opportunities 
offered by horizontal cooperation equally. This hypothesis is supported by the data (β11: 0.108, 
significance: 0.193), which indicates that the opportunities expected by the non-cooperators seem 
to be experienced in practice by the cooperators. This, together with the high average scores of the 
propositions about opportunities, illustrates the strong potential of horizontal cooperation for LSPs. 
The hypothesis stating that size does not influence opportunities (H2) was supported (β12: 
0.084, significance: 0.308). Prior to the analysis, size was expected to affect opportunities in two 
ways.  Since  smaller  companies  have  smaller  economies  of  scale  and  can  thus  operate  less 
efficiently individually, they could benefit from forming a coalition in order to compete more 
effectively  with  larger  companies.  Therefore  size  would  have  a  negative  relation  with 
opportunities. On the other hand, small companies are likely to operate on market niches where 
cooperation with other LSPs is not possible or desirable. In contrast to these smaller companies, 
larger LSPs generally offer a broader service range and have a larger customer base so that they 
can more easily select suitable activities on which cooperation might be profitable. This argument Chapter 5: Opportunities and Impediments 
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would in turn predict a positive relation between size and opportunities. Testing the hypothesis 
shows that these opposite effects might cancel out to result in an insignificant coefficient. 
H3 states that profitability does not influence the attitude of firms towards opportunities. 
This  hypothesis  is  rejected  by  the  survey  data  (β13:  -0.237,  significance:  0.004).  A  possible 
explanation of the observed negative relation is that the more profitable an individual company is, 
the less inclined he is to cooperate with competitors. At the other end of the spectrum, for low-
profit or unprofitable LSPs, cooperation can be a surviving strategy to increase efficiency and 
improve financial results. 
 
Partner Selection Impediments Hypotheses 
H4 states that cooperation does not influence partner selection impediments. This hypothesis 
was  supported  (β21:  -0.138,  significance:  0.103).  In  other  words,  there  is  no  evidence  that 
cooperators perceive the problems with finding partners differently than non-cooperators do. A 
priori, the expectation was that cooperators would encounter fewer problems in finding partners 
than non-cooperators do. This expectation is however not supported by the data. In the survey, 
respondents  were  also  asked  whether  it  would  be  better  to  have  an  independent  third  party 
coordinating the partnership. Table 5-7 shows that the majority of the respondents do not consider 
independent  parties  the  most  adequate  candidates  to  lead  and  coordinate  a  cooperation.  This 
suggests that there is little demand for non-asset based Fourth Party Logistics parties or consultants 
to start up or coordinate horizontal cooperation. 
 
  “YES”  “NO” 
Frequency  17  50 
Additional 
remarks 
Provided  that  the  coordinator  carries 
responsibility. 
A third party can be useful in bringing 
parties  together  and  exploring  the 
possibilities of a cooperation. 
It is preferable to remain in complete control. 
The third party introduces extra costs. 
One of the participants should coordinate the 
cooperation. 
Table 5-7: Is it preferable that a third independent party coordinates the cooperation? 
 
H5 states that size does not influence the way LSPs think of impediments related to partner 
selection. This  hypothesis  was  supported  (β22:  -0.052,  significance:  0.532).  In  advance,  it  was 
expected that large LSPs would not be favoured partners for smaller LSPs, because larger firms 
could misuse their greater economic strength.  
H6 states that profitability does not influence partner selection impediments. This hypothesis 
is rejected at the 5% level (β23: -0.216, significance: 0.010). The interpretation of the observed 
negative relation is that very profitable companies experience fewer difficulties in finding partners 
than less profitable LSPs. An explanation might be that profitable LSPs have more to offer in terms 
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to overcome the required initial investment of time and money to start an intensive cooperation. 
This increases the probability that the cooperation will last and investments are not in vain. 
 
Other Impediments Hypotheses 
H7 states that cooperation does not influence the view of LSPs on other impediments. This 
hypothesis was supported by the data (β31: -0.067, significance: 0.437), suggesting that cooperators 
and  non-cooperators  evaluate  the  other  (i.e.,  non-partner  selection)  impediments  alike.  Stated 
differently, this seems to suggest that the impediments expected by the non-cooperators are in fact 
experienced  by  the  cooperators.  In  the  questionnaire,  respondents  were  asked  to  report  on 
additional impediments encountered in practice for structural, long-term cooperation. The answers 
- as well as the number of respondents providing this answer - are given in Table 5-8. The fact that 
14 respondents consider the small size of their company to be an impediment for cooperation puts 
the conclusions under hypothesis 5 into perspective. These small-sized LSPs (one or two full time 
equivalent  employees)  indicate  that  they  either  lack  the  business  connections  to  set  up  a 
cooperation or have a small number of customers that fill their capacity entirely. 
 
Explanation  Frequency 
Our company is too small.  14 
Incidental  cooperation  is  OK,  but  structural  cooperation  is  not  desirable  because  of 
competition considerations. 
6 
Agreements are not complied with in a cooperation.  5 
Competition prohibits cooperation.  4 
We are interested in joining a cooperation, but the Flemish logistics sector lacks the 
broad vision that is necessary to start such initiatives. 
4 
Our company offers services that are too specialised.  4 
We do not yet cooperate horizontally, but we are looking for partners.  2 
Cooperation is impossible in the Flemish logistics sector.  2 
We have not thought about it yet.  2 
Other (lack of top-level and government support, strict customer requirements)   5 
Table 5-8: Additional impediments to cooperation 
 
H8  states  that  company  size  does  not  impact  other  impediments.  This  hypothesis  was 
supported (β32: -0.115, significance: 0.182), indicating that there are no significant differences in 
the way cooperators and non-cooperators evaluate the proposed impediments. 
H9  states  that  profitability  does  not  influence  other  impediments.  This  hypothesis  was 
supported (β33: -0.011, significance: 0.898), which suggests that profitability of an LSP does not 
help to avoid or overcome the other impediments for cooperation. 
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5.5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
To  assess  potential  benefits  of  horizontal  cooperation  between  LSPs  and  the  main 
impediments to its implementation, 1,537 LSPs were contacted in Flanders, Belgium. Together 
with the Netherlands, Flanders is the centre of gravity of logistics services in Europe, hosting the 
vast majority of European Distribution Centres. Although this study is exploratory in nature, the 
survey results provide the logistics sector with some important insights into horizontal cooperation. 
The opportunities of horizontal cooperation, introduced in Chapter 2 and further developed 
into specific propositions in Section 5.2, are widely supported across the Flemish logistics sector. 
The evaluations show a positive agree/disagree balance for all seven proposed opportunities. O1 
(“Horizontal cooperation increases the company’s productivity for core activities”) receives the 
strongest support. In particular, it receives more approval than O2 (“Horizontal cooperation reduces 
the costs of non-core activities”). It can be concluded that cooperation on core activities, although it 
involves the exchange of customer information, is considered to be more desirable than cooperation 
on  non-core  activities  because  of  the  higher  cost  savings  potential.  Apart  from  cost  and 
productivity opportunities, the strong support for O4 (“LSPs can specialise while at the same time 
broadening their services”) leads to the conclusion that respondents consider horizontal cooperation 
to be an interesting possibility for increasing their customer service. The broad support by all 
respondents for the propositions on opportunities is however negatively related to the profitability 
of the respondents (Hypothesis 3). 
The  factor  analysis  in  Section  5.4  subdivided  the  proposed  impediments  for  horizontal 
cooperations into two sets: Partner Selection Impediments and Other Impediments. The first set 
(Partner Selection Impediments) consists of two propositions that are strongly supported by the 
respondents. Partner choice is vital for the success or failure of cooperations and is well-studied in 
the organizational science literature, (e.g. Geringer, 1991; Nielsen, 2003; Beckman et al., 2004). 
The problems with finding suitable partners are less severe for the more profitable respondents 
(Hypothesis  6).  Concerning  the  other  impediments,  respondents  expect  most  difficulties  from 
issues relating to bargaining power: I4 (“Partners find it hard to ensure a fair allocation of the 
shared workload in advance”), I5 (“A fair allocation of benefits to all the partners is essential for a 
successful cooperation”), I7 (“Over time smaller companies in the cooperation may lose customers 
or  get  pushed  out  of  the  market  completely”),  and  I8  (“When  benefits  cannot  be  shared  in  a 
perceived fair way, the larger players will always benefit most”). Potential partners must therefore 
explicitly  take  these  impediments  into  account  and  take  actions  to  overcome  them  before 
cooperation starts. Unfortunately, the literature on the distribution of both costs and benefits arising 
from  horizontal  cooperation  is  scarce.  To  start  filling  this  gap,  the  gain  sharing  issue  will  be 
revisited in Chapter 9 and Chapter 10.   87




6.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Many logistics companies are facing hard times (see Chapter 1). This chapter will focus on 
European Road Transport Companies (RTCs) in particular. In the light of this, we will start by 
taking  a  closer  look  at  recent  trends  that  are  of  special  importance  to  RTCs.  Low  capacity 
utilisation, significant amounts of empty haulage (although this is not applicable to some markets, 
e.g.  packed  goods),  declining  profit  margins,  and  a  negative  public  image  have  become 
symptomatic of the companies over the last years. The main causes for these problems are the 
fierce competition in the globalizing markets, high fixed costs, rising petrol and labour prices, the 
proliferation of products with shorter life cycles and the ever-increasing expectations of customers 
in terms of both service and price. This has caused a strong fragmentation of transport flows, which 
in turn has led to severe adverse effects on RTCs’ business and profitability. Eurostat figures (E.R. 
9) show that after an increase in the 1990s, the number of active RTCs has steadily been declining 













Figure 6-1. Number of RTCs (source: Eurostat, E.R. 9) 
 
Gaining  greater  insight  into  the  characteristics  of  those  carriers  with  poor  or  excellent 
performance  is  critical  for  the  long-term  competitiveness  of  the  whole  sector.  This  chapter 
specifically  aims  at  increasing  this  understanding,  and  focuses  on  the  potential  of  horizontal 
cooperation  to  improve  efficiency  and  profitability  of  RTCs.  To  this  end,  Data  Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) is used to test conjectures on efficiency in road transport, based on the survey data 
described  in  Chapter  5.  The  remainder  of  this  chapter  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  6.2 Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  88 
introduces the conjectures and their rationale. Then Section 6.3 elaborates on the setup of the 
survey in Flanders and the results. Consequently in Section 6.4, the use of DEA is explained and 
the results of the DEA are provided in Section 6.5, together with the testing of the conjectures. 
Finally, Section 6.6 draws the conclusions of this analysis. 
 
 
6.2  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The first two conjectures relate to the scale at which RTCs operate. It is evident that from an 
operational point of view, RTCs benefit from a certain level of scale because this enables them to 
construct efficient (round)trips, reduce inter-drop distances and/or reduce empty mileage. Figure 
4-4 in Chapter 4 provides quantitative evidence for this intuition. On the other hand, if companies 
grow too large, coordination costs may increase disproportionately. Together, these two effects 
would imply the existence of an ‘optimal’ size for RTCs. It is hypothesised that in Flanders the 
sector is too fragmented, i.e., that many RTCs are operating below their optimal size. In 2003 for 
example, the number of RTCs in Flanders equalled 4,667. With a population of around 6 million 
people,  this  means  that  there  is  one  RTC  per  1,285  inhabitants.  The  following  two  related 
conjectures are formulated and tested to gain insight into the optimal firm size: 
C1: Larger companies in Flanders are more efficient. 
C2: The Belgian transport market is too fragmented. 
 
Secondly,  we  are  interested  in  apparent  relations  between  the  characteristics,  efficiency 
levels and horizontal cooperation of a firm. It was argued in Chapter 2 that horizontal cooperation 
is a possible means to improve efficiency of logistics companies such as RTCs. This leads one to 
expect that RTCs that are in fact engaged in a horizontal cooperation perform better on average 
than companies that are not. 
However, successfully implementing and managing horizontal cooperations is not easy (cf. 
Verstrepen et al., 2006). A considerable amount of vision, market knowledge, and professionalism 
is required before a company finds a workable means of cooperating horizontally with potential 
competitors.  It  is  therefore  anticipated  that  highly  inefficient  companies  have  enough  trouble 
managing their own business, and will be less inclined to start up a horizontal cooperation than 
their more efficient counterparts. Furthermore, we are interested in knowing whether there is a link 
between the scale of an RTC and horizontal cooperation. This boils down to the following three 




C3: Cooperating companies show greater efficiency levels than non-cooperating companies. 
C4: Companies interested in (intensified) cooperation are more efficient than companies that are 
not interested. 
C5: Larger companies cooperate more often than smaller ones. 
 
Finally, we want to know if the efficiency level of firms has an impact on their attitude 
towards  opportunities  of  or  impediments  for  horizontal  cooperation.  If  statistically  significant 
relationships are found, these relationships, together with the result of conjecture C4, can tell if 
horizontal cooperation is primarily a ‘defensive’ strategy to solve inefficiency problems, or a more 
‘proactive’ strategy to protect the satisfactory current efficiency level of an RTC. To test this, use 
the following two conjectures are used. 
C6: Less efficient companies value the opportunities of cooperation higher than more efficient 
companies do. 
C7: Inefficient companies consider the impediments for horizontal cooperation to be more severe 
than less efficient firms do. 
 
 
6.3  THE SURVEY 
 
This study builds upon the results of the survey discussed in Chapter 5. This section briefly 
elaborates on some results of the survey that are of special importance for the goals of the current 
chapter. Furthermore, it is explained why certain respondents were excluded from the DEA. 
 
6.3.1  Sample Selection and Respondents 
The survey included LSPs in the categories freight transport by road, inland water transport, 
cargo  handling  and  storage,  courier  activities  other  than  national  post  activities  and  freight 
forwarding. With a few exceptions, see the National Bank of Belgium website (E.R. 35) for details, 
all Belgian companies are obliged to publish their annual accounts. Whereas large companies must 
submit a ‘complete’ annual account, small and medium-sized companies are permitted to submit a 
short or ‘contracted’ annual account. A ‘large’ company is defined as a company that either on 
average  employs  more  than  100  people  during  a  specific  year  or  exceeds  at  least  one  of  the 
following three criteria: 
•  Average number of employees of 50 
•  Annual turnover (excluding Value Added Tax) of € 7,300,000. 
•  Value of total assets of € 3,650,000 
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The selection of the sample was based on the annual accounts of 2002, which was the most 
recent year for which all reports had been submitted at the time of the survey (for the setup of the 
sample and the response, see Table 5-3). Because the sample contained five different types of 
companies that are generally active in disjunctive markets, it is not possible to objectively compare 
their efficiency levels. Therefore one focus category is chosen: freight transport by road. With a 
market share of 75% of the total freight transport volume (Eurostat, E.R. 9), this transport mode is 
dominant in Flanders. Restricting the analysis to road freight transport respondents reduces the size 
of the sample to 118.  
To calculate company efficiency levels, data on their input and output levels are needed. Due 
to the fact that information on inputs and output levels are considered confidential by many LSPs, 
the danger exists that including these questions in the questionnaire would significantly reduce the 
response rate. Therefore, information is collected on total assets and total hours worked (inputs) 
and  added  value  and  profit  or  loss  (outputs)  from  the  BelFirst  database.  Since  the  companies 
completed the questionnaires in 2004, the most recent input/output data that were available at the 
time of the analysis are used. These were the data of 2003. Of the 118 responding RTCs however, 
seven appearing in the 2002 edition did not appear in the BelFirst database of 2003, meaning that 
they terminated their activities in the period between the survey date and final date on which the 
2003 data could have been submitted. These seven companies have been removed from the sample, 
resulting  in  a  set  of  111  companies  for  which  the  required  financial  data  are  available. 
Unfortunately, the smallest companies are not obliged by Belgian law to submit a social balance 
sheet. Since the data on labour input come from these social balance sheets, these companies also 
have to be removed from the set. After removing these very small companies the sample consists of 
83 companies that have filed all relevant data. One extra firm was removed because the total hours 
worked in that company amounted to only 152 for 2003, which was considered too few for a 
normally operating company. The next smallest number of hours worked was 1,501, which is close 
to 1 FTE, so all other responding companies in the set are retained. The final analysis set therefore 
consists of 82 companies. 
 
6.3.2  Short Survey Results 
This section provides a summary of the results of the survey that are relevant for the current 
chapter.  More  specifically,  in  order  to  test  conjectures  C6  and  C7  the  respondents’  attitudes 
towards opportunities of and impediments for horizontal cooperation are required. The formulation 
of these opportunities and impediments can be found in Table 5-1 and Table 5-2. 
Table 6-1 indicates that both the propositions on the impediments and on the opportunities of 
horizontal cooperation are endorsed quite strongly. The most supported opportunity is the possible 
increase in a company’s productivity on its core activities (O1). 79% of the respondents to the 
survey agreed with this proposition, while only 2% disagreed. The in-depth interviews (see Section Chapter 6: Efficiency of Road Transport Companies 
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5.3.1) revealed that decreases in empty mileage, better usage of storage facilities and increased load 
factors are the most common examples. The impediments for cooperation that the respondents 
consider  most  prohibitive  is  the  problem  of  finding  a  reliable  party  that  can  coordinate  the 
cooperation  in  such  a  way  that  all  participants  are  satisfied  (I2)  and  the  construction  of  fair 
allocation mechanisms for the attained savings (I5). 
 
Code  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
#Observ.  Missing    Str. 
disagree 
Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Str. 
agree 
O1  4.26  0.83  77  5    1  1  10  30  35 
O2  3.68  0.92  77  5    1  4  31  24  17 
O3  3.30  1.04  77  5    3  11  36  14  13 
O4  3.71  1.05  77  5    4  4  20  31  18 
O5  3.55  1.02  76  6    5  1  31  25  14 
O6  3.57  1.16  77  5    4  9  24  19  21 
O7  3.29  1.06  77  5    3  14  30  18  12 
Total  3.62  1.06                 
                     
I1  3.92  0.97  79  3    1  6  16  31  25 
I2  4.05  0.83  79  3    0  3  16  34  26 
I3  3.54  0.89  78  4    0  11  24  33  10 
I4  3.72  0.88  78  4    2  5  17  43  11 
I5  4.10  0.86  78  4    1  2  13  34  28 
I6  3.57  0.85  77  5    0  10  21  38  8 
I7  3.97  0.94  78  4    0  6  17  28  27 
I8  3.59  1.17  78  4    3  13  18  23  21 
I9  3.48  0.87  77  5    0  8  35  23  11 
Total  3.77  0.95                 
Table 6-1. Summary of evaluations of the propositions on opportunities and impediments 
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6.3.3  Categorisations 
To support the analysis of the conjectures formulated in the introduction, 3 categorisations of 
respondents are introduced. These are explained in Table 6-2. 
 
 
Categorisation  Explanation 
Cooperator & Non-cooperator  A  respondent  is  indicated  to  be  a  cooperator  if  he/she  regards 
him/herself as currently cooperating horizontally on either core or non-
core activities (questionnaire result, see E.R. 33). 
Interested & Not-interested  Companies  who  answered  positively  to  the  question  “In  the  current 
situation,  are  you  interested  in  (intensifying)  horizontal  cooperation 
with colleague companies” are referred to as interested firms, those who 
negated are labeled not interested firms (questionnaire result, see E.R. 
33). 
Complete account & 
Contracted account 
This  categorisation  is  based  on  the  type  of  annual  account  that  a 
company has to submit (result form BelFirst database, E.R. 2). 
Table 6-2. Categorisations of respondents 
 
When the results in Table 6-1 are reorganized into the described categorisation, the numbers 
in  Table  6-3  are  produced.  The  null  hypotheses  state  that  there  is  no  difference  between  the 
evaluations  of  different  subgroups.  In  the  top-left  corner  of  Table  6-3  for  example,  the  null 
hypothesis is: “Cooperators and Non cooperators value the opportunities of horizontal cooperation 
alike”. It turns out that Cooperators agree with the opportunities of horizontal cooperation more 
than  non-cooperators  do.  Similarly,  the  cooperators  consider  the  impediments  for  horizontal 
cooperation to be less severe than the non-cooperators do. Both observations also hold true for the 
interested vs. the not interested companies. Finally, the companies with a contracted annual account 
consider the impediments for horizontal cooperation to be more severe than the companies with a 
complete annual account. 
 
  Opportunities    Impediments 












Cooperator (n=33)  3.77  1.09  30264.5  0.002    3.65  0.96  52748  0.005 
Non-cooperator (n=49)  3.51  1.02        3.86  0.93     
                   
Interested (n=34)  4.04  1.05  21011  0.000    3.6  1.06  52230  0.001 
Not interested (n=48)  3.31  0.95        3.9  0.82     
                   
Contracted account (n=61)  3.6  1.06  27811  0.547    3.84  0.9  41465  0.009 
Complete account (n=21)  3.69  1.05        3.59  1.04     
Table 6-3. Breakdown of results according to categorisations 
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6.4  THE USE OF DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS 
 
The conjectures listed in the introduction assume knowledge about the efficiency level of 
RTCs. However, this efficiency is not directly measurable, but rather depends on the levels of 
multiple outputs, relative to the used amounts of multiple inputs. In cases where a set of Decision 
Making  Units  (in  this  case  these  are  RTCs)  perform  similar  tasks  under  multiple  inputs  and 
multiple outputs, DEA is considered an appropriate technique to measure efficiency.  
DEA was developed by Charnes et al. (1978), based on work of Farrell (1957). It allows the 
measurement of the efficiency of firms by benchmarking them with respect to an estimated piece-
wise linear production function. This model is known as the CCR model, after its inventors. Banker 
et al. (1984) further built upon the CCR model to arrive at the BCC model. Whereas the CCR 
model explicitly assumes that companies are operating at their most efficient scale by imposing 
constant returns to scale (CRS), the BCC model does not. The BCC model is therefore used for 
analysing variable returns to scale (VRS) situations. Both the BCC and CCR models are used to 
calculate relative efficiency scores and scale efficiencies. 
The best performance or efficient frontier is the boundary of the convex hull of the set of 
efficient companies in the input/output space (Charnes et al., 1978; Deprins et al., 1984; Fare et al., 
1985; Banker, 1993). Two basic approaches exist in DEA to estimate this frontier. The first is 
input-oriented,  the  second  output-oriented.  In  an  input  orientation,  outputs  are  fixed  at  their 
observed  levels  and  companies  are  expected  to  proportionally  reduce  their  input  levels  in  the 
direction of their efficient peers. In this case, an RTC is not efficient if it is possible to increase any 
output without increasing any input and without decreasing any other output. If, on the other hand, 
an output orientation is chosen, the input levels are fixed and the possibility of a proportional 
increase of the created outputs is explored. In this input-oriented model, an RTC is not efficient if it 
is possible to decrease any input without increasing any other input and without decreasing any 
output. The latter orientation is considered the most appropriate in the current context, because the 
assets and workforce of the RTCs are usually rather fixed: in total 96.5% of the hours worked in 
the Flemish road transport sector is made by employees on a fixed contract. The challenge for these 
companies lies in generating more profit and/or added value with these given inputs. Measures that 
can be taken to attain this goal are e.g. increasing marketing activities or engaging in projects such 
as horizontal cooperation. 
Because  of  its  ability  to  model  relationships  with  multiple  inputs  and  multiple  outputs 
without  a  priori  assumptions  on  the  underlying  functional  form,  DEA  has  been  applied  in 
numerous areas (Seiford (1997) provides a DEA bibliography until 1996). One of the main areas of 
DEA application has been transport and logistics. However, most emphasis in the literature on this 
domain is on airliners’ efficiency (e.g. Adler and Golany, 2001; Chiou and Chen, 2006), seaports 
(e.g. Pestana Barros and Athanassiou, 2004; Turner et al., 2004), urban transport systems (e.g. Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  94 
Boame, 2004; Karlaftis, 2004), and traffic safety (e.g. Mejza and Corsi, 1999; Odeck, 2006). As far 
as  logistics  is  concerned,  DEA  applications  mainly  focus  on  customer-supplier  relations  (e.g. 
Kleinsorge et al., 1991; Narasimhan et al., 2001), and in-company logistics processes of production 
companies (e.g.  Clarke  and  Gourdin,  1991;  Ross and  Droge,  2004).  However,  until  now little 
attention has been paid to the efficiency of third parties that perform logistics services for shippers. 
Taking  into  account  the  economic  importance  of  these  LSPs,  this  is  an  important  gap  in  the 
literature. 
The general output-oriented DEA model is formulated below. This model has to be solved 
for every RTC in the data set. In the formulation below there are J inputs, I outputs, and K RTCs. 
kj x  represents the amount of input j that RTC k uses and  ki y  is the amount of output i that RTC k 
produces.  k λ  is the multiplier with respect to the k
th RTC for the RTC under consideration (k’). 
Companies with  1 θ =  are considered efficient relative to the other companies. Constraint set (6.2) 
ensures that the used amount of each input j by k’ is a linear combination of the used amounts of 
inputs by relatively efficient RTCs plus the possible excess input of RTC k’. Constraint set (6.3) 
states that the output levels of k’ should be a linear combination of the output levels of relative 
efficient RTCs. In the output-orientation of DEA, the outputs  ' k i y  should grow to  ' k i y θ  to achieve 
relative  efficiency  taking  into  account  the  fixed  current  input  levels  of  RTC  k’.  The  model 
generates an efficient piece-wise linear frontier of relative efficient RTCs. In the case that k’ has a 
1 θ > , a composite RTC could be configured from the RTCs along the efficient frontier that uses 
the same inputs levels, but produces more outputs than k’ currently does. Therefore, the larger θ , 
the more inefficient RTC k’ is. Constraint set (6.4) is only relevant for VRS case (i.e., the BCC 
model), and can be ignored in the BCC model with CRS. 
 
Maxθ     (6-1) 









≥   
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y y θ λ
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=      
(6-4) 
0 k λ ≥     (6-5) 
1,2,..., k K =     (6-6) 
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The production process of RTCs is represented by the use of multiple inputs to produce 
several outputs. In general, their total inputs are a combination of  
•  labour (e.g. total wages, (drivers’) experience, total hours worked, number of employees, etc.), 
•  equipment (e.g. number of trucks, number of trailers, total loading capacity etc.), and 
•  intangible assets (market information, customer contacts, goodwill etc). 
 
Unfortunately,  information  on  most  of  these inputs is  not  available  in  the  Flemish  road 
transport industry, which is generally quite fragmented and under-digitalised. The inputs that are 
available for each company in this study are the total assets and the number of hours worked. Given 
the fact that in the road transport sector there are very few unique or scarce technologies that 
greatly enhance performance and as a result a large share of total assets is represented by basic 
equipment  such  as  trucks  and  trailers,  these  two  inputs  provide  a  good  approximation  of  the 
underlying measures. Outputs can also be subdivided into several categories, such as turnover, 
added value, profit, truck utilisation, kilometres driven, customer satisfaction, average payload, 
average  price  paid  per  loadmeter,  number  of  deliveries on  time,  etc.  Also  on  the output side, 
obviously not all this information is available. Although there are disadvantages of working with 
monetary figures under DEA, in this specific case it would be incorrect to focus on only a limited 
number  of  (physical)  outputs,  because  excluding  the  remaining  ones  would  not  resemble  the 
company’s delivered quality of service and would therefore certainly bias the DEA results. For 
example, it might be possible to retrieve the kilometres driven by a company, but this would give 
no information about efficiency without knowledge of e.g. truck utilisation or the price paid per 
loadmeter by the customers. Therefore, the decision was to work with two compound monetary 
outputs that provide a good summary of the separate output components mentioned above. These 
are added value and profit. 
Significantly positive correlation coefficients are found between inputs and outputs as shown 
in Table 6-4, confirming that the input/output data of the 82 respondents satisfy the hypothesis of 
isotonicity underlying DEA. During the whole process of analysis it is therefore assumed that all 
defined inputs affect production levels. Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  96 
 
    TA  HOUR  AV  PR 
Inputs           
Total assets  TA  -       
Hours worked  HOUR  0.922 (0.000)  -     
Outputs           
Added value  AV  0.953 (0.000)  0.979 (0.000)  -   
Profit/loss before taxes  PR  0.599 (0.000)  0.669 (0.000)  0.693 (0.000)  - 
Table 6-4. Correlation coefficients between variables (significance levels between brackets) 
 
Table 6-5 shows the average input and output levels of the different categories of responding 
RTCs. In addition, Flemish road transport market averages are reported in the far right column. It is 
clear from the table that the larger companies cooperate horizontally or are interested in doing so 
more often than small and medium sized companies. 
 
  Cooperator  Non-
cooperator 








Overall     Flanders 
n  33  49  34  48  61  21  82    2,784 
                   
Inputs                   
-HOUR  84,270  28,512  91,435  22,275  17,593  147,849  50,951    28,047 
-TA  2,895  1,305  3,282  998  750  5,414  1,945    1,823 
                   
Outputs                   
-AV  2,701  875  2,829  746  568  4,637  1,610    929 
-PR  172  33  158  40  24  276  89     51 
Table 6-5. Average inputs and outputs 
 
 
6.5  PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND HORIZONTAL COOPERATION 
 
The AIMMS modelling system (version 3.6) is used to calculate CRS and VRS efficiency 
levels and scale efficiencies for 
1.  the entire Flemish road transport sector (resulting in 2 DEAs),  
2.  the complete set of 82 usable respondents (resulting 2 DEAs), and  
3.  subgroups of these respondents based on the categorisations in Table 6-2 (resulting 12 DEAs). 
 
The results can be found in Table 6-6 and the corresponding explanation is organized as 
follows: Section 6.5.1 discusses CRS and VRS efficiency scores, Section 6.5.2 focuses on the scale 




6.5.1  CRS and VRS Efficiency Levels 
For both the VRS and CRS models, frequencies and cumulative percentage frequencies are 
tabulated in Table 6-6 for eight groups of RTCs. Six of these groups are subgroups of the set of 
respondents,  being  the  cooperators,  non-cooperators,  interested  respondents,  non-interested 
respondents,  respondents  with  a  complete  annual  account,  and  respondents  with  a  contracted 
annual account. Finally, DEA results are displayed for the complete set of respondents and for the 
entire population of Flemish RTCs, of which the respondents of course form a subset. To calculate 
the  efficiency  levels  for  responding  RTCs,  we  perform  the  DEA  on  the  entire  Flemish  road 
transport sector and use the thus calculated efficiency levels. This renders the analysis more robust 
since the sample was constructed randomly from all Flemish RTCs and obviously there is no 
reason  why  the efficient  frontier  would  consist  of  only  companies that  are  respondents to the 
questionnaire. 
The most prominent conclusion to be drawn from the results is that there is ample room for 
improvement amongst the Flemish RTCs. The far right column of Table 6-6 indicates that only 
1.2% in the CRS case and 4.6% in the VRS case comes within reasonable distance (i.e., efficiency 
scores <1.5) of the frontier formed by the efficient RTCs. For this, note that an efficiency score of 
1.5 means that an RTC could have produced 50% more with its current inputs, were it efficient. 
Median efficiency scores for (subgroups of) respondents vary from 2.70 to even 2.91 in the 
CRS case and from 1.73 to 2.74 in the VRS case. Although at this point no final conclusions can be 
drawn,  it  would  appear  that  the  cooperating  respondents  are  more  efficient  than  their  non-
cooperating colleague RTCs (median scores of 2.70 vs. 2.91 and 2.30 vs. 2.74). Similarly, for the 
time being it might be inferred that in the road transport sector, it is ‘good to be big’. This is 
supported by the higher efficiency levels of companies with a complete annual account, compared 
to those respondents with a contracted annual account. 
To better observe structural differences within the three categorisations of the respondents 
set, e.g. structural differences in efficiency scores between cooperators and non-cooperators, it is 
appropriate to  apply  DEA  to  each  subgroup separately  in  order to  construct efficient frontiers 
formed by RTCs from the same subgroup. To this end, two separate DEA models are calculated 
(cf. Ross and Droge, 2004; Johnes, 2006). These models, called “Before Frontier Projection” and 
“After Frontier Projection” consequently have different dimensions and reference sets. For the 
“Before” model the subgroups of respondents were analysed both individually and independently.  
The efficiency scores that result from these DEAs can be found in Table 6-7 under “Before”. 
To  arrive  at  the  results  for  the  “After”  model,  we  projected  the  separate  subgroups  on  their 
respective efficient frontiers. Then the total group of respondents is joined again and an aggregate 
DEA  is  conducted  to  arrive  at  the  “After”  efficiency  scores  in  Table  6-7.  This  procedure  is 
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and for respondents with a contracted/complete annual account. This frontier projection approach 
removes the managerial component of inefficiencies, leaving the ‘structural’ inefficiencies of the 
subgroups  unaltered.  Charnes  et  al.  (1981)  refer  to  this  as  programmatic  (in)efficiency.  Non-
parametric  tests  can  then  be  used  to  find  significant  differences  in  programmatic  efficiency. 
Interpretations of the results follow in Section 6.5.3. 
 
  Cooperators     Non-cooperators   Interested     Non-Interested 
CRS Eff.  n  %     n  %     n  %     n  % 
1 – 1.5  0  0%    0  0%    0  0%    0  0% 
1.5 - 2.5  8  24%    13  27%    9  26%    12  25% 
2.5 - 3  18  79%    17  61%    16  74%    19  65% 
3 – 5  7  100%    18  98%    8  97%    17  100% 
> 5  0  100%    1  100%    1  100%    0  100% 
Average  2.83        2.93        2.95        2.85    
St. dev  0.49      0.69      0.70      0.56   
Median  2.70      2.91      2.80      2.81   
                       
  Cooperators     Non-cooperators   Interested     Non-Interested 
VRS Eff.  n  %    n  %    n  %    n  % 
1 - 1.5  9  27%     2  4%     9  26%     2  4% 
1.5 - 2.5  11  61%    16  37%    10  56%    17  40% 
2.5 - 3  7  82%    19  76%    10  85%    16  73% 
3 - 5  6  100%    11  98%    4  97%    13  100% 
> 5  0  100%     1  100%     1  100%     0  100% 
Average  2.27      2.68      2.29      2.67   
St. dev  0.85      0.71      0.93      0.63   
Median  2.30      2.74      2.19      2.71   
                       
  Cooperators     Non-cooperators   Interested     Non-Interested 
Scale Index  n  %    n  %    n  %    n  % 
0 - 0.25  3  10%     9  18%     9  26%     8  17% 
0.25 - 0.5  3  19%    10  39%    10  56%    11  40% 
0.5 - 0.75  2  26%    8  55%    10  85%    7  54% 
0.75 – 1  2  32%    5  65%    4  97%    4  63% 
1 - 2.5  10  65%    12  90%    1  100%    14  92% 
> 2.5  11  100%     5  100%     0  100%     4  100% 
Average  3.69      1.46      4.03      1.16   
St. dev  5.71      2.46      6.00      1.32   
Median  1.49        0.70        1.41        0.73    




  Complete annual 
account   
Contracted annual 
account    Respondents    Flanders 
CRS Eff.  n  %     n  %     n  %     n  % 
1 – 1.5  0  0%    0  0%    0  0%    33  1% 
1.5 - 2.5  5  24%    16  26%    21  26%    547  21% 
2.5 - 3  11  76%    24  66%    35  68%    737  47% 
3 – 5  5  100%    20  98%    25  99%    1264  93% 
> 5  0  100%    1  100%    1  100%    196  100% 
Average  2.85      2.90       2.89      3.43   
St. dev  0.55      0.64      0.62      3.20   
Median  2.76      2.83      2.80      3.06   
                       
 
Complete annual 
account   
Contracted annual 
account    Respondents    Flanders 
VRS Eff.  n  %    n  %    n  %    n  % 
1 - 1.5  9  43%    2  3%    11  13%    127  5% 
1.5 - 2.5  7  76%    20  36%    27  46%    801  33% 
2.5 - 3  4  95%    22  72%    26  78%    697  59% 
3 - 5  1  100%    16  98%    17  99%    1007  95% 
> 5  0  100%    1  100%    1  100%    140  100% 
Average  1.87      2.74      2.52      3.10   
St. dev  0.65      0.71      0.79      2.54   
Median  1.73      2.72      2.57      2.82   
                       
 
Complete annual 
account   
Contracted annual 
account    Respondents    Flanders 
Scale Index  n  %    n  %    n  %    n  % 
0 - 0.25  1  5%    13  21%    14  17%    501  18% 
0.25 - 0.5  1  10%    12  41%    13  33%    541  37% 
0.5 - 0.75  1  14%    9  56%    10  45%    379  51% 
0.75 – 1  0  14%    7  67%    7  54%    272  61% 
1 - 2.5  4  33%    18  97%    22  80%    602  82% 
> 2.5  14  100%    2  100%    16  100%    488  100% 
Average  6.39      0.97      2.35      1.85   
St. dev  6.72      1.08      4.20      4.26   
Median  4.61      0.67      0.89      0.73   
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  Cooperator    Non-Cooperator    Interested 
CRS  Before  After  %    Before  After  %    Before  After  % 
Average  1.218  1.084  11.0%    1.383  1.005  27.4%    1.307  1.064  18.6% 
Stand. Dev.  0.214  0.084  60.6%    0.306  0.017  94.3%    0.305  0.100  67.2% 
Median  1.177  1.059  10.0%    1.350  1.000  25.9%    1.214  1.016  16.3% 
                       
VRS  Before  After  %    Before  After  %    Before  After  % 
Average  1.115  1.063  4.6%    1.202  1.050  12.6%    1.165  1.055  9.5% 
Stand. Dev.  0.170  0.155  8.9%    0.242  0.095  60.6%    0.240  0.156  35.0% 
Median  1.056  1.008  4.6%    1.137  1.007  11.5%    1.099  1.001  8.9% 
                       
  Not-interested    Contracted ann. account    Complete ann. account 
CRS  Before  After  %    Before  After  %    Before  After  % 
Average  1.300  1.034  20.5%    1.154  1.164  -0.8%    1.365  1.000  26.7% 
Stand. Dev.  0.238  0.036  85.0%    0.197  0.061  69.1%    0.285  0.000  100% 
Median  1.263  1.029  18.6%    1.089  1.141  -4.8%    1.324  1.000  24.5% 
                       
VRS  Before  After  %    Before  After  %    Before  After  % 
Average  1.156  1.065  7.9%    1.086  1.039  4.3%    1.233  1.026  16.8% 
Stand. Dev.  0.180  0.085  52.8%    0.162  0.088  45.9%    0.255  0.046  81.8% 
Median  1.072  1.052  1.9%    1.003  1.000  0.3%    1.175  1.005  14.5% 
Table 6-7. The “Before” and “After” DEA models 
 
6.5.2  Scale Indices 
Following Banker (1984) the economic scale of each RTC can be measured by its scale 
index (i.e.,  j λ    in the CRS model). A company with a scale index of 1 operates at its most 
efficient scale. If  1 j λ <   , this company experiences increasing returns to scale (IRS) and should 
expand. If on the other hand  1 j λ >    there are decreasing returns to scale (DRS), meaning that the 
company would benefit from downsizing it operations. In line with the procedure for generating 
VRS and CRS efficiency levels in the previous section, we use the DEA of the total Flemish sector 
and then use the scale indices of the RTCs in the respondents set (see Table 6-6). 
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6.5.3  Testing of the Conjectures 
This section describes the DEA results step by step by discussing and testing the seven 
conjectures formulated in Section 6.2. 
 
C1: Larger companies are more efficient 
The first conjecture states that larger RTCs are more efficient than smaller ones. In order to 
test this conjecture, a measure of the size of an RTC is needed. Since the total hours worked and 
the total assets together resemble the reasonably fixed working capital of an RTC, the following 
construct  ( ) S k  is used as indicator of the size of RTC k : 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) S k HOUR k HOUR TA k TA = +   (6-7) 
where  X  is the sector average value of input X. Consequently, S(k) is correlated with the 
vector of VRS efficiency scores of the respondents as calculated when taking the entire population 
of Flemish RTCs into account. Figure 6-2 shows the corresponding scatter plot. It resembles a 
statistically  significant  correlation  coefficient  of  –0.532  (Asymp.  Sig.  =  0.000).  This  negative 
relation means that larger companies are likely to have a smaller θ value, and are therefore more 
efficient than smaller RTCs. This is in line with expectations, which were based on the fact that 
being small (e.g. having only a limited numbers of trucks) strongly limits a company’s ability to 

































Figure 6-2. Conjecture C1 
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C2: The Flemish transport market is too fragmented. 
The Flemish road transport market is said to be too fragmented if a disproportionate share of 
RTCs is operating below their most productive scale size (mpss). Results by Banker (1984) state 
that the scale index determines whether a company is operating below, at, or above its mpss. We 
therefore focus the discussion of the present conjecture on the scale indices at the bottom of Table 
6-6. It turns out that in Flanders as a whole, 61% of RTCs are operating below their mpss and the 
median scale index is 0.73. This suggests that the Flemish road transport sector would benefit from 
scale expansion of presently active RTCs and as a result conjecture C2, stating that the Flemish 
road transport market is too fragmented, is supported. The most obvious scenarios for this market 
consolidation would be mergers, takeovers or horizontal cooperation between existing RTCs.  
When taking a further look at the scale indices in Table 6-6, it can be seen that there exist 
some interesting differences between the various categorisations. It is no surprise that the RTCs 
with  a  complete  annual  account  show  greater  scale  indices  than  the  RTCs  with  a  contracted 
account. As indicated in Section 6.3.1, the latter can be considered ‘small’ companies while the 
former fall into the category of ‘large’. However, the median scale index of the responding RTCs 
with a complete annual account is strikingly large (4.61), meaning that these companies operate far 
above their mpss. This, together with the fact that the respondents with a contracted annual account 
have a median scale index below 1 (0.67) once again suggests the existence of an ideal firm size 
somewhere in between the complete and contracted annual account average firm sizes. A second 
observation is that cooperating RTCs and RTCs interested in setting up or intensifying horizontal 
cooperation tend to operate above their mpss (scale indices of 1.49 and 1.41, respectively). From 
this one may conclude that horizontal cooperation is more frequently considered a ‘defensive’ 
strategy  aimed  at  rationalizing  inputs  and  defending  turnover  or  market  share,  rather  than  an 
‘offensive’  strategy  to  enter  new  markets  or  actively  attract  additional  customers  in  present 
markets. 
 
C3: Cooperating companies show greater efficiency levels than non-cooperating companies 
The third conjecture states that cooperating RTCs are more efficient than non-cooperating 
RTCs. To test this, we use the efficiency scores of the (non-)cooperating respondents as displayed 
in Table 6-7. Charnes et al. (1981) refer to the separate sets of companies that make up the efficient 
boundaries for (in this case) cooperating and non-cooperating RTCs as the α-envelopes. Table 6-7 
outlines the adjustment of the outputs of both sets of RTCs onto their corresponding α-envelope. In 
this way, each RTC is forced to become as efficient as its most efficient peer in the same subgroup 
of  respondents.  This  frontier  projection  removes  managerial  efficiency  (e.g.  in  the  CRS  case, 
leaving out the managerial efficiency improves the average efficiency scores of companies with a 
contracted annual account from 1.37 to 1.11), and tests for significance of programmatic efficiency 
differences can be conducted. In the case of conjecture C3, the two ‘programs’ are 1) Cooperating Chapter 6: Efficiency of Road Transport Companies 
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RTCs, and 2) Non-cooperating RTCs. The non-parametric Mann-Whitney test is used to compare 
the “After” efficiency scores of cooperators vs. non-cooperators. If present, this test procedure will 
find significant differences in the rank distributions of efficiency scores for the (non)cooperating 
RTCs. The results are at the top of Table 6-8. As it turns out, there is no significant difference 
between  the  efficiency  levels  of  cooperating  and  non-cooperating  RTCs, and conjecture  C3  is 
rejected. 
Certainly,  there  are  several  possible  interpretations  of  our  observation  that  ‘current 
cooperation’ does not correlate with a company’s efficiency level. It can however be concluded 
that horizontal cooperation is not a universal remedy for bad (financial) performance of LSPs. 
Instead,  it  should  be  complemented  by  e.g.  managerial  restructuring,  input  rationing,  business 
reorientation,  and/or  investments  in  new  technologies.  Moreover,  in  line  with  the  result  of 
Hypothesis 3 in Section 5.4.2, companies that are already quite efficient might not feel a strong 
incentive to cooperate horizontally.  
 
 
Number of RTCs 
Average  rank  of  VRS 
Efficiency level   
Mann-
Whitney U  Asymp. Sig. 
Cooperators  33  41.24    800  0.935 
Non-cooperators  49  41.67       
           
Interested  34  33.15    532  0.007 
Not interested  48  47.42       
Table 6-8. Conjectures C3 and C4 
 
C4: Companies interested in (intensified) cooperation are more efficient than companies that are 
not interested. 
Table  6-6  already  suggests  that  in  the  VRS  case  efficient  firms  are  more  interested  in 
initiating or increasing the intensity of horizontal cooperation: the median efficiency scores for 
interested RTCs is 2.19, whereas for non-interested RTCs it is 2.71. In order to get a more reliable 
comparison between the two subgroups however, the frontier projection procedure outlined under 
C3 is once again employed to arrive at the results at the bottom of Table 6-8. Indeed, the expected 
difference between efficiency levels of interested and not interested RTCs is statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level, and the conjecture is supported. Horizontal cooperation is thus unlikely to find 
solid ground at companies that are operating very inefficiently. On the other hand, a more efficient 
company  might  be  in  the  position  where  internal  processes  are  more  or  less  optimised  and 
cooperation with colleague companies offers an interesting opportunity to improve the company’s 
achievements. 
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C5: Larger companies cooperate more often than smaller ones. 
To evaluate this conjecture, the Mann-Whitney test is used to compare the S(k) construct of 
cooperators vs. non-cooperators. Table 6-9 shows that conjecture C5 is supported at the 0.01 level: 
larger companies cooperate horizontally more often than their smaller counterparts. In response to 
open questions in the questionnaire (see E.R. 33), many respondents indicated that they considered 
themselves too small to engage in a horizontal cooperation. The rationale behind this is that many 
RTCs in the smallest category have 5 trucks or less. This means that often the director/owner also 
drives a truck, which limits his time for managerial tasks, including research into novel business 
opportunities such as horizontal cooperation. In contrast, the large companies generally have a 
more  mature  backoffice  organisation  formed  by  well-educated  professionals  to  look  into  new 
business opportunities. This facilitates a more open-minded attitude towards innovative projects 
such as horizontal cooperation. 
 
  Number of RTCs  Average rank of S(k) 
Cooperator  33  49.85 
Non-cooperator  49  35.88 
     
Mann-Whitney U  533   
Asymp. Sig.  0.009   
Table 6-9. Conjecture C5 
 
C6: Less efficient companies value the opportunities of cooperation higher than more efficient 
companies do. 
For  the  assessment  of  this  conjecture  the  VRS  efficiency  scores  of  the  respondents  are 
correlated with their evaluations of the propositions about opportunities of horizontal cooperation, 
which are  listed  in Table 6-3.  The results in Table 6-10  indicate  that  this  conjecture  must  be 
rejected:  none  of  the  advantages  shows  a  significant  correlation  with  efficiency.  It  can  be 
concluded that respondents subscribe to the advantages, irrespective of their efficiency level. This 
puts the discussion under conjecture C4 into a broader perspective: (heavily) inefficient RTCs 
admit that horizontal cooperation can bring value to their business, but they are simply not ready 




Proposition  Correlation Coef.  Sig. (1-tailed) 
O1  -0.002  0.494 
O2  0.045  0.348 
O3  0.098  0.199 
O4  0.138  0.116 
O5  -0.004  0.487 
O6  -0.027  0.408 
O7  0.050  0.334 
     
I1  0.123  0.140 
I2  0.025  0.412 
I3  0.223  0.025 
I4  0.038  0.371 
I5  0.137  0.116 
I6  0.151  0.095 
I7  -0.010  0.466 
I8  0.339  0.001 
I9  -0.042  0.359 
Table 6-10. Conjectures C6 and C7 
 
C7:  Inefficient  companies  consider  the  impediments  for  horizontal  cooperation  to  be  more 
severe than less efficient firms do. 
Table 6-10 shows that this conjecture is not supported in general. The evaluations of two 
disadvantages however, show a significant positive correlation with the VRS efficiency of RTCs, 
meaning that inefficient RTCs consider these disadvantages to be more severe. They are I3 (“It is 
hard to determine the benefits or operational savings of horizontal cooperation beforehand.”) and I8 
(“Benefits cannot be shared in a fair way; the larger players will always benefit most.”). A factor 
common to these two impediments is that they are the ones that might occur first to those RTCs 
who have no experience to date with horizontal cooperation. Inefficient RTCs are appropriately 
very cautious about unfair gain sharing and about the expected payoff of such a project, since some 
of them will not have the financial buffer required to survive a failed project. 
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6.6  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The goal of this chapter was to employ DEA on the empirical data of Chapter 5 and to draw 
conclusions regarding 1) the efficiency of the Flemish road transport sector and 2) the potential of 
horizontal  cooperation  to  improve  its  competitiveness.  DEA  proved  to  be  a  useful  tool  in 
empirically identifying frontiers of efficient companies and measuring the relative efficiency levels 
of the remaining companies.  
Based on the respondents’ answers to survey questions, respondents were categorised three 
times, depending on 1) whether or not they are currently cooperating horizontally, 2) whether or 
not they are interested in (intensifying) horizontal cooperation, and 3) the respondent’s type of 
annual account, the latter being an indicator of firm size. Following Ross and Droge (2002), in 
order to make reliable statements about efficiency differences between such groups, ordinal ranks 
and  the  Mann-Whitney  procedure  were  used.  The  analysis  set  contained  82  road  transport 
companies, which accounts for 1.8% of the total Flemish road transport sector (only companies in 
which at least 1,500 hours were worked in 2003 were incorporated). Although this percentage is 
relatively low, the random manner is which the surveyed sample was constructed, strengthens the 
belief that the results presented provide a good indication of the situation across the entire Flemish 
road transport sector, as far as companies that are of a size that oliges them to submit a social 
balance sheet are concerned. 
The main contributions of this chapter come from the results of the conjectures formulated in 
Section 6.2. Most importantly, the Flemish road transport sector turns out to be highly inefficient: 
less  than  5%  of  the  responding  companies  come  within  a  reasonable  distance  of  the  efficient 
frontier. Still, it is an interesting observation that this inefficient sector for a large part facilitates the 
dominant  position  of  Flanders  as  a  preferred  location  for  European  Distribution  Centres 
(Sleuwaegen et al., 2002). 
Conjectures C1 and C2 revealed that an important reason for inefficiency lies in the strong 
fragmentation of the sector. This is illustrated by the fact that Flanders houses 4,667 RTCs, or one 
RTC  per  1,285 inhabitants.  Horizontal  cooperation is  put forward as a  possible resolution,  by 
benefiting from its potential to rationalise on inputs and to boost a company’s efficiency. The scale 
inefficiency found in the research can be considered strong enough to expect that severe future 
market consolidation will be needed in order for the sector to remain competitive with foreign 
(Eastern-European) RTCs. The main lesson learned from conjectures C3 to C5 is that horizontal 
cooperation  is  not  easy.  A  minimum  degree  of  efficiency  and  scale  is  needed  before  the 
impediments  can  be  overcome  and  rewards  can  be  reaped.  Finally,  conjectures  C6  and  C7 
examined the relation of RTCs’ efficiency levels with their attitudes towards opportunities of and 
impediments for horizontal cooperation. It turned out that inefficient companies consider some of 
the  impediments  for  horizontal  cooperation  significantly  more  severe  than  the  more  efficient Chapter 6: Efficiency of Road Transport Companies 
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companies do. However, no significant difference in the evaluations of the opportunities between 
efficient and less efficient companies could be found. This means that even the inefficient transport 
companies think that horizontal cooperation can improve their business, but their bad (financial) 
performance makes it problematic. They cannot afford to spend time and money on starting up a 
horizontal cooperation project and/or run the risk of a failed project. This is also the most likely 
explanation for the fact that inefficient companies consider the impediments to be more severe than 
their more efficient counterparts.   109
CHAPTER 7  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DUTCH AND 




7.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 5 discussed a large-scale survey that was sent out to Flemish LSPs to map their 
attitude towards many aspects of horizontal cooperation. It showed that generally LSPs strongly 
believe in the potential of horizontal cooperation. However, most often they do not capitalise the 
benefits because the impediments are considered too severe as to actually start a cooperation with 
potential competitors. This survey is the first large-scale empirical research on the attitude of LSPs 
towards horizontal cooperation. Since the surveyed population is restricted to Flemish LSPs, it is 
hard to determine to what extent the outcomes are influenced by regional factors. Therefore, to 
check the validity of the survey results of Chapter 5 for other European countries, this chapter 
discusses a second survey that was undertaken in the Netherlands. The same questionnaire was sent 
out in the fall of 2004 to 2,500 Dutch LSPs. 
The Netherlands was selected for the second survey because interestingly, when asked for 
examples of horizontal cooperation, many Flemish respondents came up with Dutch cases. Also in 
the supporting in-depth interviews, it was more than once stated that Dutch LSPs are more inclined 
to start a pilot cooperation with colleague companies, than the Flemish LSPs. Considering the 
strong  similarities  in  the  logistics  infrastructure  of  the  Netherlands  and  Flanders,  this  is  an 
intriguing observation. This chapter further examines this observation by testing two claims.  
 
Firstly, based on the remarks of Flemish LSPs, it is conjectured that 
(CLAIM 1) Flemish LSPs consider the impediments for horizontal cooperation more severe than 
their Dutch colleagues do. 
 
To check the validity of the results of the Flemish survey for other countries as well, the 
second conjecture states that 
(CLAIM 2) the highest (lowest) rated propositions on opportunities and impediments are the same 
in both Flanders and the Netherlands. 
 
Section 7.2 will briefly comment on the sample and response rates of both surveys. After 
that,  the  research  propositions  and  their  evaluations  by  the  respondents  will  be  reported  and 
discussed in Section 7.3. To evaluate claim 1, Section 7.4 then incorporates a comparative analysis 
of the attitudes of Dutch and Flemish LSPs towards the research propositions. In Section 7.5 the Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  110 
propositions on opportunities and impediments are ordered based on their evaluations in both the 
Flemish and the Dutch survey. These lists are then compared to check claim 2. Finally, some 
concluding remarks are formulated in Section 7.6. 
 
7.2  TWO SURVEYS 
 
Dutch and Flemish data have been collected in two separate stages. In March 2004, a survey 
was sent to 1537 Flemish LSPs. The sample consisted of companies in the NaceBel categories 
Freight  transport  by  road,  Inland  water  transport,  Cargo  handling  and  storage,  Freight 
forwarding and Courier activities other than national post activities. Detailed information on both 
the sample and the results of this survey can be found in Chapter 5. Here, the sample composition 
and the response rates for the Flemish questionnaire are briefly repeated in Table 7-1. 
 
NaceBel main  
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2  9  11% 
          Total  1,537 
(4,906) 
34  162  11% 
Table 7-1. Sample and response of the Flemish survey 
 
To ensure a fair and consistent comparison with the Dutch sample consisting exclusively of 
road transport companies (see below), a restriction is made to the Flemish respondents of the 
categories Freight transport by road and Express carriers. The joint response rate for these two 
categories is 11.7%. 
The second survey was sent out in June 2004 to Dutch LSPs, again by means of personalised 
questionnaires. These companies were selected from a database maintained by Holland Transport 
(E.R.  11).  This  database  contains  information  of  all  Dutch  road  transport  companies  (around 
12,000 in 2004). The companies are subdivided into 6 categories based on the number of truck 
permits (see Table 7-2). Chapter 7: A Comparative Analysis of Dutch and Flemish LSPs' Attitudes 
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The sample size was pre-set to approximately 2,500 companies. Subsequently, companies 
were  randomly  selected  from  the  six  categories  in  such  a  way  that  the  sample  had  the  same 
category distribution as the database. Of the sample sizes that fulfilled this condition, 2,486 came 
closest to the desired sample size of 2,500. This sampling procedure guarantees that the sample is a 
good representation of the sector. 
Unfortunately, the database suffered from some inaccuracies. In 95 cases, questionnaires 
were returned blank as a result of wrong addresses or compan shut-downs. This resulted in a net 
sample size of 2,388, but it should be noted that the real net sample size might be even smaller, 
since it is expected that not all ex-entrepreneurs will have contacted us to communicate the shut-
down of their business. With a total of 183 respondents, the overall response rate amounted to 
7.7%. As already stated in Section 5.3.2, these low response rates have become symptomatic for 
large-scale mail surveys (cf. Wisner, 2003). Table 7-2 gives an overview of the sample and the 
response to the Dutch survey. Note that for ten respondents, their category could not be traced back 
because the company name was not filled in. 
 






#Invalid  #Resp.  Net response 
rate 
A  1-2  5,256 (48.6 %)  1,199  48  82  7.1% 
B  3-5  2,225 (20.6 %)  522  19  34  6.8% 
C  6-10  1,476 (13.6 %)  352  16  26  7.7% 
D  11-25  1,204 (11.1 %)  258  14  17  7.0% 
E  26-50  427 (3.9 %)  100  1  10  10.1% 
F  Over 50  227 (2.1 %)  51  0  4  7.8% 
?          10   
Total    10,815  2,482  98  183  7.7% 
Table 7-2. Sample and response to the Dutch questionnaire 
 
 
7.3  RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS AND RESULTS 
 
Besides  other  (open)  questions,  both  questionnaires  contained  3  groups  of  propositions 
regarding  opportunities,  impediments  and  general  issues  related  to  horizontal  cooperation, 
respectively. These were based on both formal literature and a number of in-depth interviews with 
industry experts (see Section 5.3.1). The purpose of the propositions was to analyse the subject of 
horizontal cooperation from multiple perspectives, while keeping the number of propositions small 
to limit the workload for respondents and safeguard an acceptable response rate. Table 7-3 lists the 




Propositions on opportunities of horizontal cooperation 
O1  Horizontal cooperation increases the company’s productivity for core activities, e.g.: decrease in 
empty hauling, better usage of storage facilities etc. 
O2  Horizontal cooperation reduces the costs of non-core activities, e.g.: organizing safety trainings, joint 
fuel facilities etc. 
O3  Horizontal cooperations reduce purchasing costs, e.g. trucks, onboard computers, fuel etc. 
O4  LSPs can specialise, while at the same time broadening their services. 
O5  LSPs can offer better quality of service at lower costs, e.g. in terms of speed, frequency of deliveries, 
geographical coverage, reliability of delivery times etc. 
O6  Tendering on larger contracts with large shippers becomes possible. 
O7  Forming cooperations helps to protect market share. 
 
 
Propositions on impediments for horizontal cooperation 
I1  It  is  hard  to  find  commensurable  LSPs  with  which  it  is  possible  to  cooperate  for  (non-)  core 
activities. 
I2  It  is  hard  to  find  a  reliable  party  that  can  coordinate  the  cooperation  in  such  a  way  that  all 
participants are satisfied. 
I3  It is hard to determine the benefits or operational savings of horizontal cooperation beforehand. 
I4  Partners find it hard to ensure a fair allocation of the shared workload in advance. 
I5  A fair allocation of the benefits is essential for a successful cooperation. 
I6  When an LSP cooperates with commensurable companies, it becomes harder for it to distinguish 
itself. 
I7  Over time smaller companies in the cooperation may lose customers or get pushed out of the market 
completely. 
I8  Benefits cannot be shared in a fair way; the larger players will always benefit most. 
I9  Cooperation is greatly hampered by the required indispensable ICT-investments. 
 
 
General propositions on horizontal cooperation 
G1  LSPs that are mainly active in coordination, rather than in the actual transport itself, benefit less from 
horizontal cooperation. 
G2  Cooperation with distant (foreign) colleague companies generates a wider geographical coverage and 
minimises competitive conflicts. 
G3  Customers ask you to engage in horizontal cooperation. 
G4  In the present situation, you are interested in (intensified) horizontal cooperation. 
G5  When the most important impediments are removed, horizontal cooperation has great potential. 
Table 7-3. Propositions included in the questionnaire 
 
The rationale behind the first two groups of propositions (opportunities and impediments) 
has already  been  discussed  in  detail in  Chapter  5. The  third  group  does  not relate  to  specific 
advantages  or  disadvantages  of  horizontal  cooperation,  but  addresses  some  additional  issues 
regarding  horizontal  cooperation.  Proposition  G1  is  based  on  the  expectation  that  logistics 
companies  already  active  in  (vertical)  transport  coordination,  are  less  inclined  to  put  their 
coordinating position at stake by engaging in horizontal cooperation. Secondly, G2 is founded on Chapter 7: A Comparative Analysis of Dutch and Flemish LSPs' Attitudes 
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the literature study in Chapter 2. Amongst others, Bleeke and Ernst (2005) indicate that horizontal 
cooperation is useful for extending a company’s geographical coverage. An additional beneficial 
circumstance is that two far-away companies face less competitive pressure, because customer 
bases are generally disjunctive. The third general proposition regards the impetus for cooperation: 
it is interesting to know if the initiative for engaging in horizontal cooperation comes from the LSP 
itself, or from his customers. Finally, G4 and G5 are incorporated to assess the overall potential of 
horizontal cooperation in the logistics industries of Flanders and the Netherlands. 
The  respondents  were  asked  to  indicate  on  a  5-point  Likert  scale  (1=Strongly  disagree; 
2=Disagree;  3=Neutral;  4=Agree;  5=Strongly  agree)  to  what  extent  they  agreed  with  the 
propositions. Table 7-4 shows the evaluations of the propositions by the respondents. Columns 2 to 
5 present the mean and standard deviation per proposition for the Flemish and the Dutch survey. 
Because testing claim 1 requires identifying any significant difference in the attitudes towards 
horizontal  cooperation  between  the  Flemish  and  the  Dutch  transport  sector,  two  independent-
samples  tests  were  performed  to  compare  the  evaluations  of  both  groups  for  each  individual 
proposition listed in Table 7-3. Because the data are ordinal, the Mann-Whitney U test statistic is 
used to test for each proposition the following hypotheses: 
 
Ho: The Dutch and Flemish samples come from identical populations  
Ha: The Dutch and Flemish samples come from different populations.  
 
The  last  two  columns  report  on  the  hypothesis  testing.  Italic  numbers  indicate  that 
statistically significant differences are observed between both questionnaires (at the 5% level). Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  114 
 
  VL  NL     
  Mean  Standard 
deviation 




O1  4.16  1.00  4.01  0.98  9,558.0  0.096 
O2  3.65  1.00  3.60  0.99  10,381.5  0.792 
O3  3.45  1.12  3.57  1.03  9,853.5  0.267 
O4  3.70  1.12  3.53  1.01  9,426.0  0.098 
O5  3.56  1.11  3.37  1.13  9,536.5  0.147 
O6  3.68  1.10  3.52  1.08  9,738.0  0.233 
O7  3.18  1.09  3.36  1.08  9,381.0  0.086 
             
I1  3.81  1.01  3.54  0.97  8,874.0  0.009 
I2  4.02  0.89  4.02  0.95  10,676.5  0.863 
I3  3.58  0.87  3.51  0.95  10,131.0  0.584 
I4  3.77  0.88  3.79  0.85  10,581.0  0.921 
I5  4.13  0.81  3.72  0.90  7,401.5  0.000 
I6  3.52  0.92  3.33  0.91  9,357.0  0.091 
I7  4.00  1.00  3.75  1.03  9,168.5  0.033 
I8  3.67  1.19  3.26  1.15  8,112.5  0.002 
I9  3.50  0.93  3.19  0.91  8,429.5  0.010 
             
G1  3.12  0.89  3.17  0.93  9,743.0  0.607 
G2  3.55  0.97  3.32  0.98  8,616.0  0.067 
G3  2.72  1.06  2.45  0.91  6,472.5  0.025 
G4  3.33  1.15  3.04  1.08  8,599.0  0.027 
G5  3.54  1.14  3.50  0.86  9,266.5  0.303 
Table 7-4. Evaluations of the propositions 
 
The  first  thing  that  strikes  in  Table  7-4  is  the  strength  with  which  the  opportunities  of 
horizontal cooperation are endorsed, Flemish and Dutch transport companies alike (no significant 
differences). This illustrates the great potential of horizontal cooperation for the Benelux. This 
observation  is  reconfirmed  by  the  evaluations  of  proposition  G5,  and  also  by  Ruijgrok  and 
Groothedde (2005).  
When the evaluations of the impediments for horizontal cooperation are compared, some 
interesting observations can be made. As was already suggested in the in-depth interviews, Flemish 
LSPs seem to structurally experience more difficulties with horizontal cooperation than their Dutch 
colleagues do. Five of the nine impediments show a difference that is statistically significant on a 
5% confidence level. These differences are discussed in detail in the next section. The fact that 
Flemish road transport companies consider impediments to be more severe does not mean that the 
Dutch think lightly about them. Generally, they also agree with the propositions, but in contrast to 
their Flemish peers, more of them tend to ‘see light at the end of the tunnel’. Chapter 7: A Comparative Analysis of Dutch and Flemish LSPs' Attitudes 
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The  general  propositions  also  show  statistically  significant  differences  between  the  two 
countries.  Curiously,  the  Flemish  transport  companies  feel  a  stronger  assignment  from  their 
customers to actively engage in horizontal cooperation. Moreover, and maybe as a result, Flemish 
companies are also more interested in (increased) horizontal cooperation (Proposition G4). 
Finally, as an additional question, companies were asked if they thought that it would be 
preferable if an independent third party would coordinate the cooperation. Only 17 % responded 
positively (scores 4-5) to this question, 48 % reacted negatively (scores 1-2), and 35% was neutral 
(score  3).  This  indicates  that  both  in  the  Netherlands  and  in  Flanders,  there  is  only  limited 
immediate demand for consultants or Fourth Party Logistics service providers (4PL) to start up or 
manage horizontal cooperation between companies. 
 
 
7.4  CLAIM 1: LSPS’ ATTITUDES IN THE NETHERLANDS AND FLANDERS 
 
In this section, claim 1 is evaluated by discussing those propositions that show a statistically 
significant difference between Dutch and Flemish respondents. 
 
It is hard to find commensurable LSPs with whom it is possible to cooperate for (non-) core 
activities (I1). 
Flemish LSPs consider it more difficult to find colleague companies with whom they can 
cooperate to the benefit of both. The average evaluation of proposition I1 by the Flemish LSPs is 
3.81 and for the Dutch 3.54. This difference is significant at the 1% confidence level. Although the 
transport sector in Flanders suffers from roughly the same difficulties as the Dutch (low capacity 
utilisation, frequent empty hauling, negative public image, low profit margins etc.), LSPs are more 
reluctant to cooperate in Flanders as compared to the Netherlands. As a result of this difference in 
attitude, in contrast to Flanders, in the Netherlands there are many reported examples of horizontal 
cooperation. A selection of them is presented in Table 7-5. Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  116 
 
Name   
Bouwvervoer Groep   E.R. 3 
Dailyfresh  E.R. 5 
Distribouw  E.R. 6 
Euromovers  E.R. 10 
Fritom  E.R. 11 
IDS  E.R. 14 
IJmond transport groep   E.R. 16 
Mondial movers  E.R. 20 
Nedvan  E.R. 22 
System Alliance  E.R. 29 
Teamtrans   E.R. 30 
Topmovers   E.R. 32 
Transport Groep Gelderland  E.R. 32 
Table 7-5 Some Dutch horizontal cooperation initiatives 
 
In Flanders, such cooperations are much harder to find and if they arise, more than often 
Dutch partners are involved (e.g. Octo Logistics and Transmission). The interviews with industry 
experts indeed indicated that the Dutch have a more proactive attitude towards industry threats and 
innovative  logistics  concepts  involving  a  high  degree  of  cooperation.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
opportunities are valued likewise by the Dutch and the Flemish respondents. Therefore, a possible 
explanation  for  the  fact  that  the  number  of  Flemish  cases  lags  behind  could  be  the  more 
conservative commercial attitude in Flanders. Moreover, it is also possible that a reluctance to 
large-scale publicity for horizontal cooperations plays a role in Flanders. 
 
A fair allocation of the benefits is essential for a successful cooperation (I5),  
Smaller  companies  in the  cooperation may  lose  customers  or  get  pushed  out  of  the market 
completely (I7), and 
Benefits cannot be shared in a fair way, the larger players will always benefit most (I8) 
The impediments related to gain sharing and market positions were considered most severe 
by the Flemish. The differences between both surveys are quite strong, given the average of 3.93 
for the Flemish, and 3.58 for the Dutch. I7 has a difference that is significant at the 5% confidence 
level, I5 and I8 even at the 1% level. Respondents had the possibility to comment on why they do 
not cooperate in the current situation, and the linking pin in these explanations was that companies 
are too self-focused. Small companies fear that the larger ones will exploit them, while the large 
companies hesitate to put their individual market dominance at stake. However, the Dutch cases of 
horizontal cooperation mentioned in Table 7-5 however illustrate that successful cooperation is 
possible. Chapter 7: A Comparative Analysis of Dutch and Flemish LSPs' Attitudes 
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Gain  sharing  issues  are  crucial  to  cooperations,  but  can  be  tackled  when  crystal  clear 
arrangements  are  agreed  upon  before  starting  the  cooperation.  Especially  in  the  beginning, 
pragmatism is the best concept. Clear rules of thumb that are supported by all partners provide a 
fruitful starting point. Once the cooperation becomes more established and stable, more advanced 
gain  sharing  rules  can  be  installed  that  guarantee  fairness.  Possible  allocation  rules  will  be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 9 and Chapter 10. 
 
Cooperation is greatly hampered by the required indispensable ICT-investments (I9). 
Cooperation cannot occur without the exchange of information. Since the transport sectors in 
both the Netherlands and Belgium predominantly consist of small and medium sized companies, 
customer  and  order  administration  is  still  mostly  done  via  telephone,  fax  and/or  email.  These 
companies lack the critical mass to install an EDI or web-based information exchange platform, 
which makes the sharing of information difficult and labour intensive. Successful implementations 
of horizontal cooperation frequently have a small number of employees whose prime job is to 
support and coordinate the cooperation. All partners together pay the salary of these ‘cooperation 
champions’. This of course requires the cooperation to be quite intense to make the human capital 
investment profitable. Again, the data show that Flemish LSPs are the most reluctant. 
 
Customers ask you to engage in horizontal cooperation (G3) and 
In the present situation, you are interested in (intensified) horizontal cooperation (G4). 
Since  both  propositions  expose  differences  that  are  significant  on  the  5%  level,  it  is 
hypothesised that the Flemish LSPs experience stronger internal and external drives to cooperate 
horizontally than the Dutch. Open questions in the Flemish questionnaire indicated that there is a 
growing interest of LSPs in cooperation with competitors. However, the subject is still relatively 
taboo. A number of respondents state that they are, sometimes pushed by customers, interested in 
horizontal  cooperation,  but  do  not  know  how  to  start.  There  seems  to  be  only  limited 
communication  within  the  sector  and  therefore  suitable  partners  are  hard  to  find.  The  survey 
indicates that customers that actively encourage LSPs to participate in horizontal cooperation are 
mainly active in the (petro-) chemical industry. The reasons for this are the enormous volumes 
handled  by  the  shippers  and  the  relatively  small  capacities  of  LSPs  capable  of  serving  these 
shippers. Also, the specialised trucks and tankers active in this industry are very expensive pieces 
of  equipment.  By  means  of  order  exchange,  pooling  of  resource  pooling,  and  backloads 
improvement,  the  total  fleet  needed  by  the  few  transport  companies  that  are  qualified  for  the 
transport of chemicals can be downsized. For an analysis of the potential of horizontal cooperation 
in the petrochemical industry, see McKinnon (2004b). Industries with small numbers of shippers 
and carriers, such as the chemical industry, provide promising fields for horizontal cooperation, 
because this simplifies communication and visibility. The fact that shippers sometimes ask LSPs to Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  118 




7.5  CLAIM 2: VALIDITY OF THE RESULTS 
 
Now that the significant differences have been discussed, we turn to the similarities in both 
surveys to get a qualitative feel for the validity of the Flemish survey results in other countries. It 
turns out that, to a large extent, Flemish and Dutch respondents have similar beliefs about the 
relative importance of the individual opportunities and impediments. Table 7-6 shows the ranks for 
both the Flemish and the Dutch survey. The sixth column gives the rank differences. It turns out 
that out of the two groups of propositions, only three have a rank difference larger than two. Nine 
of the sixteen propositions show a rank difference of zero or one. Although this is by no means a 
proof for the validity of the survey results for other countries, the empirical data do provide some 
confidence that the listed opportunities and impediments for horizontal cooperation are valued by 
the Dutch and Flemish respondents in more or less the same way. Therefore, it is conjectured that 
the relative importance of the opportunities and impediments in Flanders and the Netherlands, as 
indicated by the numbers in the rightmost column of Table 7-6, gives a good estimate of the 
importance of the relative importance in other countries. 
 
  Flanders  The Netherlands     
  Average  Rank  Average  Rank  Rank difference  Average rank 
O1  4.16  1  4.01  1  0  1 
O2  3.65  2  3.60  4  2  3 
O3  3.45  3  3.57  6  3  4.5 
O4  3.70  4  3.53  2  2  3 
O5  3.56  6  3.37  5  1  5.5 
O6  3.68  5  3.52  3  2  4 
O7  3.18  7  3.36  7  0  7 
I1  3.81  5  3.54  4  1  4.5 
I2  4.02  1  4.02  2  1  1.5 
I3  3.58  6  3.51  7  1  6.5 
I4  3.77  2  3.79  5  3  3.5 
I5  4.13  4  3.72  1  3  2.5 
I6  3.52  7  3.33  8  1  7.5 
I7  4.00  3  3.75  3  0  3 
I8  3.67  8  3.26  6  2  7 
I9  3.50  9  3.19  9  0  9 
Table 7-6. Validity of the survey results 
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Table 7-6 shows that the two impediments that have a rank difference of three are related to 
gain sharing issues (I4: partners find it hard to ensure a fair allocation of the shared workload in 
advance; I5: a fair allocation of the benefits is essential for a successful cooperation). This provides 
additional evidence for the observation made in the previous section that Flemish LSPs consider 
gain sharing impediments to be more severe than their Dutch counterparts do. 
 
 
7.6  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The discussions in Section 7.4 provide evidence for Claim 1, which states that Flemish LSPs 
consider the impediments for horizontal cooperation more severe than their Dutch colleagues do. 
At the same time, they value the opportunities alike. The explanation for this is not unambiguous. It 
is  possible  that  there  are  clear-cut  economic  reasons  for  the  reluctance  of  Flemish  LSPs.  For 
example, Eurostat data (E.R. 9) show that between 1995 and 2003, the EU-15 countries have 
shown only a very small increase of 0.6% in the total freight volume. Belgium and the Netherlands 
both contributed negatively to this growth. While the volume dropped with 4.8% in Belgium, the 
Netherlands transport sector showed an even stronger decrease in volume of 10.7% over the same 
period of eight years. Maybe this stronger financial threat has led Dutch LSPs to be more willing to 
accept the potential dangers of horizontal cooperation. Another possible explanation is of a more 
cultural nature. Flemish entrepreneurs may be more inclined to first see where the cat jumps before 
implementing innovative or otherwise far-reaching concepts. Considering the results of both the 
interviews and the surveys, the latter seems to be the most probable explanation. If this is true, the 
Flemish  may  learn  from  both  the  successful  and  unsuccessful  cooperation  projects  in  the 
Netherlands. 
Claim  2,  stating  that  the  highest  (lowest)  rated  propositions  on  opportunities  and 
impediments are the same in both Flanders and the Netherlands, is also supported. This is based on 
the  analysis  of  rank  differences  in  Table  7-6.  Therefore,  it  can  be  expected  that  the  relative 
importance of the opportunities and impediments in Flanders and the Netherlands, gives a good 

















The third part of this thesis focuses on the way in which horizontal cooperation can be put into 
practice. In many cases, horizontal cooperation is not a ‘stand alone’ measure to be incorporated 
in a company’s business processes. Rather, as a result of changes in the company’s environment, 
current  business  processes  are  gradually  reconsidered.  To  make  these  changes  successful, 
horizontal cooperation can provide a promising tool. Therefore, the introduction of new logistics 
concepts  frequently  paves  the  way  for  horizontal  cooperation.  Three  such  concepts  will  be 
discussed in detail. The first is Factory Gate Pricing. Basically, this means that retailers pick up 
their  ordered  goods  at  suppliers,  instead  of  having  them  delivered.  Secondly,  Insinking  is 
discussed. In this concept, a Logistics Service Provider implicitly enforces horizontal cooperation 
by simultaneously targeting a group of possibly competing shippers. Finally, a method is presented 
to develop Joint Hub Networks. 
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8.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This  chapter  discusses  a  first  enabling  concept  for  horizontal  cooperation.  As  will  be 
explained below, cooperation is in this case facilitated by a shift in the orchestration of transport 
flows. The concept will be illustrated by means of a case study from the food retail industry. 
The difficulties of logistics companies discussed in Chapter 1 are especially true for the retail 
sector:  margins  are  getting  thinner,  customer  requirements  in  terms  of  product  freshness  and 
product assortment are growing and product life cycles are becoming shorter. In response to this, 
retail logistics is going through drastic changes. In the early 1980s, it was common practice for 
suppliers to deliver products directly to the shops (Mercer, 1993). In the mid-eighties, retailers 
gradually moved towards central warehousing: suppliers delivered to a retailer distribution centre 
(DC), enabling retailers to supply their own shops more efficiently. As a result of this change, the 
retail supply chain was split into two parts: 
•  Primary distribution: from the supplier to the retailer distribution centre 
•  Secondary distribution: from the retailer distribution centre to the shops 
 
In most cases, suppliers remainded in control of the primary distribution. The retailer on the 
other hand, controls the secondary distribution. As a result, logistics has become part of the day-to-
day business environment of the retailer. According to Fernie and Staines (2001), since the nineties 
logistics is even one of the crucial determinants of success in the retail sector. Factory Gate Pricing 
(FGP) is one of the latest trends in retail logistics. Under FGP, the retailer also takes over the 
orchestration of the primary distribution from the supplier. Specifically, this means that the cost of 
transport is no longer included in the price that suppliers charge to the retailer. Instead, the retailer 
buys the products ‘at the factory gate’ and takes care of the transport on his own account (FGP is 
also referred to as ‘ex-works ordering’). Figure 8-1 presents a graphical overview of a general retail 
supply chain and the shift from the original situation to FGP. 
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Figure 8-1. The retail supply chain 
 
The  increasing  product  range  and  demand  variability  are  forcing  retailers  to  focus  on 
inventory reductions. In recent years, this has resulted in more frequent and smaller replenishment 
orders  delivered  by  the  suppliers  to  the  retailer  DCs.  To  manage  this  efficiently,  suppliers 
introduced consolidation hubs where many small orders for the same retailer DC are combined (see 
Figure 8-1). 
Suppliers only incur the costs of primary transport and therefore they are negatively affected 
by many small replenishment orders. The retailers on the other hand, only incur inventory costs and 
therefore have an incentive to decrease their order sizes. Because of this lack of a helicopter view 
on logistics costs, the optimal balance of transport and inventory costs in the replenishment policy 
of retailers is seldom achieved. The retailer is not directly charged for the higher transport costs 
that are a consequence of the increased frequency of delivery. Bringing the control of primary 
transport and inventory under the control of one supply chain entity by means of FGP is therefore 
likely to generate cost savings. 
In addition to the savings resulting from coordination of transport and inventory, FGP offers 
three other sources for savings. Firstly, retailers generally have a vast product range for which they 
can make the transport-inventory trade-off simultaneously. This means that orders from suppliers 
located close to each other may be synchronised in time, such that they can be combined in the 
same  route.  Secondly,  under  FGP,  primary  and  secondary  distribution  can  be  integrated.  For Chapter 8: Factory Gate Pricing 
 
125
example, on the backhaul of a delivery trip to a shop, the same truck may, if this is efficient, visit a 
supplier to pick up a shipment destined for a retailer distribution centre. Finally, FGP facilitates 
horizontal cooperation because less decision makers are involved. 
A well-known concept that is related to FGP is Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI, see e.g. 
Cheung and Lee, 2002; Disney et al., 2003). This type of vertical cooperation also concentrates the 
control of inventory and primary transport, and sometimes even secondary transport, at a single 
supply chain entity. The difference with FGP is that under VMI the supplier instead of the retailer 
is in control. VMI is typically implemented in situations where a few large suppliers deliver a 
substantial  volume  to  retailers,  but  it  becomes  unmanageable  if  hundreds  of  small  suppliers 
frequently visit the retailer’s distribution centre to deliver new supplies. Moreover, it is unlikely 
that small suppliers have the logistics and ICT capabilities to carry out VMI. With FGP, this 
problem  is  less  severe  since  in  most  retail  supply  chains  there  are  many  more  suppliers  than 
retailers. Furthermore, the logistics capabilities of retailers and their Logistics Service Providers 
(LSPs) seem to be well enough developed to take over the transport from the suppliers. Which 
concept is more suitable depends for a large part on product characteristics (like size, weight, 
temperature conditioning, vulnerability) and the capabilities of both the supplier and the retailer. 
The  promising  future  of  FGP  has  already  been  demonstrated  in  the  UK  where  leading 
retailers such as Tesco and Sainsbury’s have implemented FGP for a part of their product range. 
Other British retailers such as Asda, Somerfield, Safeway, and Waitrose have announced plans for 
FGP (E.R. 15; Finegan, 2002). Potter et al. (2003) report significant potential kilometre reductions 
through FGP for Tesco. 
This chapter aims at quantifying the expected benefits of FGP for the Dutch retail sector for 
dry grocery goods, with and without horizontal cooperation. To achieve this goal, route planning 
scenarios  down  to  the  operational  level  of  execution  are  constructed.  For  each  product 
group/distribution centre combination, the size of the shipments, the frequency of delivery of the 
products,  the  safety  stock,  and  the  delivery  mode  (i.e.,  direct  or  via  a  consolidation  hub)  are 
determined. Then, the operational vehicle routing problem is solved. Although this study is of a 
strategic nature, the detailed operational problem is solved to get a good estimation of transport 
costs and performance indicators. The reason for this is that the small nuances in different scenarios 
go back to the operational level and cannot be adequately expressed in strategic models.  
The  chapter  is  further  organized  as  follows.  Section  8.2  discusses  the  literature  on 
optimisation problems that are relevant for FGP. Section 8.3 includes a detailed description of the 
case study in the Dutch retail sector and a discussion of issues such as consolidation, cooperation, 
and  supply  chain  orchestration.  The  solution  methodology  is  elaborated  on  in  Section  8.4.  In 
Section 8.5, the results of the case study are discussed. Then, in Section 8.6 practical barriers for 
FGP implementations and directions for further research are identified. Finally, conclusions are 
presented in Section 8.7. Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  126 
 
 
8.2  RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Perhaps because of the relative novelty of Factory Gate Pricing, there is little literature on 
the subject as such. Moreover, because of its many aspects and enormous size, it is very hard to 
develop efficient algorithms for what is called the Factory Gate Pricing optimisation problem (this 
problem will be discussed in detail in Section 8.4). To cope with this, a two-phase heuristic is 
constructed. Firstly, by determining the frequency of delivery for each product, a good balance 
between inventory and transport costs can be made. Secondly, transport orders are combined into 
routes by solving a vehicle routing problem. During these two phases, some general optimisation 
problems occur. This section presents a brief survey of the literature on these problems. They are: 
periodic routing, routing with a consolidation hub, combined inventory and route planning, and 
routing with a large customer base. 
 
8.2.1  Periodic Routing 
Since the dataset (see section 8.3) contains frequencies of delivery for each transport order, 
the routing problem has a periodic character. The Periodic Vehicle Routing Problem (PVRP) is 
identical to the classical vehicle routing problem, except that the planning period consists of  M  
days  instead  of  one  day.  Each  customer  i  must  be  visited  i k times  during  this  period  where 
1 i k M ≤ ≤ .  i k   is  called  the  frequency  of  delivery  to  customer  i   and  sets  of  daily  routes  are 
generated to minimise transport costs. Some references on periodic vehicle routing are Christofides 
and Beasley (1984), Tan and Beasley (1984), Russell and Gribbin (1991), Chao et al. (1995), 
Cordeau, et al. (1997), Drummond et al. (2001) and Baptista et al. (2002). 
 
8.2.2  Routing with a Consolidation Hub 
The routing of products through a network may improve if a consolidation hub is introduced 
(see also Chapter 10). One of the first papers on transport systems in which both direct shipping 
and shipping via one or more hubs is allowed, is due to Aykin (1995). The problem consisted of 
determining the best hub locations and the best delivery modes for customers. The objective was to 
minimise  total  transport  cost.  Four  heuristic  algorithms  were  proposed  to  solve  the  problem. 
Unfortunately, the problem instances solved were limited to 5 hubs and 20 demand points. Liu et 
al. (2003) showed that, when compared to a pure hub-and-spoke system or a pure direct shipment 
system, allowing both delivery modes results in roughly a 10% saving. Again, problem sizes were 
relatively small: the largest solved instance consisted of 5 suppliers and 25 customers.  
Irnich (2000) introduced a problem with multiple depots in a pickup and delivery setting. In 
this problem, all requests are to be picked up at or delivered to one central location that has the Chapter 8: Factory Gate Pricing 
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function of a consolidation hub. A two-phase set-covering algorithm based on column generation 
was proposed. This approach again severely limits the maximum size of the instances since it is 
assumed that all possible routes can be enumerated. The largest instances solved consist of 130 
orders and 22 depots. 
 
8.2.3  Combined Inventory and Route Planning 
An important aspect of FGP is that decisions on replenishment orders influence the transport 
and handling costs as well as the inventory costs. Improving supply chain efficiency thus requires 
an integrated approach to inventory control and transport planning. The literature mentioned in this 
subsection provides a good understanding of how transport costs and inventory costs interact. 
Daganzo and Newell (1985) conducted a study on the simultaneous routing and inventory 
problem. They illustrated how the nature of the objects carried (e.g. cheap/expensive) affects the 
optimal configuration of a distribution system. The results also depend on factors such as the 
inventory carrying cost per item per unit of time, the transport cost per unit distance, the demand 
per unit area and unit time, the average distance from the depot, the average speed, and the time per 
stop. Other references for the simultaneous minimisation of transport and inventory costs in various 
settings are Bell et al. (1983), Dror and Levy (1986), Blumenfeld et al. (1987), Dror and Ball 
(1987), Chien et al. (1989), Anily (1990), Anily and Federgruen (1993), Herer and Levy (1997), 
and Viswanathan and Mathur (1997). Qu et al. (1999) deserves special attention since they come 
closest to the FGP situation. In their setting, the control of the supply chain lies with one central 
distribution centre that collects products from a set of suppliers. Again, problem sizes are small: the 
heuristic was tested on instances with a maximum size of 50 items. 
For issues concerning inventory policies for the retail sector in particular, see Kapalka et al. 
(1999) and Dubelaar et al. (2001). 
 
8.2.4  Routing with a Large Customer Base 
Because of the large instances at hand, most of the standard optimisation techniques cannot 
be applied. In literature, little attention is given to huge vehicle routing problems. However, some 
research has been done on very large instances of the generalised assignment problem, a problem 
that can be reformulated as a basic vehicle routing problem (Higgins, 2001). To our knowledge, 
routing problems that incorporate characteristics such as periodicity and consolidation hubs have 
not yet been discussed in the literature for the very large instances at hand. 
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8.2.5  Discussion 
No papers were found in literature that incorporate all the problem characteristics of the FGP 
situation. Nevertheless, there is extensive literature on some of the discussed building blocks of the 
FGP  optimisation  problem.  Some  ideas  and  concepts  are  readily  usable  for  FGP.  The  biggest 
challenge  is  the  enormous  problem  size:  compared  to  the  FGP  optimisation  problem,  most 
problems solved in the literature are fairly small.  
 
 
8.3  CASE DESCRIPTION 
 
Three participants (CoopCodis, Dekamarkt, and Jumbo) of SuperUnie, a Dutch horizontal 
cooperation initiative, provided the data for the case study described here. Until now, SuperUnie 
mostly acted as a purchasing group. SuperUnie represents approximately 25% of the Dutch food 
retail market. The dataset consists of 355 slow moving dry grocery product groups of 340 suppliers 
that (almost) all retailers have in their assortments. These product groups consist of on average 16 
individual  products.  This  already  takes  a  certain  level  of  consolidation  by  the  suppliers  into 
account. Some suppliers have more than one product group due to the fact that some of their 
product groups have different characteristics. The product group volumes are for a representative 
period  of  24  working  days  without  seasonal  and  promotional  effects.  The  retailers  consider  a 
product group to be a ‘slow mover’ if the turnover in a distribution centre is less than 66 pallets a 
week. Product groups with a larger volume are assumed to be distributed by full truckloads and are 
therefore excluded from the analysis. For a discussion of the effect of combining the distribution of 
slow and fast movers, we refer to Fleischmann (1999). 
For a fair comparison between the current situation and Factory Gate Pricing, the data of the 
SuperUnie members do not suffice. This is because restricting the case to the SuperUnie retailers 
would bias the current situation by underestimating the economies of scale present at the suppliers. 
To avoid this, the dataset is scaled up on the basis of the market shares of the other Dutch food 
retailers and the known locations of their distribution centres. This results in a dataset with the 
characteristics listed in Table 8-1. The hubs are the sites of LSPs that currently work for multiple 




Dataset characteristic  Value 
Number of suppliers  340 
Number of product groups  355 
Number of retailer distribution centres  47 
Number of hubs  25 
Number of productgroup – DC relations  11,980 
Number of monthly orders  Appr. 60,000 
Table 8-1. Size of the problem 
 
The  cost  and  time  data  for  handling  activities  (like  truck  loading,  unloading,  storing), 
transport (driving, stopping), and administration (ordering) come from a sector-specific database 
(see Stichting Ketenmoduul, 2000) and have been verified by the three participating retailers (see 
Figure 8-2). Since the constructed dataset covers a representative period of a year, the results of the 







































unlimited number of vehicles
Vehicle cost
€ 33 per regular hour
€ 66 per hour overtime
€ 0.35 per driven kilometer
 
Figure 8-2. Overview of processes with data 
 
Inventory costs can be directly derived from the values per pallet. These are obtained from 
the  retailers’  databases  and  the  cost  per  pallet  position  in  a  distribution  centre  (Stichting 
Ketenmoduul, 2000). In general, inventory costs are not dominant for the product groups under 
consideration, as the average pallet value is only € 784. 
In  order  to  assess  the  potential  of  FGP,  seven  scenarios  are  defined,  corresponding  to 
different  supply  chain  orchestrators,  degrees  of  cooperation  and  flow  synchronisation.  An 
overview of the scenarios is presented in Figure 8-3. 
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Optimization of delivery frequency










Factory Gate Pricing scenarios
(retailers control primary transport)
Traditional scenarios









Figure 8-3. Overview of the interrelation of the scenarios 
 
Below, we explain the scenario’s in Figure 8-3. First of all, there is an important distinction 
between flows and orders. A flow is a productgroup – DC relation with a given constant demand 
per unit of time. The number of orders corresponding to a flow is equal to its frequency of delivery 
and  it  is  assumed  that  they  are  equally  spread  over  the  planning  horizon.  The  supply  chain 
orchestrators have the planning authority over the transport flows and are thus responsible for the 
corresponding orders. In the original situation, the supplier is the supply chain orchestrator for the 
primary distribution. Under FGP however, the retailers take over this role. ‘Cooperation’ means 
that there is horizontal cooperation between orchestrators by means of joint route planning for all 
their transport orders for a certain day (cf. Chapter 4). Finally, synchronisation is the process of 
moving orders within the time horizon to obtain better flow combinations. Two types of flow 
synchronisation exist: internal and external synchronisation. Internal synchronisation means that 
the  supply  chain  orchestrators  can  only  shift  their  own  flows  over  time.  With  external 
synchronisation, the supply chain orchestrators cooperate in synchronizing their flows. Note that 
external synchronisation can only take place if there is cooperation. 
Based on the different possibilities described above, seven scenarios are defined in Figure 
8-3. Scenario 1 is the original situation, where the suppliers are in control of the transport. Scenario 
2 is equal to Scenario 1, except that frequencies of delivery are optimised based on total supply 
chain  costs..  Scenario  3  extends  scenario  2  with  horizontal  cooperation  between  suppliers. 
Scenarios 4 and 5 are basic FGP situations. Retailers are the orchestrators and the frequencies of Chapter 8: Factory Gate Pricing 
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delivery  are  optimised  on  the  basis  of total  supply  chain  costs.  Scenario  5  adds  internal  flow 
synchronisation to scenario 4. Finally, Scenarios 6 and 7 are FGP situations with different degrees 
of  retailer  cooperation.  In  Scenario  6,  the  retailers  jointly  plan  their  transport  orders  (i.e.,  the 
situation analysed in Chapter 4). In Scenario 7, the timing of the replenishment flows is also tuned 
between the retailers (i.e., external flow synchronisation). Section 8.5 develops statements about 
the impact on the total cost of each transition from one scenario to another. 
In assessing the value of FGP, the primary distribution is concentrated on. The reason is that 
the current case consists solely of slow moving (grocery) products. Given the trend of central 
warehousing as described in Mercer (1993) and the inherently small volumes of slow movers, it is 
unlikely that these products will be transported directly from the supplier directly to the shops. It is 
furthermore assumed that an infinite number of trucks is available (this is in fact an assumption that 
will be made in all enabling concepts for horizontal cooperation discussed in PART III of this 
thesis). Other restrictions on trips are the maximum (legally allowed) working time of a driver and 




8.4  METHODOLOGY 
 
This section describes the methodology for solving the Factory Gate Pricing optimisation 
problem.  Considering  the  huge  size  of  the  problem  (see  Table  8-1),  we  adopted  a  two-phase 
heuristic approach. This section discusses phase 1 in detail and sketches at phase 2. 
 
8.4.1  Phase 1: Mode of Transport and Frequency Optimisation 
Throughout,  four  cost  factors  are  distinguished.  They  are:  transport,  handling,  order 
processing, and inventory costs (see Figure 8-2). For each product group ( pg ) - distribution centre 
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The main goal of the first phase of the heuristic is to find the right balance between inventory 
costs and transport costs. This balance can be influenced by means of two decision variables. 
Firstly, there is the frequency of delivery ( , pg dc Freq ) with which productgroup  pg  is delivered to 
distribution  centre  dc.  The  planning  period  consists  of  four  weeks  (24  working  days).  After 
consulting SuperUnie experts, six possible frequencies of delivery that occur in practice during a Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  132 
24-day period are defined (see Table 8-2). However, for some products certain frequencies may not 
be feasible because of restrictive product characteristics. When this was the case, this was added to 
the model as an extra flow-specific restriction. Choosing a high frequency of delivery for a given 
flow generally increases transport, order processing, and handling costs, but it decreases inventory 
costs. 
 
, pg dc Freq   Interpretation 
1  Delivery once every four weeks 
2  Delivery once every two weeks 
4  Weekly delivery 
8  Delivery twice a week 
12  Delivery three times a week 
24  Daily delivery 
Table 8-2. The allowed frequencies 
 
The second decision variable is the delivery mode ( , pg dc Mode ).  , 1 pg dc Mode =  means that 
productgroup  pg  travels directly from the supplier to distribution centre dc, while  , 0 pg dc Mode =  
means that product  pg  is consolidated at a hub before it goes to distribution centre dc. 
Demand  is  constant  over the  24-day  period, so  the  order  sizes can  be  straightforwardly 
adjusted according to the frequency of delivery. For the currently used frequencies of delivery, the 
safety stocks of each product are given in the dataset. These are then adjusted for changes in the 
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Furthermore, the ordering and handling cost are estimated using formulas (8.3) and (8.4). 
Total order processing costs exhibit a one-to-one relation with the frequency of delivery, while 
handling costs depend on both the frequency of delivery and the mode of transport, i.e., the number 
of  loading/unloading  activities  for  each  flow.  Therefore,  estimating  these  three  cost  factors  is 
relatively straightforward. 
 
, , , , ( ) * pg dc pg dc pg dc dc ag OrderingCosts Freq CostPerOrder Freq =   (8.3) 
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  (8.4) 
 
The last cost factor is transport costs. These are unfortunately harder to estimate, since they 
depend on the possible combinations of orders in trucks. This problem is tackled by analysing a 
large set of pick-up and delivery routes, calculated by the routing heuristic (see description of 
Phase 2 in Section 8.4.2) on selected instances of the periodic pick-up and delivery problem in the 
case study. The cost of each route was then assigned to the orders according to truck space usage 
per kilometre from pick-up to delivery address. This routine leads to an estimate of the transport 
costs for each order. Finally, a formula for the transport costs is estimated by means of three 
regression  models  with  a  number  of  order  characteristics  as  explanatory  variables.  The  three 
different regression models relate to three types of transport links: 
1.  From supplier to distribution centre 
2.  From supplier to hub 
3.  From hub to distribution centre 
 
Link 1 represents the direct mode, links 2 and 3 correspond to the indirect mode. For each 
type  of  link  s ,  a  set  of  characteristics  with  the  corresponding  parameter  estimations  s β   is 
determined. 
The  explanatory  variables  are  formed  by  a  number  of  order  characteristics.  These 
characteristics are indicators for the level of synergy and are based on the analysis in Chapter 4. 
They relate to: 
•  Driving time in minutes from the pick-up to the delivery location 
•  Distance in kilometres from the pick-up to the delivery location 
•  Volume to be shipped 
•  Volume within 30, 45, 60 minutes of driving time from the pick-up (delivery) location 
•  Number of DCs within 30, 45, 60 minutes of driving time from the pick-up (delivery) location 
•  Number of suppliers within 30, 45, 60 minutes of driving time from the pick-up (delivery) 
location 
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s pg,dc pg,dc X (Freq , Mode )specifies the values of the explanatory variables in each of the 
three regression equations. It is now possible to estimate the transport cost for a given  ( ) , pg dc -
combination: 
 
if  , 1 pg dc Mode =  (direct mode), then 
( )
sup,dc
pg,dc pg,dc pg,dc s s pg,dc pg,dc
s S
TransportCosts (Freq ,Mode ) X Freq ,Mode β
∈
= ⋅     (8.5a) 
 
if  , 0 pg dc Mode =  (via a hub), then 
( ) ( )
sup,cc cc,dc
pg,dc pg,dc pg,dc
s s pg,dc pg,dc s s pg,dc pg,dc
s S s S
TransportCosts (Freq ,Mode )
X Freq ,Mode X Freq ,Mode β β
∈ ∈
=





, X Y S  is the set of links from location type  X  to location type  Y . The explained 
variance of this regression model is 90%. This level of precision suffices to make a reasonable 
estimate of the transport costs that can be used for the frequency and delivery mode optimisation in 
phase I. Later, in phase II, detailed Periodic Pickup and Delivery Problems are solved to obtain the 
precise transport cost figures for the chosen frequency and delivery mode. 
Now that estimates are available for each cost factor, we are able to make a choice on the 
frequency of delivery and mode of transport for each order. Since there are only twelve possible 
combinations (six frequencies of delivery and two modes of transport), costs are estimated for 
every possible combination. Finally, the cheapest feasible possibility is selected. 
Phase 1 is now finished by constructing an instance of the Periodic Pick-up and Delivery 
Problem  based  on  the  generated transport  orders,  corresponding  to  the  chosen  combination  of 
frequency of delivery and mode of transport. 
 
8.4.2  Phase 2: Periodic Pick-up and Delivery Problem 
To  get  reliable  distribution  cost  estimates,  a  very  large  Periodic  Pick-up  and  Delivery 
Problem (PPDP) must be solved. Like many other routing heuristics, ours consists of a construction 
part and an improvement part. Since this PPDP heuristic uses classical techniques only i.e., an 
adaptation of the savings method (Clarke and Wright, 1964) for construction and re-insertions in 
the improvement part, it will not be discussed in detail. It should however be noted that, to the best 
of our knowledge, this heuristic is the first that is able to deal with very large instances of the 
PPDP. Instances that cover all Dutch food retailers (for slow movers) consist of up to 60,000 
transport orders. Instances are solved within thirty minutes to twelve hours of calculation time on a 
Pentium 2,200 MHz processor with 512 MB of RAM. 
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8.4.3  Verification and Validation of the Model 
In order to verify internal consistency of the model, test runs and sensitivity analyses are 
performed. Parameters are varied between their extreme values to check if the behaviour of the 
models is in line with expectations and whether the outcomes are correct. Then, in the validation 
process,  the  external  correctness  of  the  model  is  tested  to  check  if  the  model  gives  a  good 
representation of the real world. Several organizations helped to validate the model, amongst them 
the three participating SuperUnie retailers, a consultancy firm specialised in retail distribution, and 
academics. After this, we are confident that the model and its assumptions are representative. 
 
 
8.5  RESULTS 
 
This section discusses six statements derived from the numerical results of the case study. 
All numbers are yearly cost figures. Table 8-3 provides a detailed overview of the costs of the 
scenarios 1 to 7. 
 
  Scen. 1  Scen. 2  Scen. 3  Scen. 4  Scen. 5  Scen. 6  Scen. 7 
Transport  76,921  59,894  43,627  49,996  48,468  42,923  41,776 
Inventory  21,063  28,279  28,279  28,279  28,279  28,279  28,279  
Handling,  loading 
and unloading 
53,533  43,321  43,215  42,969  42,799  43,059  42,824  
Ordering  12,003  6,204  6,204  6,204  6,204  6,204  6,204  
Table 8-3. Costs of the different scenarios (in k€ ) 
 
Statement I: Optimisation of frequencies of delivery can create large costs savings (transition 
from scenario 1 to scenario 2). 
Figure 8-4 represents a comparison of the supply chain cost under the present frequencies of 
delivery  used  by  the  retailers  and  the  cost  under  optimised  frequencies.  With  the  optimised 
frequencies of delivery, the transport, handling, and order processing costs decrease at the expense 
of slightly higher inventories and the overall cost reduction amounts to 15.8%. Beside this cost 
effect, it can be observed that the use of the consolidation hubs is drastically reduced. The reason is 
that, as a result of the lower frequencies of delivery, the average size of the shipments increases. 
Furthermore, the average load factor of the trucks increases by 3.0% and the number of empty 
kilometres per route decreases by 9.5%. 
























Figure 8-4. Statement I: The optimisation of frequencies 
 
Statement II: Shifting to Factory Gate Pricing decreases the supply chain costs (transition from 
scenario 2 to scenario 4). 
Figure 8-5 illustrates Statement II: in the Dutch retail supply chain for slow moving dry 
grocery goods, FGP is beneficial. By shifting the flow orchestration from the suppliers to the 
retailers, supply chain costs go down by 7.5%. This shift of control changes the transport process 
from a delivery system to a collection system. Since the supplier sites strongly outnumber the 
retailer  distribution  centres,  the  collection  network  of  the  retailers  is  denser  than  the  delivery 
network of the suppliers. Therefore, more efficient route schemes can be created (see the discussion 
of Figure 4-4 in Chapter 4). Under FGP, the total number of kilometres driven exhibits a decrease 
of 21% from over 65 million to less than 52 million kilometres. These results are in line with the 
observations of an FGP study undertaken by Tesco in the UK where a kilometre reduction of 25% 
for ambient products and 23% for fresh products was reported (Potter et al., 2003). 
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Figure 8-5. Statement II: Shifting to Factory Gate Pricing 
 
Statement  III:  Internal  flow  synchronisation  creates  value  (transition  from  scenario  4  to 
scenario 5). 
Under FGP, internal flow synchronization can enhance planning decisions of an individual 
retailer. As explained above, flow synchronization means the shifting of orders belonging to the 
same transport flow over the planning horizon to attain more suitable combinations of orders. Note 
that this does not influence the frequency of delivery and the time between two consecutive visits. 
Although the resulting decrease of 1.3% of total logistics costs is relatively small (see Figure 8-6), 
this reduction is interesting because it can be easily attained without any organizational changes. 























Figure 8-6. Statement III: Internal flow synchronisation 
 
Statement IV: Cooperation is profitable regardless of the orchestration (transition from scenario 
2 to scenario 3 and the transition from scenario 5 to scenario 6). 
Statement IV is of special importance in the context of this thesis. Figure 8-7 shows the 
effect of horizontal cooperation between either the suppliers or the retailers. The upper part of the 
figure illustrates cooperation between suppliers in the original situation; in the lower part retailer 
cooperation  under  FGP  is  illustrated.  Although  cooperation  is  profitable  regardless  of  the 
orchestration, in the original situation the cost savings from cooperation are much larger than in the 
FGP situation, 11.9% and 4.2%, respectively. This is explained by the fact that in the FGP situation 
the retailers already have a dense collection network that enables them to construct quite efficient 
routes. This is in line with the observation made in Section 4.4.6 that synergy values are negatively 
related to market concentration. 
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(Factory Gate Pricing situation)
 
Figure 8-7. Statement IV: Cooperation 
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Statement V: External flow synchronisation creates value (from scenario 6 to scenario 7). 
The results of combining cooperation between retailers with external flow synchronisation 
are  shown  in  Figure  8-8.  Besides  combining  transport  orders  in  the  same  truck,  retailers  also 
cooperate in determining the timing of the transport orders. It turns out that this results in an 
additional cost  benefit  of 1.2%. Taking  into  account  the  significant  organizational cost  that is 
needed to externally synchronise orders and the small benefit of this, external flow synchronisation 






















Figure 8-8. Statement V: External flow synchronisation 
 
Statement VI: When a small subset of the retailers engage in FGP, adverse cost effects due to 
the reduced network density for the suppliers are small. 
In practice, it is unlikely that all retailers in the sector will change their logistics structure at 
the same time. Also, it may be expected that only retailers that are already in some way organized 
will cooperate horizontally. Statement VI is illustrated by showing the cost effects of a shift to FGP 
of only the retailers participating in this study. This group, referred to as JuDeCo, operates five 
distribution centres in the Netherlands. Figure 8-9 gives a comparison of the total transport costs in 
the sector before and after the JuDeCo retailers moved to FGP. A restriction is made to transport 
costs because this is the only cost group that is affected by the reduction in network density of the 
suppliers  delivering  to  the  other  retailers.  The  reduction  in  total  transport  costs  of  the  system Chapter 8: Factory Gate Pricing 
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amounts to 1.1% for the total system, which is brought about by a strong transport cost saving of 
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Figure 8-9. Statement VI: Factory Gate Pricing of JuDeCo retailers 
 
 
8.6  POINTS OF ATTENTION 
 
The preceding sections have shown that Factory Gate Pricing potentially is a promising 
concept  for  optimising  logistics  operations.  However,  there  are  some  points  of  attention  that 
practitioners and researchers should take into account. This section discusses practical barriers to 
FGP implementation (Section 8.6.1) and some directions for further research (Section 8.6.2). 
 
8.6.1  Practical Limitations and Points of Attention 
The case study indicates that FGP is attractive for slow moving dry grocery products. From a 
logistics point of view, these products are easy to handle. They have a long storage life, low value 
per unit, small volumes, and temperature-controlled transport is not required. For other products or 
industries, the savings reported here may therefore not be attainable. Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  142 
Suppliers may be concerned about the decreased density of their distribution network caused 
by the shift to FGP of some of their customers. Obviously, this makes their distribution networks 
less  dense. The  results  presented  in  section  8.5  however  show  that  this  effect  does  not  cause 
dramatic cost increases if only a small number of retailers apply the concept. 
Finally, there is the core assumption behind the FGP concept that retailers can buy products 
from  their  suppliers  at  a  price  from  which  transport  costs  are  filtered  out.  This  requires  that 
suppliers have both the ability and the willingness to provide insight into their price structure. 
Moreover, suppliers might not have the flexibility to allow retailers to pick up products because of 
limited  dock  capacity  or  long-term  contracts  with  LSPs  for  the  transport  of  their  products. 
However, if a retailer is a very important customer for a supplier, as is often the case, he might 
simply be able to enforce FGP. 
 
8.6.2  Directions for Further Research 
In this section we discuss five directions for further research. First, in its present form, the 
model only incorporates primary transport. It is possible to also incorporate secondary transport in 
the routing problem. For certain (large) flows, it may be optimal to bypass the retailer’s DC and 
travel directly from the supplier to a retail outlet. This would create a higher degree of freedom and 
possibly increase the total cost savings of FGP. Second, when retailers cooperate to achieve a 
cooperative planning, they all contribute to the benefits that this cooperation yields. In order to 
provide good incentives for retailers considering participation, a fair allocation mechanism of the 
total gain is needed. This topic will be discussed in detail in Chapter 9 and Chapter 10. Third, 
consolidation hubs can be of great use for combining small loads in order to increase load factors 
and cut down on empty kilometres. Clearly, the locations of the consolidation hubs are of great 
importance for the performance of the system. It is worthwhile to calculate the optimal locations 
from real data and compare the present savings to the simulated savings with the consolidation 
hubs at their optimal locations. Moreover, it would be interesting to calculate the cost advantages in 
case cooperating retailers open their distribution centres for consolidation activities. Chapter 10 
will study the development of such a cooperative hub network in detail. Fourth, it is assumed 
throughout the calculations that a planning period of four weeks gives a good representation of a 
whole year. This may not be true for products other than dry grocery goods. Finally, to cross-check 
the validity of the results, it would be very interesting to perform the analysis for other countries as 
well. 
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8.7  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter introduced the concept of Factory Gate Pricing. A model was developed that is 
capable of simulating different scenarios for a distribution system in terms of the orchestration, 
cooperation, and flow synchronisation. Results have been generated for a Dutch retail supply chain 
of slow moving dry grocery goods.  
The cost savings with respect to the original situation are mainly caused by three factors. 
Firstly,  the  frequencies  of  delivery  are  optimised  based  on  total  supply  chain  costs.  This  is 
facilitated by FGP because it brings the coordination of inventory and transport under the control of 
the  retailer.  Secondly,  there  is  the  synchronisation  of  replenishment  orders:  the  retailer  can 
determine the timing of replenishment orders so that nearby suppliers can be combined in one 
route. Finally, the asymmetry in the network is exploited to save costs. In the case studied, the 
suppliers outnumber the retailers’ distribution centres. 
The experiments show that compared to the original situation, FGP results in a 22% decrease 
in supply chain costs. If there is also horizontal cooperation, savings up to 26% are possible. These 
savings are based on a transition of all retailers in the market to FGP. However, experiments with 
the transition of only a small number of retailers to FGP still result in considerable savings for the 
participating retailers. 
 More research on the subject is needed. The model was developed to assess the potential of 
FGP  on  a  strategic  level,  focusing  on  the  primary  distribution  part.  Combining  primary  and 
secondary distribution is appealing since this may increase the savings resulting from FGP even 
more.  Although  there  is  extensive  operations  research  literature  on  subproblems  of  the  FGP 
optimisation problem, there are no models that tackle the complete problem. Since FGP is being 
implemented more and more in practice, this offers an interesting challenge for researchers. 
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9.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This  chapter  introduces  a  second  enabling  concept  for  horizontal  cooperation.  In  this 
concept,  a  Logistics  Service  Provider  (LSP)  implicitly  enforces  horizontal  cooperation  by 
simultaneously targeting a group of possibly competing shippers. 
In recent years, LSPs have had to cope with stricter requirements of shippers in terms of 
speed, flexibility and price (cf. Chapter 1). In addition, because of broader product assortments and 
shorter  life  cycles,  streams  through  the  LSPs’  networks  became  fragmented.  This  causes  load 
factors and, by consequence, profit margins to drop. To cope with these difficult market conditions, 
LSPs  are  on  a  continuous  search  for  opportunities  to  increase  their  efficiency  and  discern 
themselves from competitors. 
 
9.1.1  Insinking versus Outsourcing 
Razzaque  and  Sheng  (1998)  define  logistics  outsourcing  or  third  party  logistics  as  the 
provision of a single or multiple logistics services by a vendor on a contractual basis. It has been 
estimated that about 40% of global logistics is outsourced, and increasing numbers of shippers 
consider it an attractive alternative to the traditional logistics service mode (cf. Wong et al., 2000; 
Hong et al., 2004). 
For their turnover, LSPs heavily depend on the extent to which industrial shippers outsource 
their logistics activities. Wilding and Juriado (2004) provide a literature review of empirical papers 
on  outsourcing,  investigating  which  activities  are  typically  outsourced  and  what  are  the  most 
important reasons for doing so. Table 9-1 shows the top-5 reasons for outsourcing.  
 
Rank  Reason 
1  Cost or revenue related 
2  Service related 
3  Operational flexibility related 
4  Business focus related 
5  Asset utilisation or efficiency related 
Table 9-1. Reasons for outsourcing logistics activities 
 
The outsourced activities can be related to transport, warehousing and inventory, information 
systems and value added services. It turns out that the most basic logistics functions of transport, 
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The general idea behind outsourcing is a focus of companies on their core businesses. For 
example, customers of an LSP benefit from the LSP’s larger economies of scale that enable him to 
perform transport and warehousing more efficiently than his customers. In this context, outsourcing 
and  horizontal  cooperation  aim  at  achieving  the  same  goal.  Traditionally,  the  initiative  for 
outsourcing lies with the shippers: once it is reckoned by management that logistics activities can 
better be performed by a third party, an invitation to submit a tender is sent out to a number of pre-
selected LSPs. Based on this invitation, the LSPs then propose a price for their services. 
The  subject  of  this  chapter  is  the  reverse  mode  of  operation,  where  the  initiative  for  a 
contract  lies  with  the  LSP.  To  stress  the  contrast  between  the  traditional  push  approach  of 
outsourcing, and the here proposed pull approach where the LSP is the initiator of the shift of 
logistics activities from the shipper to the LSP, this phenomenon will be referred to as insinking, 
the antonym of outsourcing. 
The  advantage  of  insinking  over  outsourcing  is  that  it  enables  LSPs  to  gain  maximum 
synergetic effects by tendering for multiple shippers whose distribution networks can be merged 
very efficiently. Therefore, there exist promising business opportunities for insinking in practice. 
One example is the introduction of the so-called transport-arrangements in the Dutch Randstad 
metropolis (E.R. 19). In this project, a Dutch LSP offers prominent shippers in the fashion sector to 
perform the distribution to their shops in the city centres against very competitive tariffs. These 
tariffs are low because of the strong synergies the LSP can benefit from in case he replenishes 
multiple  fashion  outlets  in  the  same  city  centre.  The  Dutch  branch  organization  for  fashion 
companies, actively participates in this project by stimulating their members to accept the offer. 
Engaging in the transport-arrangements project is beneficial for the individual producers because 
transport costs are reduced and customer satisfaction is likely to increase since the number of visits 
per shop decreases when multiple shippers make use of the transport-arrangements. As a result, 
trucks  interrupt  store  personnel  less  frequently.  Moreover,  congestion  in  the  city  centre  will 
decrease as a result of the smaller number of truck movements. Apart from the time investments 
that all partners in this project are making, the financial risk rests solely with the LSP. After all, the 
tariff  offers  are  based  on  the  expectation  that  a  certain  minimum  number  of  shippers  will 
participate. So if only one or two shippers accept the offer, the synergies required to break even 
may not be attained. When the behaviour of potential customers is highly unpredictable, this risk 
might be prohibitive for the LSP. To resolve this issue, this chapter offers a methodology for LSPs 
to apply insinking while eliminating this financial risk. 
 
9.1.2  Co-opetition 
Shippers who are active in the same sector, such as the fashion producers in the transport-
arrangements  example,  will  sell  products  with  roughly  the  same  characteristics  and  ordering 
dynamics (time windows, order sizes, conditioning, etc.). This creates strong synergy potential for Chapter 9: Insinking 
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an LSP, because he can operate the same truck types and sometimes even the same routes to serve 
multiple shippers. When shippers are served on the same route, insinking creates a special type of 
horizontal  cooperation:  so-called  ‘co-opetition’  (cf.  Section  2.2).  Although  the  shippers  are 
competitors on their core businesses, they tacitly cooperate with each other on the non-core domain 
of transport since they agree that their products are distributed in a single shipment with their 
competitors’  products. Transport,  the  area  where  the  cooperation  takes  place, is  not  visible  to 
customers.  It  was  already  argued  is  Section  2.2.1  that  this  is  a  beneficial  circumstance  for 
horizontal cooperation. Particularly in transport and logistics, where there are almost no unique 
technologies, companies must often rely on applying innovative concepts such as co-opetition to 
achieve growth. In practice, co-opetition is quickly gaining momentum in the grocery industry. In 
this sector, profit margins are thin and demand variation is strong. Examples of co-opetition in the 
consumer goods industry can be found in Bahrami (2003), and Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
 
9.1.3  Gain Sharing 
In Chapter 2 it was argued that there exist important barriers that can prevent horizontal 
cooperation  initiatives  from  prospering.  Nine  specific  potential  impediments  for  horizontal 
cooperation have been presented to Flemish LSPs. Table 5-4 presents the evaluations of these 
impediments (5-point Likert scale). 
Because impediments for LSPs will supposedly also hold for horizontal cooperation between 
shippers, the assumption is made that the evaluations by the LSPs provide an indication for the 
attitude  of  shippers.  It  turned  out  that  the  impediments  about  the  fairness  and  stability  of 
cooperation (impediments 1, 3, 5, and 6) rank high. In particular, guaranteeing a fair allocation of 
the achieved benefits is the most important impediment for horizontal cooperation. 80% of the 
respondents (strongly) agreed with this proposition, 16% was neutral, and as little as 4% (strongly) 
disagreed. Mistrust about the fairness of the applied allocation rule for the savings has caused many 
horizontal  logistics  cooperation  initiatives  between  shippers,  and/or  LSPs  to  marginalise  or 
disintegrate. 
It was already discussed in Section 2.4.2 that gain sharing is a difficult problem that in 
general cannot be solved to the satisfaction of all partners by applying simple proportional rules. 
On  the  contrary,  to  ensure  a  fair  gain  sharing  mechanism,  the  marginal  contributions  of  each 
shipper to the total gain have to be accurately quantified. The insinking approach uses the true 
contributions  to  the  group’s  synergy  to  calculate  customised  prices  that  fairly  distribute  the 
monetary  savings  attained  by  consolidating  flows  of    shippers.  The  applied  methodology  is 
explained to the shippers and the LSP’s cost structure is deliberately made transparent. 
Instead  of  practical  rules  of  thumb,  we  propose  to  employ  solution  procedures  from 
cooperative game theory. Cooperative game theory models the negotiation process within a group 
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proved capable of solving fairness issues in many fields. Some logistics related examples are: 
(Vertical) Supply Chain Coordination (cf. Vos et al., 2002; Cachon and Lariviere, 2005; Hub-and-
Spoke network formation (cf. Matsubayashi et al., 2005), Outsourcing (cf. Elitzur and Wensley, 
1997), and Inventory pooling (cf. Anupinidi et al., 2001); Bartholdi and Kemahlioğlu-Ziya, 2004; 
Sošić, 2005). Other sectors where game theoretical methods have been successfully applied in 
practice include amongst others: Automotive (cf. Cachon and Lariviere, 1999), Retail (cf. Sayman 
et al., 2002), Telecommunication (cf. van den Nouweland et al., 1996), Aviation (cf. Adler, 2001), 
and Health Care (cf. Ford et al., 2004). Cooperating companies in these sectors benefit from game 
theoretical methods that objectively take into account each player’s impact within the group as a 
whole and produce compromise allocations that distribute the benefits of cooperation based on 
clear cut fairness properties. Different fairness properties are represented by well-known allocation 
rules such as the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) and the tau-
value (Tijs, 1981). As will become clear in the remainder of this chapter, cooperative game theory 
offers a solution to the four gain sharing related impediments for horizontal logistics cooperation in 
Table  5-2.  For  a  discussion  of  the  performance  differences  between  game  theoretical  solution 
concepts on the one hand, and rules of thumb on the other, we refer to Frisk et al. (2006). 
 
9.1.4  Price setting 
With the insinking procedure, the LSP establishes fair gain sharing by means of customised 
pricing.  This  enables  the  LSP  to  explicitly  take  into  account  the  participants’  marginal 
contributions to the group’s synergy value. The business opportunities offered by intelligent pricing 
strategies are being increasingly recognised in Marketing (cf. Desiraju and Shugan, 1999) and 
Psychology (cf. Hermann et al., 2004). The advent of Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) in the last decade has opened up a vast array of new pricing possibilities (cf. Dixit et al., 
2005). The  most  important  challenge  of  such information  enhanced  pricing  strategies is to  be 
perceived  by  customers  as  fair.  Perceived  fairness  depends  on  comparisons  to  past  prices, 
competitor prices, and perceived cost of the product or service (cf. Bolton et al., 2003). Although 
these factors come from a Business-to-Consumer setting, it is hypothesised that the same constructs 
are relevant for the Business-to-Business situation that is considered in this chapter. 
An important aspect of fair pricing is the principle of dual entitlement (cf. Kahnemann et al., 
1986). This means that a profit increase by the selling firm (the LSP) is only accepted if it does not 
harm the customer’s interest. This egalitarian principle sometimes conflicts with the utilitarian 
principle of cost-based pricing. Under cost-based pricing, an LSP will charge the total costs plus a 
‘reasonable’ percentage. Dixit et al. (2005) argue that dissatisfaction about fairness of prices could 
be  avoided  by  proper  and  clear  communication  about  the  price  composition.  Therefore,  this 
openness is an important aspect of insinking and, as will become clear in the next section, both the 
egalitarian and utilitarian principles mentioned above are satisfied.  Chapter 9: Insinking 
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Despite its obvious business opportunities, only few firms take full advantage of intelligent 
pricing. The vast majority still uses pricing strategies based on historical cost benchmarks, whereas 
more forward-looking and clientele-oriented pricing is likely to be more promising (cf. Noble and 
Gruca, 1999). Especially in the very competitive and low-margin transport sector, smart pricing 
offers LSPs an excellent opportunity to gain a competitive edge. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  In the next section the insinking 
procedure for exploiting synergy in transport will be explained and illustrated by means of a small 
hypothetical example. In Section 9.3, the applicability of the procedure is established by means of a 
practical example based on real-life data from the Dutch grocery transportation sector. Finally, 
Section 9.4 concludes. 
 
 
9.2  THE INSINKING PROCEDURE 
 
The insinking procedure builds on customized pricing by an LSP. These prices (or: tariffs) 
are induced by the varying claims of the shippers’ order sets on the LSP’s resources. Among other 
properties, order sets may differ in the number of orders, the geographical spread of the drop 
points,  the  location  of  the  shipper’s  warehouse(s),  the  narrowness  of  time  windows,  and  the 
average and standard deviation of the order sizes. In Chapter 4 it was shown that each of these 
aspects has a clear influence on the synergy value when the order sets are combined. In this section 
we introduce the insinking procedure by describing its three steps: 
1.  Target group selection, 
2.  Cost reductions, and 
3.  Negotiation and structure of sequential offers. 
 
These steps will be successively discussed in the three subsections below and necessary 
notation will be gradually introduced. At the end of this section, a comprehensive overview of the 
insinking procedure will be provided. 
 
9.2.1  Target group selection 
As a first step, the LSP has to select the group of shippers  M  he wishes to serve from the 
total set  N  of potential customers. It was mentioned in the introduction that opting for a group of 
shippers from the same industry comes at the advantage of having similar product characteristics 
and ordering dynamics. It also fits in the current trend of (sectoral) specialization in the logistics 
sector: having multiple customers in e.g. the chemical, consumer electronics, paper or textile sector 
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Four  necessary  ingredients  of  successful  market  targeting  are:  information,  the  LSP’s 
capabilities and capacity, synergy, and a sustainable path towards the end solution. First, the LSP 
must  have  enough  market  information  to  assess  its  chances  to  obtain  the  required  amount  of 
contracts. In some cases this information is publicly available, such as in the grocery case discussed 
in Section 9.3, but for other markets obtaining this information will require a more thorough market 
analysis. The second condition is the good match between the market and the LSP’s capabilities. If 
for  example  an  LSP’s  past  experience  involves  predominantly  unconditioned  palletized 
transportation,  it  might  not  be  advisable  to  target  the  specialized  petrochemical  industry. 
Furthermore, the LSP must have sufficient capacity or the possibility to increase his capacity to the 
level required to serve the target group. Thirdly, when market information is available and the LSP 
has the capabilities and capacity to serve the market, the attractiveness of a target group depends on 
the synergy potential that exists between them. Gupta and Gerchak (2002) have studied operational 
synergies for mergers and acquisitions, which can be seen as an upper bound for the synergy under 
horizontal cooperation. In this paper we assume that the LSP is able to make a reliable estimate of 
the monetary synergy value, which we define as the sum of the costs that individual shippers make 
in  the  present  situation  minus  the  costs  when  the  whole  set  of  shippers  would  be  serviced 
collectively by the LSP. Besides these operational considerations however, often also relational 
issues play an important role. For example, it may be the case that an LSP already has (informal) 
contacts with a group of shippers of whom he knows they are interested in the service. Although 
this group may not be optimal from a synergy perspective, this can be outweighed by the group’s 
cohesion and their established contacts with the LSP. In fact, applying an innovative concept such 
as insinking requires a considerable amount of trust between the LSP and the shippers, which will 
benefit from positive past business experiences. Finally, the existence of a beneficial (i.e., Shapley 
monotonic, see Section 9.2.3) path towards the end solution is a very important characteristic of 
beneficial target groups. 
 
9.2.2  Cost reductions 
When the LSP has identified the group of shippers targeted, he is ready to calculate the cost 
reductions for each of the shippers involved. Since we use cooperative game theory in this step, we 
first recall some basic notions from game theory. Myerson (1991) defined game theory as “the 
study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent and rational decision-
makers. Game theory provides general mathematical techniques for analyzing situations in which 
two or more individuals make decisions that will influence one another’s welfare”. Cooperative 
game theory focuses on cooperative behaviour by analyzing the negotiation process within a group 
of  players  in  establishing  a  contract  or  joint  plan  of  activities,  including  an  allocation  of 
collaboratively  generated  revenues.  In  particular,  the  possible  levels  of  cooperation  and  the 
revenues of each possible coalition (a subgroup of the cooperating players) are taken into account Chapter 9: Insinking 
 
151
so as to allow for a better comparison of each player’s role and impact within the group as a whole. 
In this way, players in a coalition can settle on a compromise allocation in an objectively justifiable 
way.  Having  this  in  mind,  the  game  underlying  the  insinking  methodology  is  evidently  a 
cooperative game. The problem of allocating the jointly generated synergy savings is critical to any 
logistics cooperation (cf. Thun, 2003). 
Let N be a finite set of players and denote by 2
N the collection of all subsets of N. Elements 
of 2
N are called coalitions, N is the grand coalition. The cost savings that a coalition  S  can jointly 
generate without the players in  \ N S  is called the value of coalitionS . The values of all coalitions 
S  are captured in the so-called characteristic function :2
N v → ￿. The Shapley value (Shapley, 
1953) is a well-known solution concept that constructs a vector  ( , )
N N v Φ ∈￿ that allocates the 
value  ( ) v N  of the grand coalition based on the values  ( ) v S of all coalitionsS . The idea behind 
the Shapley value can be explained as follows. Consider the creation of a coalition  S  to which i  













.  After  S   has  been  drawn,  player  i   is  allocated  his  so-called  marginal 
contribution  { } ( ) ( ) v S i v S ∪ − . Then, the Shapley value is the expected payoff for player i  in this 
random procedure, as indicated in formula (9.1): 
 
( ) , i N v Φ   = 
( ) { } ( ) ( )
:
! 1 !
! S N i S
S N S
v S i v S
N ⊂ ∉
− −
    ∪ −       , for alli N ∈ .    (9.1) 
 
For a coalition  S  the subgame  ( )
S v S,  is given by the restriction of  v  to  2
S , with for all 
( ) ( ) ,
S T S v T v T ⊂ = . In particular, the Shapley value  ( ) ( ) , : ,
S
S S v S v Φ = Φ ∈￿  is defined as 
follows: 
 
( ) , i S v Φ   = 
( ) { } ( ) ( )
:
! 1 !
! T S i T
T S T
v T i v T
S ⊂ ∉
− −
    ∪ −       , for alli S ∈ .    (9.2) 
 
The Shapley value possesses a number of fairness properties. Below we will briefly discuss 
four of these properties that are useful in our context. First, the efficiency property of the Shapley 
value ensures that the total value of the grand coalition is distributed among the players, i.e., no 
value is lost. The Shapley value is also symmetric, meaning that two players that create the same 
additional value to any coalition receive the same share of the total value. The dummy property 
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indeed receive exactly their individual value as a final share of the total value. Finally, we mention 
the Shapley value’s property of strong monotonicity. This guarantees that if all of the player’s 
marginal contributions increase, his payoff will increase. Since these four properties make perfect 
sense from a practical perspective, we make use of the Shapley value in this paper.  
Having introduced the necessary terminology, we are now ready to formulate the cooperative 
game that forms the basis of the insinking procedure: the insinking game. In the current step, the 
LSP knows his target group of shippers (from now on called the players) and faces the problem of 
distributing the group’s synergy value, i.e., the value  ( ) N v  of the grand coalition. 
In order to cover the extra overhead costs needed to service the players and to gain profit, the 
LSP claims a pre-determined share of the synergy value. This claim is called the synergy claim and 
is denoted by  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ p . In choosing the value of the synergy claim the LSP faces a trade-off 
between a higher prospected profit by setting  p  high, and a larger probability that the players will 
indeed accept by choosing a smaller value. The LSP can make this decision based on a qualitative 
assessment of his bargaining power in the market. 
The value  ( ) S v of a coalition S  in the insinking game is now determined as follows: 
 
( ) v S   =  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 1 max ,0
i S
p C i C S
∈
        − −    
            (9.3) 
 
Here,  ( ) i C0  are the costs of player i in the status quo situation, i.e., when player i privately 
performs his transportation orders  i O , while  ( ) S C  represents the costs of the LSP to collectively 




∪  of the players in  S . Obviously, a coalition  S  can only be established 
when the LSP can serve the players in  S  at a lower cost than the sum of the costs that the players 
in  S  incur when they would all perform their own orders individually. Whenever this it not the 
case,  the  players  in  S   will  not  accept  the  LSP’s  service,  and  this  coalition  is  left  out  of 
consideration.  ( ) v S  is then set to 0, which explains the use of the maximum with 0 in (9.3). 
We will illustrate the procedure by means of a hypothetical 3-player example, for which the 
relevant information is summarized in Table 9-2. For convenience of calculations, we assume that 








( ) S C   ( ) S v   ( ) v S, Φ  
{1)  350  300  50  (50; . ; . ) 
{2}  300  260  40  ( . ;40; . ) 
{3}  100  120  0  ( . ; . ;0) 
{1,2}  650  500  150  (80;70; . ) 
{1,3}  450  390  60  (55; . ;5) 
{2,3}  400  370  30  ( . ;35;-5) 
{1,2,3}  750  570  180  (95;75;10) 
Table 9-2: A hypothetical 3-player example 
 
The  last  column  of  Table  9-2,  which  is  calculated  using  formula  (9.2),  shows  that  the 
coalition consisting of only players 2 and 3 will certainly not occur since in this case both players 
receive a value that is lower than the value they would be able to get individually. 
 
9.2.3  Negotiation and structure of sequential offers 
Despite the fact that in the example in Table 9-2 all possible coalitions have a positive value, 
the LSP still has to select an effective way to establish the grand coalition. He does so by choosing 
the most suitable sequence in which he proposes offers to players. The total set  Π  of such paths 
consists of  ! N  different paths π .  ( ) i π  is used to refer to the rank of player i  on path π . 
Every time a player from the selected target group is approached with an offer, the method 
that the LSP will consistently use is clearly explained to this player. By communicating openly, the 
player’s involvement in the project increases and the LSP has better possibilities to cross-check the 
assumptions  and  data  he used  to  calculate  the  proposals.  Sequentially,  a  player  i  receives  an 
opening offer based on  {} ( ) v i S i , ∪ Φ , if S  is the coalition of players that have already committed 
before. Moreover, it is explained to player i that his offer may further improve when more players 
















   
Φ    
    = ≤ ≤
∪
  (9.4) 
 
Here, s  is the current step in the procedure. All cost reductions  ( ) , *, g i s π  along the chosen 
path  * π   are  also  announced  to  player  i ,  together  with  the  accompanying  scenarios  for 
commitment  of  the  players  j  that  are  not  yet  contacted  (i.e.,  those  players  j  for  which 
( ) ( ) * * j i π π > ). Figure 9-1 graphically shows the offered percentage cost reductions with respect 
to  the  costs  of  in-house  execution  by  the  players.  This  figure  comprises  all  ( ) , , g i s π   values, 
defined for the three players, the six different paths along which they can be approached, and the Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  154 
steps along these paths where an offer is made to a player. We use the percentage reduction of the 































Figure 9-1: Percentage cost reductions in the 3-player example 
 
In the example, when players are contacted in the sequence 123 π = , during the negotiations 
player 1 knows that he is sure to save 50 (14.3%), and that his cost reduction will increase to 80 
(22.9%) if later on player 2 consigns, and even to 95 (27.1%) if besides player 2 also player 3 
commits.  Or,  more  formally:  ( ) 1,123,1 0.143 g = ,  ( ) 1,123,2 0.229 g = ,  and  ( ) 1,123,3 0.271 g = . 
Together, the opening offer and the prospected future cost reductions should persuade the player to 
accept the offer. 
Based on Figure 9-1, the LSP has to decide on the path  * π  along which he can best contact 
the  players.  Compared to a  simultaneous approach,  the  one-by-one  modus  operandi  offers the 
benefit that the obtained commitment of one or more players leverages the value proposition that 
can be made to the remaining players, since a certain level of scale and synergy is already attained. 
Moreover, performing  N  one-on-one negotiation rounds based on reliable information about the 
attained commitment of other players can be preferred over a single negotiation with all players 
simultaneously, because of the reduced risk of strategic behavior, and the prevention of mutual 
envy. Finally, in the sequential procedure the LSP will be better able to preserve anonymity of the 
targeted players. Chapter 9: Insinking 
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The usage of a fixed synergy claim  p  makes that the LSP’s profit is maximized when the 
grand coalition is attained. Therefore, the LSP is indeed interested in finding the path  * π  through 
Figure 9-1 that gives the highest ‘probability’ that all players will accept his insinking offer. To this 
end, we introduce the notion of a Shapley Monotonic Path (SMP). Along such a path all committed 
players will be better off when the coalition grows through the decision of the next player to accept 
the insinking offer: 
 
DEFINITION 1: 
π  is a Shapley Monotonic Path if and only if  ( ) ( ) , , , , , , g i j g i k j k N i N π π < ∀ < ≤ ∀ ∈  
 
In the example above, 123, 132, 213 and 312 are SMPs. The others are not because one 
player’s offer worsens during at least one of the steps.  
Games ( ) , N v  do not in general possess an SMP. Loosely speaking, an insinking game will 
have an SMP if the target group is carefully selected based on a high synergy value among the 
players. The problem of finding conditions for the existence of SMPs in general games is however 
hard, as is the problem of finding conditions for uniqueness of an SMP, may it exist (Borm et al., 
2006).  
On the one hand, it is easy to construct games where none of the paths π ∈Π  is an SMP. On 
the other extreme, if it holds that the savings allocated to a committed player  i  are consistently 
higher in case more companies accept the insinking offer, all paths π ∈Π  will be an SMP. In game 
theoretic terms this condition means that the game is strictly convex: for all  , , S T U N ⊂  such that 
\ S T N U ⊂ ⊂  it holds that  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) v S U v S v T U v T ∪ − < ∪ − . 
 
THEOREM 1: ( ) , N v  is strictly convex if and only if every π ∈Π  is an SMP 
 
The proof is as follows. Let  ( ) , N v  be strictly convex and consider two coalitions  T  and  S  for 
which there exists a single  \ j N T ∈  such that  { } S T j = ∪ . Then for all i T ∈ : 
( ) , i T v Φ   = 
( ) { } ( ) ( ) ( )
,
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U T U
v U i v U
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∪ −    
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  =  ( ) , , i S v Φ  
where the strict inequality follows from strict convexity. This shows that every path π ∈Π  will 
be an SMP. It will be obvious that, by the same argument, the converse also holds. 
   
 
In  our  setting,  strict  convexity  means  that  the  more  players  have  already  accepted  the 
insinking offer, the more efficient the LSP can combine the order set of a not yet committed player 
with the current order base. This is in line with the findings of Chapter 4 that state that synergy 
increases when the number of combined orders grows. This is a direct result of the enlarged search 
space of the planning problem. However, these results are based on situations where the pickup 
location is identical for all flows. When this is not true (like in the example in Section 9.3), strict 
convexity  of  the  insinking  game  is  not  obvious.  Therefore,  the  LSP  should  always  check 
beforehand if the insinking game based on a target group  N  indeed possesses an SMP. Because in 
practical cases  N  will be small, this can easily be done by complete enumeration of the paths. 
Finally, note that the value of  p  does not affect the existence of SMPs. 
If there are more SMPs, the next question becomes how to choose between them. For the 
hypothetical 3-player example the four SMPs, together with the offered percentage cost reductions 




1 123 π =           
2 132 π =        
player i   1  2  3    player i   1  3  2 
( ) 0 C i   350  300  100    ( ) 0 C i   350  100  300 
( ) 1 , ,1 g i π   14.3%  .  .    ( ) 2 , ,1 g i π   14.3%  .  . 
( ) 1 , ,2 g i π   22.9%  23.3%  .    ( ) 2 , ,2 g i π   15.7%  5.0%  . 
( ) 1 , ,3 g i π   27.1%  25.0%  10.0%    ( ) 2 , ,3 g i π   27.1%  10.0%  25.0% 
                 
3 213 π =          
4 312 π =        
player i   2  1  3    player i   3  1  2 
( ) 0 C i   300  350  100    ( ) 0 C i   100  350  300 
( ) 3 , ,1 g i π   13.3%  .  .    ( ) 4 , ,1 g i π   0.0%  .  . 
( ) 3 , ,2 g i π   23.3%  22.9%  .    ( ) 4 , ,2 g i π   5.0%  15.7%  . 
( ) 3 , ,3 g i π   25.0%  27.1%  10.0%    ( ) 4 , ,3 g i π   10.0%  27.1%  25.0% 
Table 9-3: Example of possible sequential offers according to SMPs 
 
Although all four paths described in Table 9-3 are SMPs, path 312 does not seem to be a 
reasonable choice for the LSP. This is because in the first step, player 3 is not offered a cost 
reduction,  ( ) 3,312,1 0 g = , because he can perform his own orders more efficiently individually 
than the LSP can. This is captured in the concept of first offer rationality: the first offer of the LSP 
to an entering player indeed represents a cost reduction compared to player’s status quo situation of 
performing the orders individually. SMPs that satisfy this criterion are referred to as Rational 
Shapley Monotonic Paths (RSMPs): 
 
DEFINITION 2: 
π  is an RSMP if and only if π  is an SMP and  ( ) , ,1 0 g i i N π > ∀ ∈  
 
In the remainder, we will restrict attention to RSMPs and the set of all RSMPs will be 
referred to as  ˆ Π ⊆ Π . It should be noted that for a path to retain its property of Rational Shapley 
Monotonicity, the order sets  i O  of the customers should be more or less stable. This is e.g. true in 
the grocery retail example discussed in the next section. The demand locations are supermarkets 
that are visited according to a fixed delivery schedule (e.g. daily delivery). If in the long run 
considerable  changes  occur  in  the  order  set  of  one  or  more  customers,  tariffs  need  to  be 
recalculated. This of course holds true for any general contract between LSP and customer: if the 
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There might be various ways to judge which RSMP is best from the LSP’s perspective of 
achieving the grand coalition. In other words: there exist various sensible functions  ˆ : f Π → ￿  that 
denote the quality of an RSMP. It seems reasonable however that the reductions on the diagonal 
and bottom rows in Table 9-3 are relevant considerations for players. The first correspond to the 
cost reductions that player  i  is guaranteed to achieve when accepting the offer (certain gain, 
( ) ( ) , *, g i i π π ), and the second are the maximum possible cost reductions that are attained when 
the grand coalition is indeed achieved (top gain,  ( ) , *, g i N π ). 
Here, for the purpose of illustration, we assume that the best RSMP is selected on the basis 
of the certain gains. Table 9-4 shows the certain gains for the three RSMPs. Consequently, we 
select the ‘best’ RSMP in the following way: first select those RSMPs that have the maximal 
lowest cost reduction. In our example, these are 123 and 213 with a lowest certain gain of 10%. 
Then, from those RSMPs, select the one that has the maximal second-lowest certain gain, etc. In 
our hypothetical example  * 123 π =  will be selected with a second-lowest certain gain of 14.3%. 
 
  Certain gain  Sorted certain gain 
RSMP  Player 1  Player 2  Player 3  Lowest  2
nd lowest  3
rd lowest 
123  14,3%  23,3%  10,0%  10,0%  14,3%  23,3% 
213  22,9%  13,3%  10,0%  10,0%  13,3%  22,9% 
132  14,3%  25,0%  5,0%  5,0%  14,3%  25,0% 
Table 9-4: RSMP selection based on certain gains 
 
As stated above, many other quality criteria for RSMPs can be thought of. In any case, the 
choice of  ˆ : f Π → ￿  is open for the LSP, and may depend on characteristics of the targeted market 
and the LSP’s own preference. 
 
To summarize this section, we now recapitulate the introduced notation. Using this notation, 
the  three  steps  are  formalized  in  Table  9-2  to  represent  a  comprehensive  description  of  the 
insinking procedure. 
 
M   =  Set of all potential customers 
N   =  Set of targeted customers 
2
N   =  Collection of all subsets of  N (collection of all possible coalitions) 
i O   =  Set of transportation orders belonging to customer i N ∈  
( ) 0 C i   =  Costs of executing  i O  by customer i  in the status quo situation 




∪  by the LSP 
p   =  The LSP’s synergy claim 
( ) v S   =  Value of coalition  2
N S∈  as determined by (9.3) Chapter 9: Insinking 
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Π   =  Set of permutations of  N . These give the possible paths along the customers. 
( ) i π   =  Rank of customer i  in π  
( ) , i S v Φ   =  Shapley value allocated to player i in the subgame defined on  2
N S∈  
( ) , , g i s π   =  (sequential) gains offered to player i  on step s  along path π  as determined by 
(9.4) 
ˆ Π   =  The set of RSMPs 
ˆ : f Π → ￿   =  Additional selection criterion function to choose the best RSMP 







Negotiation and structure of sequential offers
For every ( ) ( ) , , , i s s i π π ≥ , calculate  ( ) , , g i s π  
Choose  N M ⊆  
For every  2
N S∈ , calculate  ( ) C S ,  ( ) v S , and  ( ) , i S v Φ  
For every i N ∈ , calculate  ( ) 0 C i  
Determine  ˆ Π  
Choose  ( )




= and negotiate 
 
Figure 9-2: Three steps of the insinking procedure 
 
This finishes our discussion of the insinking procedure. In the next section we illustrate the 




9.3  AN EXAMPLE BASED ON REAL-LIFE DATA 
 
Many grocery retailers are not performing well and have been facing a loss of profitability in 
recent years. Together with the complexity and dynamism inherent to the grocery industry, this has 
made it difficult for retailers to survive in isolation of their competitors (cf. Chapter 1; Ballou et al., 
2000). There is growing empirical evidence that retailers as a result turn to co-opetive behaviour to 
construct  win-win  situations  together  with  their  competitors.  For  example,  Kotzab  and  Teller 
(2003), present a case study in which the largest Austrian retailers cooperate in their logistics Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  160 
processes by introducing uniform load units and performing joint replenishment. This cooperation 
runs parallel to fierce price competition and heavy promotional spending. This section presents a 
co-opetive insinking case study that results in considerable efficiency gains for retailers in the 
Dutch grocery transport sector. For reasons of confidentiality, the company names in this case 
study are not disclosed. 
 
9.3.1  Background 
The case focuses around an LSP that has a large temperature controlled distribution centre 
for frozen goods (FDC) in the geographical centre of the Netherlands. Taking advantage of its 
established position in ambient food retail, the LSP’s goal is to fill this FDC with the frozen food 
products of grocery retailers, and perform the transport from the FDC to their stores. Among other 
things, this means that in the new situation suppliers of frozen products must only visit the central 
FDC instead of the multiple FDCs of individual retailers, thereby reducing the number of drops that 
suppliers make on their delivery routes. As a side effect to the synergy attained in the retailers’ 
distribution process, this will increase the efficiency of the suppliers’ transport process. 
The LSP applies the insinking procedure outlined in Section 9.2 to attract a number of large 
and medium sized grocery retailers as his customers. Below we discuss how the three steps of the 
procedure can be applied here. 
 
9.3.2  Target Group Selection 
Table 9-5 shows some characteristics of four grocery retailers A,B,C, and D with whom the 
LSP maintains close contacts.  
 
Retailer  # Outlets  Weekly demand  
(roll pallets) 
Yearly turnover  
(mln €) 
A  37  17,366  367 
B  61  25,369  616 
C  63  18,634  373 
D  195  62,857  1,187 
Table 9-5. Characteristics of targeted retailers (2003) 
 
These retailers have the same (or at least a comparable) customer base and Figure 9-3 shows 
that their distribution networks have considerable geographical overlap. Furthermore, they have not 
yet outsourced their transport activities to an LSP. All four retailers use a standardised roll pallet 
for shop deliveries, which makes it easy to consolidate loads of different retailers in one truck. The 
encouraging  synergy  value,  the existing  contacts  and  the fact  that the capacity  of  the  FDC  is 
sufficient to fulfil their orders, make that these four retailers form the LSP’s target group. 
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Retailer A Retailer B
Retailer C Retailer D
 
Figure 9-3. Geographical overlap of stores of retailers 
 
9.3.3  Cost Reductions 
In  step  2  of  the  insinking  procedure  the  values  of  all  subcoalitions  of  {A,B,C,D}  are 
calculated. The cost reduction that the LSP will be able to offer then depends on the synergy 
between the order sets of the retailers. Additionally, the offers are influenced by the LSP’s synergy 
claim. This claim must cover the extra administrative (back office) costs, the costs of storage at the 
central FDC, and profit. In this case study, the synergy claim is set to 0.2 (i.e., 20%). 
Below  we  comment  on  the  data  and  the  routing  problems  that  form  the  basis  of  the 
calculation of the cost reduction proposals. 
 Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  162 
Data 
Order data of the four retailers are estimated on the basis of the commercial surface of their 
stores and the average turnover of frozen products per square meter of commercial surface (cf. 
Groothedde,  2003).  The  daily  frequency  of  delivery  per  retailer  is  based  on  de  Koster  and 
Neuteboom (2001) and information from other industry experts. Based on these data five daily 
order sets are constructed, representing the working days in a typical week. 
By assumption, the trucks operated by the retailers and by the LSP all have a capacity of 57 
roll pallets and a uniform cost structure. This cost structure is based on the published market 
averages for the Netherlands and consists of a fixed cost per truck per day of € 120 and a cost of € 
0.33 per minute that a truck is driving or unloading at the store. The fixed costs are incorporated in 
the cost structure, because the retailers can dispose of the specialised temperature controlled trucks 
if the transport of the frozen products is taken over by the LSP.  
Besides  transport  costs,  also  the  costs  of  operating  an  FDC  are  incorporated.  In  the 
Netherlands, storage of one roll pallet of frozen goods costs on average € 2.79 per week. These 
costs include handling, depreciation and cooling. Whereas they are fixed for the LSP, the retailers 
can eliminate these costs by accepting the LSP’s insinking offer. It is assumed that the FDCs of 
each retailer have a capacity equal to a week’s throughput of pallets. 
 
Routing Problems 
To calculate the costs for all coalitions, 95 Vehicle Routing Problems with Time Windows 
(VRPTWs) need to be solved. This is because for each of the five working days in the planning 
period, there are 2
4-1 VRPTWs representing the non-empty coalitions that can be served by the 
LSP and four extra routing problems because for the 1-player coalitions also the scenario exists that 
the player rejects the insinking offer and performs the transport on his own account. 
Orders are to be delivered to the stores between 8:00 am and 6:00 pm. The dataset shows 
that the number of deliveries per store per day is either 1 or 2. If stores are delivered twice a day, 
there is a morning delivery between 8:00 am and 1:00 pm and an afternoon delivery between 1 pm 
and 6 pm. As in Chapter 4, to solve the 95 VRPTWs the heuristic of Bräysy et al. (2004) is used 
(for a discussion of this heuristic, see Section 4.2.3). The solutions to the routing problems can be 




S  # Roll pallets  # Orders  Location costs  # Trucks  Total time  Transport costs 
{A}-self  580  370  509  20  5,251  4,133 
{B}-self  716  244  743  28  11,161  7,043 
{C}-self  513  189  546  23  8,852  5,681 
{D}-self  1,758  585  1,841  45  16,345  10,794 
{A}  580  370  .  20  5,254  5,558 
{B}  716  244  .  28  11,519  7,161 
{C}  513  189  .  20  8,954  5,354 
{D}  1,758  585  .  44  16,114  10,597 
{A,B}  1,296  614  .  48  17,997  11,699 
{A,C}  1,093  559  .  45  16,314  10,783 
{A,D}  2,338  955  .  62  23,025  15,038 
{B,C}  1,229  433  .  44  17,630  11,097 
{B,D}  2,474  829  .  63  23,686  15,376 
{C,D}  2,271  774  .  51  20,590  12,914 
{A,B,C}  1,809  803  .  60  23,801  15,054 
{A,B,D}  3,054  1,199  .  78  29,383  19,056 
{A,C,D}  2,851  1,144  .  72  26,826  17,492 
{B,C,D}  2,987  1,018  .  74  28,566  18,306 
{A,B,C,D}  3,567  1,388  .  89  34,390  22,028 
Table 9-6. Routing results aggregated over five working days 
 
The first four rows of Table 9-6 represent the cases where the retailers perform the transport 
individually from their private FDCs, while for the other rows the service of the LSP is used. The 
location costs and the transport costs form the necessary input to calculate the coalitional values 
from equation (9.3). Table 9-7 displays the structure of all coalitional values and the allocation over 
the  retailers  according  to  the  Shapley  value.  Figure  9-4  depicts  all  paths  from  the  1-retailer 
coalitions to the grand coalition. Note that the percentage cost reductions in this figure are the 
quotient of the allocations given in Table 9-7 and the individual location and transport costs of the 
retailers provided in the first four rows of Table 9-6. As mentioned earlier, a synergy claim of 0.2 is 
incorporated in the coalitional values. Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  164 
 
S   ( )  
∈S i
i C0   ( ) S C   ( ) S v   ( ) v S, Φ  
{A}  4,642  5,558  0  (0; . ; . ; . ) 
{B}  7,786  7,161  500  ( . ;500; . ; . ) 
{C}  6,227  5,354  698  ( . ; . ;698; . ) 
{D}  12,635  10,597  1,630  ( . ; . ; . ;1,630) 
{A,B}  12,428  11,699  583  (42; 542; . ; . ) 
{A,C}  10,869  10,783  69  (-315; . ; 384; . ) 
{A,D}  17,277  15,038  1,791  (80; . ; . ; 1,711) 
{B,C}  14,013  11,097  2,333  ( . ; 1,067; 1,266; . ) 
{B,D}  20,421  15,376  4,036  ( . ; 1,453; . ; 2,583) 
{C,D}  18,862  12,914  4,758  ( . ; . ; 1,913; 2,845) 
{A,B,C}  18,655  15,054  2,881  (92; 1,474; 1,316; , ) 
{A,B,D}  25,063  19,056  4,806  (297; 1,670; . ; 2,839) 
{A,C,D}  23,504  17,492  4,810  (-61; . ; 1,772; 3,099) 
{B,C,D}  26,648  18,306  6,674  ( . ; 1,478; 1,939; 3,256) 
{A,B,C,D}  31,290  22,028  7,410  (266; 1,805; 1,908; 3,431) 














































































Figure 9-4. Percentage cost reduction paths 
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In practice the LSP will transfer the cost reductions to player i by means of a lower tariff 
S
i t  
per roll pallet, depending on the coalition S  that he serves. This tariff can easily be calculated from 
the cost reductions attributed to player  S i∈ and his demand  ( ) i D  in roll pallets: 
 









=   (9.5) 
 
The development of these tariffs along the paths is shown in Figure 9-5. This shows that 
player D has by far the lowest tariff, representing the cost effectiveness of operating his dense 














































































Figure 9-5. Tariff paths 
 
9.3.4  Negotiation and Structure of Sequential Offers 
Negotiation takes place on a bilateral basis between the LSP and the individual retailers. 
Only the LSP has perfect information because he has calculated all coalitional values and knows 
the tariffs he is going to offer to each individual retailer. The retailers on the other side only know 
their own current and future tariff offers and have to make their accept/reject decision based on 
these private data. Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  166 
Figure 9-4 clearly shows that there are many paths along which retailers get a positive cost 
reduction  at  every  step.  It  is  however  readily  verified  that  the  only  three  RSMPs  are  CBAD, 
BCAD, and BACD. Table 9-8 shows that, according to the criterion proposed in section 9.2.3, 
CBAD is the best RSMP. 
 
  Certain gain  Sorted certain gain 
Path  A  B  C  D  Lowest  2nd  3rd  4th 
CBAD  2  13.7  11.2  27.2  2  11.2  13.7  27.2 
BCAD  2  6.4  20.3  27.2  2  6.4  20.3  27.2 
BACD  0.9  6.4  21.1  27.2  0.9  6.4  21.1  27.2 
Table 9-8. RSMPs sorted lexicographically according to the certain gains 
 
9.3.5  Discussion 
Table 9-7 shows that all coalitions, except {A}, have a positive value. This means that for 
almost every coalition the LSP can perform the orders more efficiently than the corresponding 
players can if they reject the offer and perform the orders individually. In particular, all retailers 
benefit if the grand coalition is reached, i.e., if all retailers accept the LSP’s insinking offer. In that 
case, the monetary savings attained from the synergy between the four retailers are distributed as 
presented in Table 9-9. 
 
Retailer  Monetary gain  Percentage gain 
A  € 265.9  5.7 % 
B  € 1,805.4  23.2 % 
C  € 1,907.5  30.6 % 
D  € 3,430.7  27.2 % 
LSP  € 1,852.4  . 
Table 9-9. Distribution of monetary savings 
 
The LSP takes 20% of the total savings, which provides him with a gain of € 1,852 per week. 
This gain is used to cover the extra administrative (back office) costs and the costs of storage at the 
central FDC. The remainder is profit for the LSP. Retailer D brings in the most orders and is 
rewarded for this by getting the largest part of the savings from cooperation in absolute terms. 
Retailer C however gets the largest percentage cost reduction because his orders relatively exhibit 
most synergy with the other retailers. Figure 9-3 indeed shows that the stores of retailer C in a way 
glue together the geographical locations of the stores of the other retailers. 
An  important  decision  is  to  choose  in  which  of  the  24  possible  sequences  the  LSP 
approaches the retailers. It turns out that in the case at hand there are only three RSMPs, implying 
that  Shapley  monotonicity  is  a  quite  discriminatory  property  for  a  path.  Of  the  three  RSMPs 
available, path CBAD performs best according to the chosen quality criterion. This means that the Chapter 9: Insinking 
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LSP can best contact C first, then B, then A, and finally D. The virtue of an RSMP is that in every 
step along the path all committed players benefit if another player accepts the offer. This type of 
monotonicity makes that no committed player is harmed by the event that one of his competitors 
joins the cooperation. This is a very important condition for companies entering a co-operative 
relation. 
The small number of RSMPs encourages the insinking LSP to perform extra effort in the 
target group selection. If the possibility exists to pick shippers from a larger set than the LSP can 
effectively handle, he can proactively perform step 2 of the procedure on test groups of shippers 
and evaluate the number and quality of the RSMPs present. 
By applying insinking, the LSP offers shippers the opportunity to considerably cut down 
transport and location costs. In order to reap the maximum benefits, all involved parties depend on 
each other, which creates a beneficial lock-in that contributes to the probability of lasting success 
of the project. However, it should be noted that the numbers in Figure 9-4 represent the ‘ideal’ 
situation in which every player accepts the LSP’s offer. Although the clear initiative of the LSP 
makes his competitors less visible to the shippers, and insinking brings the retailers considerable 
cost reductions, still the retailers might have the strongest negotiation power. As a result, there is a 
chance that retailers will (initially) reject the offer. In this case, the LSP still has some room for 
bargaining  by  decreasing  his  synergy  claim  for  this  specific  retailer.  When  the  LSP  cannot 
persuade the retailer to accept the offer by lowering his synergy claim, the rejection is definitive. 
This retailer then has to be removed from the grand coalition. If for example on the best RSMP 
CBAD retailer C would reject the offer, the new grand coalition  ' N  becomes {A,B,D} and the 
insinking game is restricted to the subgame  ( )
' , '
N v N . An identical analysis reveals that the best 
RSMP in this case would in fact be DBA, instead of the sequence BAD proposed by the original 
RSMP.  If  players  further  up  the  path  reject  the  offer,  no  new  negotiations  with  the  already 




9.4  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter introduced the so-called insinking procedure that LSPs can use to attract new 
customers and improve their competitive position. The given format for approaching the potential 
customers ensures that the LSP does not run financial risks and that his business proposals to all 
shippers are as good as possible. In this way, sustainable horizontal cooperation between shippers 
can be created. Customised prices based on each shipper’s actual contribution to the total synergy 
accomplish a fair allocation of the monetary savings from the cooperation. The procedure uses an Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  168 
operations research algorithm to calculate the value of every possible coalition of shippers, and a 
game theoretical solution concept to construct the customised tariffs. 
Insinking seems to be a viable alternative for the traditional outsourcing paradigm. With 
outsourcing the initiative for transferring the execution of transport activities to an LSP lies with 
the shipper, and the occurrence of strong synergies with other shippers served by the LSP is more 
or less a matter of chance. With insinking however, the initiative lies with the LSP. He can use his 
market knowledge and experience, enriched by operations research techniques, to target exactly 
those shippers that exhibit strong synergies. Therefore, having the LSP in the driving seat seems 
natural here because the LSP is the actor in the supply chain with the best competencies to exploit 
synergies in transport systems. Moreover, the LSP has a clear economic incentive to attract as 
many shippers as possible since this increases his turnover and profit. Because of the property of 
Shapley Monotonicity, all parties involved benefit if the LSP attracts additional customers. 
From an organizational perspective insinking also has advantages compared to outsourcing, 
because it facilitates horizontal cooperation without the difficulties arising from the sharing of 
sensitive  information  between  the  cooperating  companies.  Open  communication  about  the 
methodology and the consistent usage of an objective and fair game theoretical solution concept to 
allocate savings to shippers, make the LSP a trustworthy partner. In general, transport is a hands-on 
and low-tech sector and practical cases have shown that practitioners often regard the problem of 
constructing a fair gain sharing mechanism as too difficult or academic. The insinking procedure 
has the advantage that this complex task now lies with only one actor who performs all necessary 
calculations and communication to the shippers. This avoids long and difficult rounds of discussion 
among the cooperating companies. Implicitly, insinking therefore also resolves impediment I2 of 
Chapter 5 that deals with the difficulty of finding a trusted party to lead a cooperation to this 
satisfaction of all participants. 
Although  the  calculation  of  customised  tariffs  for  new  customers  based  on  their  actual 
synergy with existing customers of an LSP seems quite logical from an economical point of view, 
still tariff proposals by LSPs are often based on static rules of thumb, past prices and (conjectured) 
competitor prices. Modelling the problem as a cooperative game makes LSPs more aware of the 
actual value that a new customer creates for their business. The advantageous customer – service 
provider combinations that will result from applying a more sensible tariff quotation methodology 
will benefit both individual companies and society as a whole. 
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CHAPTER 10  JOINT HUB NETWORK DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
10.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This final chapter of PART III examines a third enabling concept for horizontal cooperation: 
Joint Hub Network Development by multiple shippers. 
Since the construction and maintenance of physical distribution networks require substantial 
investments, a sufficiently high capacity utilization of these networks is crucial. Often it is not 
possible for individual shippers to attain the critical mass to justify such as investment. Therefore, 
horizontal cooperation between shippers that transport compatible products can be an interesting 
option.  Developing  a  well-performing  distribution  network  is  however  already  a  difficult 
(operations  research)  problem  in  its  own  right.  The  fact  that  in  such  networks  shippers  with 
inherently different interests depend on each other makes it even more complex. This is because 
actions and decisions taken by one shipper have a direct influence on other participants’ payoffs. 
This chapter proposes a framework to approach the problem of cooperative distribution hub 
network development. This framework uses existing operations research heuristics and methods 
from cooperative game theory. The objective is to improve the value proposition to cooperating 
shippers,  and  to  attain  cooperation  among  the  best  possible  combination  of  companies.  The 
remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, a brief overview of related 
literature is provided. Section 10.3 then discusses how this literature is extended in the current 
chapter. Section 10.4 explains the solution method employed, which is illustrated in Section 10.5 
by means of an illustrative example. Finally, in Section 10.6 concluding remarks are formulated. 
 
 
10.2  RELATED LITERATURE 
 
This section briefly examines literature relevant to cooperative distribution networks. Both 
its practical relevance and its theoretical richness have inspired academics to create a large body of 
literature on the topic. In its most basic form, the challenge is to design a physical network for 
directing flows of goods from production or assembly sites (i.e., the flows’ origins) to warehouses 
of customers (i.e., the flows’ destinations). A number of subproblems can be identified in which 
e.g. questions on the number, location, and size of the facilities, and the allocation of flows are 
answered (cf. Eskigun et al., 2005). Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  170 
The current chapter illustrates the potential of existing network design techniques in a novel 
framework.  For  a  general  review  on network  redesign  the reader is referred to  Dullaert  et  al. 
(2006). This chapter focuses on hub distribution network development. This is a specific kind of 
distribution network in which transhipment takes place at intermediate facilities (the hubs) between 
the  origin  and  destination  nodes.  Such  a  system  requires  less  transport  links  and  the  higher 
concentration of traffic on these links facilitates regular service with a smaller number of trucks 
(Campbell, 1996). Hub networks have become the standard in air transport, and are also becoming 
more prevalent in landside transport, e.g. in express parcel networks. 
The design problem for hub distribution networks is well studied. Over time, a number of 
literature reviews have appeared (Campbell, 1994; Klincewicz, 1998; Bryan and O'Kelly, 1999). 
Taking into account the vast body of literature on hub networks, it is remarkable that there are only 
few publications on hub networks where cooperation is explicitly taken into account. Skorin-Kapov 
(2001) recognized that in order to reap the benefits of the economies of scale made possible by 
using hub distribution networks, modelling cooperation between users with possibly conflicting 
interests is essential. Cooperative game theory is used to tackle the problem of fairly allocating the 
total gain to the users, and core elements are found for games with various characteristic functions. 
Furthermore, Matsubayashi et al. (2005) analysed the cost allocation problem in a large-scale hub-
spoke network established by multiple agents. A practical allocation scheme is proposed that is 
proven to be in the core under certain conditions on the distribution of demand and the fixed costs 
of establishing a hub. In their implementation, the network is treated as a public good, in the sense 
that  users  cannot  prevent  others  to  use  the  system.  This  is  for  example  the  case  in 
telecommunication systems, but less likely in physical transport networks. In the next section, it is 
explained how the current chapter is an extension to this literature on joint hub network design. 
 
 
10.3  STEP-WISE HUB NETWORK DEVELOPMENT 
 
With hub network development, in addition to obtaining an efficient final solution, it is also 
important to take the development path towards this solution into account. To facilitate cooperation 
between shippers, a step-wise hub network development procedure is needed. Groothedde (2005) 
indicates that although most previous research has focussed on constructing networks that are as 
close to the optimal solution as possible from a cost or service perspective, having such a step-wise 
development path towards the final solution is vital for the benefits to effectively materialize.  
Unlike hub networks in e.g. telecommunication, physical hub networks require such large 
investments that in a cooperative setting having a sustainable development path towards the final 
network is nothing less than a necessary condition for success. A step-wise approach is possible 
because participating in a cooperative hub network is not an all-or-nothing decision for shippers. Chapter 10: Joint Hub Network Development 
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Instead, they will initially only bring in those transport flows for which the highest savings can be 
attained. Because installing only a small number of hubs already requires a considerable capital 
investment, participants are likely to desire an evaluation period during which they can incorporate 
the changed network in their daily processes and ‘get used to’ the other partners. For the hub 
network to develop further, a trustworthy relationship between the partners has to be established. 
This will take some time, also because partners have to incorporate the new logistics structure in 
their  operations.  Therefore,  in  practical  cases  of  joint  hub  network  development,  a  step-wise 
approach can be more appropriate than a ‘big-bang’ approach where the complete final network is 
constructed at once. In the remainder of this chapter, the intermediate solutions in which the hub 
network operates will be referred to as the levels of the hub network development process. These 

































Figure 10-1. Levels in hub network development 
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In the setting of this chapter, shippers engage in horizontal cooperation by jointly investing 
in a hub distribution network. Although aimed at horizontal cooperation between Logistics Service 
Providers, the empirical research in Chapter 5 indicated that the outlook of cost reductions is the 
most  important  opportunity  underlying  horizontal  cooperation.  Furthermore,  according  to  the 
respondents the most severe impediments are the problems with 1) finding a reliable party that can 
coordinate the cooperation in such a way that all participants are satisfied and 2) the construction of 
fair allocation mechanisms for the attained savings. These observations form important drivers for 
the research described in the current chapter. 
Because the final network is not constructed at once, it is not straightforward to construct a 
fair gain sharing mechanism. When applying a step-wise approach, it is essential that the network 
is stable at all intermediate steps. Like in Chapter 9, to ensure stability fair gain sharing is an 
important ingredient of the procedure. The difference with the approach of Chapter 9 is that in the 
current  chapter  cooperative  games  are  played  iteratively  at  each  level  of  the  hub  network 
development process, to share the benefits of cooperation. In this way, shippers can choose at every 
level whether or not they send additional flows through the newly extended network. The reasoning 
behind this is that in a practical setting, participating shippers are mostly multinational companies 
that potentially send many shipments through the hub network. At every level, shippers can choose 
whether or not to increase the number of shipments they send through the network. Hence, on any 
level of the hub network development process, some of a shipper’s flows will be travelling via the 
hub network, while the others will remain with their individual direct routes. Such a step-wise 
approach to hub network development with gain sharing at each intermediate level does not yet 
exist in literature. 
 
 
10.4  SOLUTION FRAMEWORK 
 
This  section  explains  the  step-wise  approach  in  three  steps.  First,  two  basic  necessary 
network design routines that serve as building blocks for the procedure are discussed in general 
terms.  Then,  Section  10.4.2  summarises  the  cooperative  game  underlying  the  hub  network 
development procedure. Finally, the integrated solution approach is explained. 
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10.4.1  Network Design Routines 
The procedure requires two basic components: the ‘add-hub’ and ‘add-flows’ routines. For 
the purpose of this chapter it suffices to provide a high-level description of their main functionality. 
A detailed discussion of possible implementations of these building block heuristics can be found 
in Groothedde (2005). 
Add-hub chooses the best location for a hub that is to be newly introduced in an existing hub 
network configuration. It is assumed here that hubs are fully interconnected. Every time a hub is 
added, it is checked if there are nodes that were connected to a more distant hub than the newly 
added hub. In those cases, these nodes are re-linked to the new hub.  
The other routine, add-flows, adds flows to a given hub network configuration. A ‘flow’ is 
defined as a shipment of a fixed size, belonging to one of the cooperators, that travels from a 
known origin to a known destination. If a flow is added, this means that instead of travelling 
directly from origin to destination, this flow now goes from its origin to the closest hub, then via an 
inter-hub link to the hub that is located closest to its destination, and finally from this hub to the 
destination. 
 
10.4.2  The Underlying Cooperative Game 
A fair allocation of the generated synergy savings is critical to any horizontal cooperation. 
Mistrust about the fairness of the applied allocation rule for the savings has already caused many 
horizontal cooperation initiatives among shippers to marginalize or disintegrate. This particularly 
holds true  for  capital-intensive  projects such as the  construction  of  hub  networks  for  physical 
distribution.  
To ensure a fair gain sharing mechanism, the marginal contributions of each shipper to the 
total  gain  have  to  be  accurately  quantified.  Therefore,  along  the  lines  of  Chapter  9,  solution 
procedures from cooperative game theory are used. The basic notions of cooperative game theory 
that are needed for the current problem have already been discussed in Chapter 9 and will only 
briefly be repeated here. 
Let  N  be a finite set of players (here: shippers) and denote by  2
N  the collection of all 
subsets of  N . Elements of 2
N are called coalitions,  N  itself is called the grand coalition. The cost 
savings  that  a  coalition  S   can  generate  is  called the value  of  coalition  S . The  characteristic 
function  :2
N v → ￿ maps the values of all coalitions S . 
In the case of step-wise hub network development, coalitional values are calculated based on 
the current level of the network development process (level  j). Every time a new hub is introduced 
to reach the next level of the development process, a new game is calculated. The game for level  j 
is denoted by ( ) , j N v . Coalitional values  ( ) j v S  resemble the cost savings that can be attained by a 
coalition S  on level  j of the development process. They are calculated as follows: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) 0 j j
i S
v S C i C S
∈
= −    
(10.1) 
 
Here,  ( ) S v j  is the value of coalition  S  on level  j  of the network development,  ( ) i C0 are 
the costs that shipper i incurs in the original situation where there is no hub network and all flows 
travel directly from origin to destination, and finally  ( ) S C j  are the costs that coalition  S  incurs 
for  the  execution  of  all  their  flows  at  level  j .  These  costs  also  include  the  fixed  costs  for 
establishing hubs. 
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), represented by  ( , )
N
j N v Φ ∈￿ , is used to allocate the 
value of the grand coalition to the shippers on level  j: 
 





i j j j
S N i S
S N S
N v v S i v S
N ⊂ ∉
− −
    Φ = ∪ −       , for all i N ∈ .  (10.2) 
 
10.4.3  Solution Approach 
All necessary ingredients to describe the solution approach for developing a cooperative hub 
network are now available. Figure 10-2 gives a high-level description of the procedure, which 
consists of a number of iterative steps. 
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Figure 10-2. High-level solution procedure 
 
The procedure initialises by constructing a network configuration consisting of two hubs. 
This is because in the current setting it is assumed that horizontal cooperation by joint transport 
only takes place on inter-hub links. It is also possible to perform joint route planning on the links 
between hubs and origin or destination nodes (cf. Chapter 4). This would however require a much 
higher intensity of cooperation, which introduces additional risks and coordination costs. Here the 
choice is made to restrict cooperation to the inter-hub links. Because of this choice, no benefits can 
be  gained  by  introducing  only  a  single  hub.  Therefore,  the  first  configuration  that  is  tested 
incorporates two hubs. The locations of these hubs are chosen by the add-hub heuristic. Below, 
only  those  steps  of the  procedure  that  need  further  explanation  are  commented  on.  These  are 
indicated by the numbers in Figure 10-2. Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  176 
 
Step 1 
The  total  costs  ( ) j C N   of  the  network  configuration  at  each  level  consists  of  three 
components: 
1.  The transport costs of the flows that do not use the hub network (the direct shipments form 
origins to destinations) 
2.  The transport costs of the flows that travel via the hub network (origin-hub, hub-hub, hub-
destination) 
3.  The fixed costs of the established hubs (including handling, interest, overhead etc.) 
 
Step 2 
In Step 2 the cooperative game is calculated. For this game it is important to note that the 
individual shippers might have multiple flows passing through the hub network. This constitutes an 
important  difference  with  existing  literature  on  joint  network  development,  where  players  are 
usually single flows or nodes. Based on all coalitional values following from formula (10.1), the 
Shapley values are calculated using formula (10.2). 
 
Step 3 and Step 4 
Consequently, the current level of the hub network development process is checked for what 
we call Shapley monotonicity. The basic idea behind the step-wise approach is to consistently 
check whether each shipper is willing to ‘take the next step’. If this is not the case, the development 
of the network will stop. Therefore, in Step 3 a ‘reconsideration loop’ is initiated for each new level 
of network development (see Figure 10-2). In this loop, it is checked whether each shipper has a 
higher payoff than he had on the previous level. If the Shapley value that is allocated to shipper i 
indeed  corresponds  to  higher savings  than  were  attained  at  any  previous level (i.e., shipper  i 
benefits from the newly added hub), then this shipper’s flows that were added on the current level 
are retained. In fact, to compensate for risks and switching costs, it can even be expected that 
shippers  will  require  a certain  minimum  level  of  savings  before engaging  in an  extended  hub 
network. These thresholds can easily be incorporated in the proposed procedure. 
If on the other hand shipper i is worse off at a level  j than in an earlier level, he withdraws 
the added flows in Step 4. This means that these particular flows will travel directly from origin to 
destination again. Note however that the flows of shipper i  that were added at previous levels are 
retained in the hub network. Shipper i is then treated as a dummy player (see Section 9.2.2) for the 
rest of level  j  of the network development process. Specifically, this means that:  
 
{ } ( ) ( ) 0 j j v S i v S ∪ − =   (10.3) 
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Then, the Shapley allocation of Step 2 is repeated based on the coalitional values that are 
updated according to the withdrawal of the flows of shipper i . This updating is necessary because 
the resignation of shipper i  reduces the total volume transported through the network, which may 
influence the costs of the remaining shippers. In a sense, the process is therefore a ‘correction’ of 
the add-flows heuristic. Note that the procedure stops in case none of the shippers add any flows on 
the current level anymore. Furthermore, in cases where more than one shipper loses, the flows of 
the shipper that loses most are withdrawn. The flows of the other losing shippers are (temporarily) 
retained. 
Only when after these iterative steps the add-hub routine is called again, the flows that have 
entered the hub network in the last iteration and constituted cost reductions are really committed. 
Before  this  point,  flows  were  only  tentatively  included  and  possibly  excluded  again  in  the 
reconsideration loop when benefits turned out to be absent or insufficient.  
 
 
10.5  AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 
 
This section provides a hypothetical example for joint hub network development (see Figure 
10-3). It should be noted that the only goal of this example is to illustrate this procedure, not to 
evaluate the concept’s cost savings potential in practice. For example, practical considerations such 
as volume-dependent transport tariffs are not incorporated. 
Consider three shippers (white, grey and black) that each have two flows travelling from 
disjunctive origins to disjunctive destinations. For each shipper, these two flows are depicted as 
either a square or a circle. Note that in the tables in this section, the white shipper is referred to as 
‘w’, the grey shipper as ‘g’, and the black shipper as ‘b’. For the purpose of illustration, but without 
loss  of  generality,  it  is  assumed  that  all  flows  travel  from  left  to  right  (see  Figure  10-3). 
Furthermore, the demand size of each shipment is displayed underlined next to the origin and 
destination nodes. The flows are transported in trucks with a capacity of 25 units and there are no 
further restrictions in terms of product compatibility, time windows etc. The transport costs that the 
shippers incur are proportional to the Euclidean distances. However, it is assumed that inter-hub 
links have a 10% costs discount per unit of distance as compared to the other links as a result of the 
larger economies of scale. The transport costs are displayed on the links. In the current setting, 
shippers are only charged for one-way transport: the trucks are free at the destination node. It is 
however straightforward to adjust the procedure to support routes in which trucks must return to 
their origin. Furthermore, establishing a hub facility costs 1. This is the share of the costs incurred 
during the hub’s complete lifetime that is allocated to the period under consideration. By doing so, 
it becomes possible to make a fair trade-off between the non-recurrent costs for establishing a hub Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  178 
and the recurrent benefits of sending flows through the hub network. Finally, it is assumed that 
hubs are always located at origin or destination nodes of flows. 
Because there is no hub structure in Step 0, there is no cooperation and no savings can be 




















Figure 10-3. Illustrative example: Level 0 
 
S   {w}  {g}  {b}  {w,g}  {w,b}  {g,b}  {w,g,b} 
Hub costs  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Transport costs  11.4  12.3  10.2  23.7  21.6  22.5  33.9 
( ) 0 C S   11.4  12.3  10.2  23.7  21.6  22.5  33.9 
( ) 0 v S   .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
( ) 0 S Φ   .  .  .         
Table 10-1. Coalitional values and allocations on level 0 
 
The first iteration of the procedure (to reach level 1) is then entered and a hub structure is 
actually installed. The add-hub routine chooses both ‘circle locations’ of the black shipper as the 
most appropriate hub locations. This is illustrated in Figure 10-4 by the circles around these nodes, 
which have furthermore changed into triangles to represent hubs. The link connecting both hubs is 
in bold. The add-flows routine determines that also the circle locations of the white and grey 
shippers will now enter the hub network. Note that in the new configuration the circle locations’ Chapter 10: Joint Hub Network Development 
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demands of 10, 8 and 7 exactly fit into one truck, so that the hub link needs to be crossed only once 
to serve all three added flows. This results in a significant cost reduction for these flows. 
Based on the costs incurred in the new configuration, coalitional values are calculated. These 
values are given in Table 10-2, together with the Shapley values. It turns out that the black shipper 
receives the highest savings (21.6%), because his two locations are beneficial for the other two 
shippers and coincide with the hub locations. Note that the fixed costs for establishing the hubs are 
evenly spread over its users. This is a direct consequence of the additivity property of the Shapley 
value. When the game is split up in two subgames, one for the hub costs and one for the transport 
costs, it is readily verified (see the first row of Table 10-2) that in the hub costs subgame all 
coalitional values are equal and the costs will be evenly shared. 
Table 10-2 shows that all cooperators receive a cost reduction for their participating flows. 
This means that none of the flows will be withdrawn from the hub network via the reconsideration 
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S   {w}  {g}  {b}  {w,g}  {w,b}  {g,b}  {w,g,b} 
Hub costs  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Transport costs  12.6  12.1  9.8  21.0  18.7  18.2  27.1 
( ) C S   14.6  14.1  11.8  23.0  20.7  20.2  29.1 
( ) 0 C S   11.4  12.3  10.2  23.7  21.6  22.5  33.9 
( ) 1 v S   -3.2  -1.8  -1.6  0.7  0.9  2.3  4.8 
( ) 1 S Φ   0.6  2.0  2.2         
Allocation hub costs  0.67  0.67  0.67         
Allocation transport costs  10.13  9.63  7.33         
Costs after allocation  10.8  10.3  8.0         
Costs previous level  11.4  12.3  10.2         
Savings w.r.t. previous level  5.3%  16.3%  21.6%         
Table 10-2. Coalitional values and allocations on level 1 
 
In the second iteration, add-hub chooses the grey square origin node as the new hub location 
(see Figure 10-5). The add-flows routine now adds all remaining flows to the cooperative hub 
network. 
Note that  since there are now  multiple inter-hub  links  in  the  network,  some  elementary 
routing  problems  need  to  be  solved  to  calculate  the  coalitional  values.  For  example,  for  the 
coalition consisting of only the white shipper ( { } S w = ), the best choice is to combine the two 
flows at one of the left-hand side hubs and then crossing the link to the hub at the right-hand side 
together. This route is feasible, because the corresponding shipments sum up to 22 (10+12). This 
amount still fits into one truck so that the inter-hub link has to be crossed only once to transport 
both shipments. This is however not possible for any of the 2-shipper coalitions, nor for the grand 
coalition. For these coalitions, it is best to respectively combine the square and circle shipments 
into  separate  groups  that  travel  from  left  to  right  via  the  two  inter-hub  links.  For  coalition 
{ } , S w b =  and the grand coalition, a long hub-link even needs to be crossed three times. 


























Figure 10-5. Illustrative example: Level 2 
 
S  {w}  {g}  {b}  {w,g}  {w,b}  {g,b}  {w,g,b} 
Hub costs  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Transport costs  10.5  10.1  9.6  17.0  20.2  16.1  24.8 
( ) C S   13.5  13.1  12.6  20.0  23.2  19.1  27.8 
( ) 0 C S   11.4  12.3  10.2  23.7  21.6  22.5  33.9 
( ) 2 v S   -2.1  -0.8  -2.4  3.7  -1.6  3.4  6.1 
( ) 2 S Φ   1.08  4.23  0.78         
Allocation hub costs  1  1  1         
Allocation transport costs  9.32  7.07  8.42         
Costs after allocation  10.32  8.07  9.42         
Costs previous level  10.8  10.3  8.0         
Savings w.r.t. previous level  4.4%  21.7%  -17.8%         
Table 10-3. Coalitional values and allocations in level 2 
 
The bottom row of Table 10-3 shows that on level 2, the black shipper loses compared to 
level 1. This means that in the reconsideration loop of the procedure, this shipper will withdraw the 
flow that he added to reach level 2. This situation is illustrated in Figure 10-6: The black ‘square-
flow’ does not use the grey hub anymore, but chooses for direct transport again. This illustrates 
how the reconsideration loop corrects the add-flows routine based on fair gain sharing between the 
participating shippers: although adding the black square flow might be beneficial from a total costs Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  182 
perspective, the black shipper does not gain and is not willing to loose money to the benefit of the 
other shippers. 
As  explained  in  Section  10.4.3,  the  black  shipper  is  treated  as  a  dummy  player  in  the 
remainder of the reconsideration loop on level 2. He again incurs the costs he incurred at level 1 
(8.0) and does not bring additional value to any of the coalitions (see Table 10-4). Note that since 
the black player has committed his circle flow in level 1, he still incurs his share of the fixed costs 




























S  {w}  {g}  {b}  {w,g}  {w,b}  {g,b}  {w,g,b} 
Hub costs  2.33  2.33  0.67  2.33  3  3  3 
Transport costs  10.5  10.1  7.33  17.0  17.83  17.43  24.33 
( ) C S   12.83  12.43  8.0  19.33  20.83  20.43  27.33 
( ) 0 C S   11.4  12.3  10.2  23.7  21.6  22.5  33.9 
( ) 2 v S   -1.43  -0.13  2.2  4.37  0.77  2.07  6.57 
( ) 2 S Φ   1.54  2.84  2.2         
Allocation hub costs  1.17  1.17  0.67         
Allocation transport costs  8.69  8.29  7.33         
Costs after allocation  9.86  9.46  8.0         
Costs previous level  10.8  10.3  8.0         
Savings w.r.t. previous level  8.7%  8.2%  0.0%         
Table 10-4. Coalitional values and allocations in level 2 (reconsidered) 
 
After the withdrawal of the black shipper, it turns out that the white and grey shipper still 
benefit from the extra hub (8.7%, and 8.2% with respect to level 1). Therefore, the reconsideration 
loop of level 2 is terminated here without any further flow withdrawals. It is a straightforward 
exercise to check that adding another hub will not be sustainable, because in the reconsideration 
loop  of  level  3,  all  flows  will  be  withdrawn  and  the  procedure  will  stop.  The  final  network 
therefore is the one depicted in Figure 10-6. 




10.6  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter focussed on shippers that cooperate by setting up a joint hub network for the 
transport of goods. The construction of such networks is a well-studied optimisation problem in the 
operations  research  literature.  However,  besides  the  final  solution,  also  the  development  path 
towards this solution is of importance. Building a physical hub for the transhipment of goods is 
expensive and therefore involves considerable risks for the cooperating companies. In a practical 
setting, it is unlikely that the entire network corresponding to the final solution of the optimisation 
problem will be built at once. Rather, the partners will have a more cautious attitude and build the 
hub facilities one-by-one. Every time a new hub is introduced, partners will have the opportunity to 
decide whether or not they participate (and thus invest) in this network extension. Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  184 
Compared to the ‘big bang’ approach that prevails in literature, the step-wise procedure 
developed in this chapter will generally result in an inferior final solution in the sense that possibly 
fewer flows will travel via the hub network, overall costs will be higher and less hubs will be 
constructed. However, this should not be considered a valid drawback. The investments in physical 
transport hub networks are that large that they cannot be made without a sustainable development 
path towards the final network. Nevertheless, comparing the performance of the step-wise and big-
bang approaches is an interesting direction for further research. 
It is important to note that the framework introduced in this chapter is applicable in other 
situations than hub networks as well. In many cases where multiple (infrastructural) investments 
have  to  be  made  by  a  consortium  of  logistics  companies,  the  participants  are  likely  to  take 
advantage of a step-wise approach with gain sharing at intermediate levels. When looking at the 
horizontal cooperation types discussed in Section 3.1, the procedure can e.g. benefit maintenance 



















This thesis provides an analysis of horizontal cooperation in transport and logistics. This 
concept is defined as: active cooperation between two or more firms that operate on the same level 
of the supply chain and perform a comparable logistics function on the landside, and it provides an 
interesting direction of thought for logistics companies struggling with difficult market situations. 
The  large  economic  significance  of  the  logistics  sector  and  the  problems  it  is  currently 
facing, contribute to the importance of horizontal cooperation. Increased economies of scale are 
clearly necessary to prevent the rising transport costs, congestion and emissions from becoming an 
even larger burden to welfare than they are at present. Horizontal cooperation seems to be a viable 
alternative to mergers and acquisitions, to attain this increased scale. To illustrate its practical 
relevance, note that in the heavily congested European logistics centre of gravity (Belgium and the 
Netherlands) many horizontal cooperation initiatives of various types have already been initiated. 
Yet,  existing  literature  lacks  a  general  framework  to  guide  practitioners  in  setting  up  these 
horizontal cooperations. For sure, not all forms of horizontal cooperation are applicable to any 
given sector or company. As such, the horizontal cooperation that currently exists may very well 
not be as effective as it could be. 
 
 
11.1  RESEARCH QUESTIONS REVISITED 
 
In Section 1.5.2, five central research questions were formulated. They were addressed in the 
chapters of this thesis as displayed in Figure 1-5. Below, these research questions are revisited. 
 
Q1: What are the expected cost savings of horizontal cooperation through joint route planning? 
This first research question deals with the expected savings of horizontal cooperation. To 
answer this question, the most basic type of horizontal cooperation in transport and logistics (i.e., 
joint route planning) was analysed in detail. A benchmark scenario was developed in Chapter 4, for 
which the benefits of joint route planning turned out to be considerable: savings up to 30.7% of 
total distribution costs were obtained. In this chapter, the concept of the synergy value is formally 
introduced. This is defined as the (percent) difference between distribution costs in the original 
situation where all entities perform their orders individually, and the costs of a system where all 
orders are collected and route schemes for different flow controlling entities (FCEs) are set up 
simultaneously. Sensitivity analyses were then conducted to gain insight into the main drivers for 
synergy. The results indicate that joint route planning is most beneficial in situations where there Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  188 
are a large number of FCEs of a uniform and not too large size. Furthermore, the synergy value 
increases  if  order  sizes  are  small  compared  to  a  standard  truck’s  capacity,  time  windows  are 
narrow, and inter-customer distances are large. Together, the synergy value for the benchmark 
scenario and the sensitivity analyses provide an answer to research question Q1. The results have 
clear interpretations and can therefore be used by practitioners to develop insight on synergy value, 
should there be no time or budget to go through all the calculations. This insight thus allows for a 
rapid determination as to whether a group of cooperating logistics companies have a high synergy 
value. The mode of operation employed in this chapter can also be used to estimate savings for 
other horizontal cooperation types described in Chapter 3. 
 
Q2: To what extent do logistics practitioners consider horizontal cooperation a viable business 
approach? 
To  answer  research  question  Q2,  Logistics  Service  Providers  (LSPs)  were  contacted  in 
Flanders by means of a questionnaire. This survey is discussed in Chapter 5. The results provide 
some important insights into the opportunities and impediments for horizontal cooperation. These 
opportunities and impediments arose from the literature review of Chapter 2 and were further 
developed into specific propositions based on input from interviews with industry experts. The 
results show that the opportunities are widely supported across the Flemish logistics sector. The 
proposition  that  horizontal  cooperation  increases  a  company’s  productivity  for  core  activities, 
receives  the  strongest  support.  In  particular,  it  receives  more  approval  than  the  statement  that 
horizontal cooperation reduces the costs of non-core activities. It can therefore be concluded that 
cooperation  on  core  activities,  although  this  involves  the  exchange  of  (sensitive)  customer 
information, is considered to be more desirable than cooperation on non-core activities because of 
the  higher  potential  of  cost  savings.  Exploratory  factor  analysis  subdivided  the  proposed 
impediments for horizontal cooperations into two sets: Partner Selection Impediments and Other 
Impediments. As was apparent from the literature review in Chapter 2, partner choice is vital for 
the success or failure of cooperation. The problems with finding suitable partners seem to be less 
severe for the more profitable respondents. Concerning the other impediments, respondents expect 
most difficulties from issues related to bargaining power. Especially the enabling concepts for 
horizontal cooperation discussed in Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 provide useful directions concerning 
bargaining and fair gain sharing. 
 
Q3: Is there a relation between a company’s (financial) characteristics and its attitude towards 
horizontal cooperation? 
To answer research question Q3, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was applied to the 
survey data of Chapter 5. The DEA results made it possible to draw conclusions regarding 1) the 
efficiency of the Flemish road transport sector and 2) the potential of horizontal cooperation to Chapter 11: Conclusions and Recommendations 
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improve this efficiency. Research question Q3 is further developed into a number of conjectures 
formulated in Section 6.2. First and foremost, it turns out that the Flemish road transport sector is 
highly inefficient: less than 5% of the responding companies come within a reasonable distance of 
the efficient frontier. It became clear that an important reason for this inefficiency lies in the strong 
fragmentation of the sector. Horizontal cooperation is then put forward as a possible way to boost a 
company’s efficiency by rationalising on inputs. The scale inefficiency found by the various DEAs 
is high enough to expect that market consolidation will be needed in the future for the sector to 
keep up with foreign (Eastern-European) competitors. Furthermore, it turned out that a minimum 
degree of efficiency and scale is needed before the impediments for horizontal cooperation can be 
overcome and rewards can be reaped. 
To  answer  research  question  Q3,  two  conjectures  about  the  relation  of  road  transport 
companies’  efficiency  levels  with  their  attitudes  towards  opportunities  and  impediments  for 
horizontal  cooperation  were  tested.  It  turned  out  that  inefficient  companies  consider  the 
impediments  for  horizontal  cooperation  significantly  more  severe  than  the  more  efficient 
companies do. However, no significant difference in the evaluations of the opportunities between 
efficient and less efficient companies could be found. This means that even the inefficient transport 
companies think that horizontal cooperation can improve their business, but their bad (financial) 
performance currently prohibits it: they cannot afford to spend time and money on starting up a 
horizontal  cooperation  project  and  run  the  risk  of  failure.  This  constitutes  a  possible  role  for 
governments  to  subsidise  the  starting  period  of  horizontal  cooperations.  The  time  and  capital 
restrictions are also the most probable explanation for the observation that inefficient companies 
consider the impediments to be more severe than their more efficient counterparts. 
 
Q4: Do regional differences exist between LSPs’ attitudes towards horizontal cooperation? 
0 deals with research question Q4 by testing the hypothesis that Flemish LSPs consider the 
impediments  for  horizontal  cooperation  more  severe  than  their  Dutch  colleagues  do.  This 
hypothesis is indeed supported based on the survey data of Chapter 5 and the results of an identical 
survey conducted in the Netherlands. It was also observed that the opportunities are valued alike by 
the two groups. The explanation for the different attitudes towards the impediments is probably of a 
cultural nature: Flemish entrepreneurs may be more inclined to first see where the cat jumps before 
implementing innovative or otherwise far-reaching concepts. They can therefore learn from both 
the successful and failed cooperation projects in the Netherlands. 
In Chapter 7, also the similarities in both surveys are examined to get a feel for the validity 
of the results of the two surveys for other countries. It turns out that to a large extent, Flemish and 
Dutch respondents have similar beliefs about the relative importance of the individual opportunities 
and impediments. Therefore, it is conjectured that the relative importance of the opportunities and Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  190 
impediments  in  Flanders  and  the  Netherlands  gives  a  good  estimate  of  the  importance  of  the 
relative importance in other countries. 
 
Q5: Which logistics concepts can be used to enable horizontal cooperation? 
This final research question is answered by discussing three enabling concepts for horizontal 
cooperation  in  detail.  These  are  Factory  Gate  Pricing,  Insinking,  and  Joint  Hub  Network 
Development. 
Firstly, in Chapter 8 Factory Gate Pricing (FGP) is examined. A model was developed that is 
capable  of  simulating  different  scenarios  in  terms  of  the  orchestration,  cooperation,  and  flow 
synchronisation of a distribution system. Results have been generated for a case study in the Dutch 
retail supply chain for slow moving dry grocery goods. Cost savings are attained by three factors. 
Firstly, the frequencies of delivery are optimised based on total supply chain costs. Secondly, by 
means of order synchronisation, the retailer can determine the timing of replenishment orders so 
that nearby suppliers can be combined in one route. Finally, the asymmetry in the network is 
exploited  to  create  more  efficiency:  in  the  case  study,  the  suppliers  outnumber  the  retailers’ 
distribution centres. FGP facilitates horizontal cooperation, since the number of decision makers is 
smaller. The experiments show that a shift to FGP alone results in a 22% decrease in supply chain 
costs. If there is also horizontal cooperation, savings up to 26% are possible.  
As  a  second  enabling  concept,  Chapter  9  introduces  Insinking.  Over  the  last  decades, 
companies’  profit  margins  have  been  decreasing,  and  the  efficiency  of  logistics  processes  has 
become  critical.  To  cut  down  costs,  shippers  often  outsource  transportation  to  an  LSP. 
Traditionally, the initiative for this lies with the shipper: once he reckons that logistics activities 
should be outsourced, an invitation to submit a tender is sent out to a number of pre-selected LSPs. 
Based on this invitation, the LSPs then propose a price for their services. Chapter 9 deals with the 
reverse mode of operation, where the initiative for the contract lies with the LSP. To stress the 
contrast between the traditional push approach of outsourcing, and the proposed pull approach 
where the LSP is the initiator, we will refer to this phenomenon as insinking, the antonym of 
outsourcing. Insinking has the advantage that the logistics service provider can proactively select a 
group of shippers with a strong synergy potential. Moreover, these synergies can be allocated to the 
participating shippers in a fair and sustainable way by means of solution methods from cooperative 
game theory. Insinking facilitates horizontal cooperation without the difficulties arising from the 
sharing  of  sensitive  information  between  the  cooperating  companies.  The  complex  task  of 
allocating the attained savings solely lies with one actor who performs all necessary calculations 
and communication. This avoids long and difficult rounds of discussion among the cooperating 
companies. Insinking is illustrated by means of a practical example based on data from the Dutch 
grocery transportation sector. Chapter 11: Conclusions and Recommendations 
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Finally, Chapter 10introduces a framework for joint hub network development. Building a 
joint physical hub for transhipment of goods is expensive and therefore involves considerable risks 
for the cooperating companies. In a practical setting, it is unlikely that an entire network will be 
built at once. Rather, the partners will have a more cautious attitude and build the hub facilities 
one-by-one. In the proposed framework, every time a new hub is introduced, partners will have the 
opportunity to decide whether or not they participate (and thus invest) in this network extension. 
The framework is applicable in other cooperative situations than hub network development as well. 
In  practically  all  cases  where  multiple  (infrastructural)  investments  have  to  be  made  by  a 
consortium of logistics companies, the participants are likely to take advantage of a step-wise 
approach with gain sharing at intermediate steps. More specifically, the procedure can also benefit 
maintenance groups, warehouse sharing initiatives, and intermodal groups. 
 
 
11.2  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
The literature on horizontal cooperation, especially in the transport and logistics sector, is 
still in its infancy. Therefore, it was inevitable to make choices on which aspects to investigate and 
which not. As a consequence, some important features of horizontal cooperation have received less 
attention. In addition, parts of the research performed in this thesis give rise to supplementary 
research questions. This section provides a list of important directions for further research on the 
topic of horizontal cooperation in transport and logistics. 
 
Implementation and Management of Horizontal Cooperations 
Not much attention has been paid to how horizontal cooperations should be implemented and 
managed in everyday business. Nevertheless, this is a very important aspect. During the lifetime of 
a horizontal cooperation, four generic phases can be identified. These are: Strategic positioning, 
Design, Implementation, and Management (Verstrepen et al., 2006). Each of these phases in turn 
consists of multiple tasks that are to be carried out carefully to make the cooperation a success. 
During the lifetime, it is possible that conflicts between partners will occur about e.g. contractual 
issues, growth strategies, newly entered partners, or necessary investments. A good management of 
these conflicts is crucial for a cooperation’s long-term success. Some useful insights concerning the 
role of conflicts and other soft factors in cooperative relations can be found in the psychological 
literature (e.g. Mulder et al., 2005). Additional research is however needed to combine insights 
from various disciplines such as phychology, operations research, and management science into 
comprehensive implementation and management plans. There do exist business reports that discuss 
the management of logistics cooperations (e.g. van der Ham, 2005; Verstrepen, 2006). A more 
formal consideration by social scientists would however strongly enrich our understanding of how Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  192 
horizontal cooperations should be managed, and is therefore an important direction for further 
research. 
 
Factory Gate Pricing Model Extensions 
Chapter 8 introduced the concept of Factory Gate Pricing (FGP). An optimisation model was 
constructed to gauge the impact of frequencies of delivery, transport mode choice, and supply chain 
orchestration. In its present form however, the model only covers primary transport. It is certainly 
possible to also incorporate secondary transport, since for certain (large) flows it may be optimal to 
bypass the retailer’s DC and travel directly from supplier to retail outlet. Allowing for these two 
extensions creates a higher degree of freedom and thus increases the total cost savings of FGP. An 
extended model in which also secondary transport was incorporated has already been developed 
and applied to the supply chain of large retailers in the Netherlands and Sweden. Preliminary 
results show that optimising primary and secondary transport simultaneously offers an additional 
savings potential of around 5%. More research is however needed to validate these savings in other 
supply chains. 
 
Game Theoretical Extensions 
Chapter  9  and  Chapter  10  consider  one  of  the  most  difficult  and  delicate  questions 
concerning cooperation: gain sharing. Both chapters show how cooperative game theory can be 
used to make horizontal cooperation more sustainable. The application of a combination of game 
theoretic  methods  and  operations  research  techniques  to  real  life  problems  is  quite  unique  in 
literature.  This  gives  rise  to  a  number  of  interesting  questions.  For  example:  Under  which 
conditions do Rational Shapley Monotonic Paths (RSMPs) exist in the context of Insinking? What 
happens if also a competing Logistics Service Provider applies Insinking to attract some of the 
targeted shippers? How robust is a given RSMP to system changes such as growth or decline of a 
shipper, mergers, geographical displacements, withdrawals of shippers, etc.? What are the relevant 
selection  criteria  when  choosing  between  multiple  RSMPs?  Furthermore,  for  both  chapters,  it 
would be very interesting to know how  the results would change when a different game theoretical 
solution concept (nucleolus, tau-value, etc.) is used instead of the Shapley value. And what is the 
complexity  of  the  various  solution  procedures?  Answering  (some  of)  these  questions  is  an 
interesting direction for further research. 
 Chapter 11: Conclusions and Recommendations 
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Calculation of Savings 
In Chapter 4, expected savings are calculated for horizontal cooperation through joint route 
planning. A basic distribution setting was chosen for this analysis. Further research is needed to 
understand the impact of joint route planning in more complex distribution systems. It would be 
useful  to  perform  an  investigation  into  how  the  results  of  the  analysis  are  influenced  by  the 
introduction of e.g. multiple depots or pick up and delivery orders. 
 
Joint Hub Network Development 
Chapter 10 proposes a framework for the step-wise development of joint hub distribution 
networks.  This  framework  is  illustrated  by  means  of  a  small  hypothetical  example.  There  are 
however some practical issues that are hard to simulate in such an example. For instance, it would 
be very interesting to compare the final solutions of the step-wise approach and the big bang 
approach in a real-life case. Finally, in the current setting it was assumed that cooperation only 
takes place on the inter-hub links. A study on hybrid forms of horizontal cooperation, for example 
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Dit proefschrift behandelt horizontale samenwerking in transport en logistiek. Hoewel deze 
vorm van samenwerking ‘hot’ is in de praktijk, staat het wetenschappelijk onderzoek hiernaar nog 
in  de  kinderschoenen.  Binnen  dit  proefschrift  wordt  de  aandacht  gericht  op  horizontale 
samenwerking in transport en logistiek aan de landzijde, die als volgt gedefinieerd wordt: 
 
Horizontale samenwerking in transport en logistiek is actieve samenwerking tussen twee of meer 
bedrijven  die  opereren  op  dezelfde  hoogte  in  de  aanvoerketen  en  een  vergelijkbare  logistieke 
functie uitvoeren aan de landzijde. 
 
Het grote belang van transport en logistiek voor de Westerse economieën en de problemen 
voor  welke  de  sector  zich  momenteel  gesteld  ziet,  vormen  de  belangrijkste  drijfveer  voor  het 
onderzoek dat in dit proefschrift beschreven wordt. Er bestaat geen twijfel over dat logistieke 
ondernemingen  een  zekere  schaalgrootte  nodig  hebben  om  te  voorkomen  dat  transportkosten, 
congestie  en  CO2-uitstoot  uit  de  hand  lopen.  Dit  kan  uiteraard  bereikt  worden  door  fusies  en 




Het proefschrift is onderverdeeld in drie delen, aangevuld met een inleiding (Hoofdstuk 1) 
en een conclusie (Hoofdstuk 11). Deel I geeft de benodigde voorkennis over het onderwerp en is 
zelf weer opgesplitst in drie hoofdstukken. Hoofdstuk 2 bevat de eerste uitgebreide inventarisatie 
van de relevante academische literatuur op het gebied van horizontale samenwerking in transport 
en  logistiek.  Hoofdstuk  3  geeft  vervolgens  een  aanzet  tot  een  typologie  voor  horizontale 
samenwerkingsvormen  die  in  de  praktijk  voorkomen.  Deze  kunnen  variëren  van  een  ad  hoc 
vrachtuitwisseling tot bijvoorbeeld het gezamenlijk investeren in een gedeeld distributiecentrum. 
Tenslotte geeft Hoofdstuk 4 een inschatting van de omvang van de besparingen op transportkosten 
die behaald kunnen worden door gezamenlijke ritplanning. 
Deel II bespreekt het empirische gedeelte van het onderzoek. Door middel van twee enquêtes 
werden ongeveer 1.500 Vlaamse en 2.500 Nederlandse Logistiek Dienstverleners (LDVs) gevraagd 
om  voor  hun  eigen  bedrijf  de  kansen  van  en  drempels  voor  horizontale  samenwerking  in  te 
schatten. Hoofdstuk 5 beschrijft een uitgebreide statistische analyse van de opvattingen van de 
Vlaamse  respondenten.  Deze  resultaten  zijn  vervolgens  gekoppeld  aan  (financiële) 
bedrijfsgegevens. Dit maakt het mogelijk om in Hoofdstuk 6 een genuanceerder beeld te vormen Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  212 
van bepaalde opvattingen van LDVs over horizontale samenwerking. Het empirische deel wordt 
afgesloten in Hoofdstuk 7 door de antwoorden van de Vlaamse en Nederlandse respondenten met 
elkaar te vergelijken. 
Het laatste deel van dit proefschrift behandelt een aantal innovatieve logistieke concepten die 
horizontale  samenwerking  kunnen  faciliteren.  Dit  zijn:  Factory  Gate  Pricing  (Hoofdstuk  8), 
Insinking (Hoofdstuk 9) en Joint Hub Network Development (Hoofdstuk 10). Praktische relevantie 
was één van de belangrijkste eisen aan de analyse van elk van deze concepten. Daarom is waar 
mogelijk gewerkt met objectieve praktijkdata en worden bovendien adviezen uitgebracht over de 
vraag hoe horizontale samenwerking daadwerkelijk in de praktijk bereikt kan worden door middel 
van deze concepten. 
 
Doel en Onderzoeksvragen 
Het  hoofddoel  van  dit  proefschrift  is  het  identificeren  van  interessante  en  vruchtbare 
onderzoeksrichtingen  rond  horizontale  samenwerking  in  transport  en  logistiek  om  zo  verder 
academisch  onderzoek  naar  dit  onderwerp  te  ondersteunen.  Hopelijk  inspireren  de  verkregen 
resultaten en inzichten onderzoekers om dit interessante onderzoeksgebied verder uit te werken, en 
logistiek managers om horizontale samenwerking daadwerkelijk in te zetten als een oplossing voor 
de  uitdagingen  in  de  logistieke  sector.  Het  hoofddoel  wordt  onderverdeeld  in  vijf  specifieke 
onderzoeksvragen: 
Q1  Wat  zijn  de  potentiële  besparingen  van  horizontale  samenwerking  door  gezamenlijke 
ritplanning? 
Q2  In  hoeverre  beschouwen  managers  van  logistieke  ondernemingen  horizontale 
samenwerking als een haalbare kaart? 
Q3  Is er een relatie tussen (financiële) karakteristieken van een bedrijf en haar opvattingen 
over horizontale samenwerking? 
Q4  Bestaan  er  regionale  verschillen  in  de  opvattingen  van  LDVs  over  horizontale 
samenwerking? 
Q5  Welke logistieke concepten kunnen ingezet worden om het potentieel van horizontale 
samenwerking uit te buiten? 
 
Hieronder wordt elk van deze onderzoeksvragen nader uitgewerkt. 
 
Q1 - Deze eerste onderzoeksvraag behandelt de (maximale) besparingen die te behalen zijn 
door horizontale samenwerking. Om deze vraag te beantwoorden, analyseren we in Hoofdstuk 4 de 
meest  basale  vorm  van  horizontale  samenwerking  in  transport  en  de  logistiek,  namelijk 
gezamenlijke ritplanning. Het uitgangspunt is een benchmarkscenario, waarin de voordelen van 
gezamenlijke ritplanning aanzienlijk blijken te zijn (30,7% van de totale distributiekosten). Deze Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
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besparing noemen we de synergiewaarde. Dit is een belangrijke term in het hele proefschrift en we 
definiëren dit formeel als het (procentuele) verschil tussen de kosten in de uitgangssituatie waar 
alle bedrijven hun eigen orders uitvoeren, en de kosten in een systeem waar alle orders worden 
verzameld en gelijktijdig routeschema’s worden geconstrueerd voor alle samenwerkende bedrijven. 
Door  middel  van  gevoeligheidsanalyse  wordt  onderzocht  wat  de  invloed  is  van  verschillende 
factoren op de synergiewaarde. De resultaten hiervan geven aan dat gezamenlijke ritplanning het 
voordeligst  is  in  situaties  waarin  een  groot  aantal  gelijkwaardige  en  niet  te  grote  partijen 
samenwerkt. De synergiewaarde neemt nog verder toe wanneer de gemiddelde ordergrootte klein is 
ten  opzichte  van  de  capaciteit  van  de  gebruikte  vrachtwagens,  tijdvensters  krap  zijn  en  de 
gemiddelde afstand tussen de losadressen groot is. Deze resultaten hebben een duidelijke betekenis 
in  de  praktijk  en  kunnen  dus  gemakkelijk  gebruikt  worden  door  logistiek  managers  om  in  te 
schatten of samenwerking tussen bepaalde bedrijven voldoende potentieel heeft. 
 
Q2  -  Voor  de  beantwoording  van  onderzoeksvraag  Q2,  zijn  circa  1.500  Vlaamse  LDVs 
geënquêteerd.  De  resultaten  hiervan  staan  beschreven  in  Hoofdstuk  5.  De  hoofdmoot  van  de 
enquête  bestaat  uit  een  aantal  stellingen  over  specifieke  kansen  en  drempels  voor  horizontale 
samenwerking. Uit de evaluaties door de respondenten blijkt dat het potentieel van horizontale 
samenwerking  sterk  onderschreven  wordt  door  de  Vlaamse  logistieke  sector.  De  stelling  dat 
horizontale samenwerking de productiviteit van de kernactiviteiten verhoogt, kon rekenen op de 
meeste bijval. In het bijzonder werd deze stelling breder ondersteund dan de stelling dat horizontale 
samenwerking  de  kosten  van  niet-kernactiviteiten  verlaagt.  We  concluderen  hieruit  dat 
samenwerking  op  kernactiviteiten,  ondanks  dat  dit  vaak  uitwisseling  van  gevoelige 
(klant)informatie  vereist,  kansrijker  is  dan  samenwerking  op  niet-kernactiviteiten,  met  name 
vanwege  het  grotere  besparingspotentieel.  Vervolgens  hebben  we  exploratieve  factor  analyse 
toegepast op de stellingen. Dit resulteerde in een onderverdeling van de drempels in twee groepen: 
drempels  gerelateerd  aan  partnerselectie  en  ‘overige’  drempels.  Zoals  ook  bleek  uit  het 
literatuuroverzicht in Hoofdstuk 2, is partnerselectie van essentieel belang voor de slaagkans van 
een samenwerking. Voor wat betreft de overige drempels, verwachten de respondenten de meeste 
moeilijkheden door verschillen in de onderhandelingsposities van de partners. In de hoofdstukken 9 
en 10 worden door middel van innovatieve logistieke concepten praktische handvatten aangereikt 
om deze drempels te slechten en vervolgens ook de synergiewaarde eerlijk te verdelen. 
 
Q3  -  Om  onderzoeksvraag  Q3  te  beantwoorden,  is  Data  Envelopment  Analysis  (DEA) 
toegepast  op  de  enquêteresultaten  van  Hoofdstuk  5.  Deze  techniek  maakt  het  mogelijk  om 
conclusies te trekken aangaande 1) de efficiëntie van de Vlaamse wegtransportsector en 2) het 
potentieel van horizontale samenwerking om deze efficiëntie te verhogen. De onderzoeksvraag is 
in Sectie 6.2 nader uitgewerkt in een aantal concrete hypothesen. De voornaamste conclusie is dat Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  214 
de  Vlaamse  wegtransportsector  hoogst  inefficiënt  is:  minder  dan  5%  van  de  responderende 
bedrijven komt binnen een redelijke afstand van de zogenaamde efficiënte grens. Een belangrijke 
verklaring voor deze inefficiëntie is de sterke fragmentatie binnen de sector. Rationaliseren op de 
benodigde productiemiddelen door middel van horizontale samenwerking wordt vervolgens naar 
voren gebracht als een mogelijke remedie. De ‘schaalinefficiëntie’ is omvangrijk genoeg om te 
veronderstellen dat in de toekomst vergaande marktconsolidatie nodig zal zijn om de toenemende 
Oost-Europese concurrentie het hoofd te kunnen bieden. Verder bleek uit de analyse dat een zeker 
minimum niveau van efficiëntie nodig is alvorens de drempels voor horizontale samenwerking 
kunnen  worden  overwonnen  en  de  voordelen  kunnen  worden  benut.  Tenslotte  bleek  er  geen 
significant verband te bestaan tussen de evaluaties van de kansen en het efficiëntie niveau van 
bedrijven.  Dit  betekent  dat  zelfs  de  inefficiënte  transportbedrijven  denken  dat  horizontale 
samenwerking hun bedrijfsvoering ten goede kan komen. Hun slechte (financiële) situatie maakt 
dit echter een hachelijke onderneming: door de kans op mislukking kunnen zij het zich moeilijk 
veroorloven tijd en geld te spenderen aan het opstarten van een horizontaal samenwerkingsproject. 
Dit is ook de meest voor de hand liggende verklaring voor het feit dat de inefficiënte bedrijven de 
drempels hoger inschatten dan hun meer efficiënte collega’s. 
 
Q4 - Hoofdstuk 7 behandelt onderzoeksvraag Q4 door de hypothese te testen dat Vlaamse 
LDVs  de  drempels  voor  horizontale  samenwerking  hoger  inschatten  dan  hun  Nederlandse 
collega's.  Deze  hypothese  wordt  getest  op  basis  van  de  Vlaamse  onderzoeksgegevens  van 
Hoofdstuk 5 en de resultaten van een identieke enquête onder 2.500 Nederlandse LDVs. Het blijkt 
dat  de  voordelen  door  beide  groepen  even  hoog  worden  ingeschat,  maar  dat  de  Vlaamse 
respondenten de drempels voor samenwerking significant hoger inschatten dan hun Nederlandse 
collega’s. De verklaring zou van culturele aard kunnen zijn: de Vlaamse ondernemers zijn mogelijk 
geneigd  om  langer  de  kat  uit  de  boom  te  kijken  voordat  daadwerkelijk  overgegaan  wordt  tot 
invoering  van  innovatieve  of  anderszins  ingrijpende  logistieke  veranderingen.  De  Vlamingen 
kunnen hierdoor dus leren van zowel de succesvolle als de mislukte Nederlandse initiatieven. Een 
tweede doel van Hoofdstuk 7 is een idee te krijgen van de generaliseerbaarheid van de resultaten 
van de Vlaamse enquête naar andere West-Europese landen. Het blijkt dat er slechts beperkte 
verschillen  zijn  tussen  de  relatieve  inschattingen  van  stellingen  door  Vlaamse  en  Nederlandse 
respondenten. We spreken daarom het vermoeden uit dat de ordening van de stellingen betreffende 
de voordelen en drempels voor horizontale samenwerking zoals die uit de Vlaamse enquête naar 
voren kwam een goede indicatie is voor het relatieve belang van elk van de voordelen en drempels 
in andere landen. 
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Q5  -  Deze  laatste  onderzoeksvraag  wordt  beantwoord  door  drie  logistieke  concepten  te 
bespreken die horizontale samenwerking  kunnen faciliteren. Dit zijn achtereenvolgens: Factory 
Gate Pricing, Insinking, en Joint Hub Network Development. 
Om  te  beginnen  onderzoekt  Hoofdstuk  8  Factory  Gate  Pricing  (FGP).  Dit  is  een  retail 
concept waarin retailers hun bestellingen zelf ophalen bij hun leveranciers, in plaats van dat de 
leveranciers de bestellingen komen afleveren bij de distributiecentra van de retailers. De analyse 
gebeurt door middel van een model dat in staat is verschillende scenario's in termen van ketenregie, 
samenwerking en ordersynchronisatie voor een distributiesysteem te simuleren. Concrete resultaten 
zijn gevonden voor een casestudy van langzaamlopende droge kruidenierswaren in Nederland. De 
kostenbesparingen  worden  hier  met  name  bereikt  door  drie  factoren.  Ten  eerste  is  er  de 
optimalisatie van leverfrequenties op basis van de totale logistieke kosten. Ten tweede kan de 
retailer door ordersynchronisatie de timing van bestellingen veranderen, zodanig dat nabijgelegen 
leveranciers in één route worden gecombineerd. Tot slot wordt de asymmetrie in het netwerk benut 
teneinde een hoger efficiëntiegraad te bereiken: in de voorliggende casestudy zijn er immers (veel) 
meer  leveranciers  dan  distributiecentra.  Dit  maakt  horizontale  samenwerking  onder  FGP 
gemakkelijker,  aangezien  het  aantal  beslissers  kleiner  is  dan  in  de  traditionele  situatie.  De 
uitkomsten tonen aan dat de genoemde drie factoren een daling van 22% van logistieke kosten 
mogelijk maken. Als er daarnaast ook samenwerking tussen de retailers is, zijn er besparingen tot 
26% mogelijk.  
Het tweede logistieke concept dat geïntroduceerd wordt is insinking (Hoofdstuk 9). Teneinde 
de kosten te verlagen, besteden verladers hun transportactiviteiten de laatste jaren in toenemende 
mate uit aan één of meerdere LDVs. Traditioneel ligt het initiatief hiervoor bij de verlader: wanneer 
deze onderkent dat het beter is om het transport uit te besteden, stuurt hij een offerteverzoek naar 
een aantal vooraf geselecteerde LDVs. Gebaseerd op de informatie in dit verzoek, offreren de 
LDVs dan een tarief. Onder insinking wordt dit proces omgedraaid en komt het initiatief bij de 
LDV te liggen. Om het verschil tussen de traditionele ‘push’ methode en de hier voorgestelde ‘pull’ 
benadering te benadrukken, noemen we dit fenomeen ‘insinking’ (het antoniem voor het Engelse 
woord ‘outsourcing’). Insinking biedt het voordeel dat de LDV proactief een aantal verladers met 
een grote onderlinge synergiewaarde kan selecteren. Verder kan deze synergiewaarde eenvoudig en 
eerlijk  worden  verdeeld  over  de  verladers  door  middel  van  methoden  uit  de  coöperatieve 
speltheorie.  Ook  insinking  wordt  geïllustreerd  aan  de  hand  van  een  voorbeeld  op  basis  van 
praktijkdata uit de Nederlandse retail sector. Horizontal Cooperation in Transport and Logistics  216 
Tot slot introduceert Hoofdstuk 10 een methode voor de gezamenlijke ontwikkeling van een 
hub netwerk. Het opzetten van een gezamenlijk fysiek hub netwerk voor het transport van goederen 
is erg duur en brengt daardoor aanzienlijke risico's voor de samenwerkende bedrijven met zich 
mee. Het is dus onwaarschijnlijk dat een compleet netwerk in één klap zal worden gerealiseerd. De 
partners zullen zich aanvankelijk terughoudend opstellen en de hubs één voor één bouwen. In de 
voorgestelde methode kunnen de partners telkens wanneer er een nieuwe hub wordt geïntroduceerd 
beslissen om al dan niet aan deze netwerkuitbreiding deel te nemen. In elk van deze tussenstappen 
vindt  winstverdeling  plaats  op  basis  van  coöperatieve  speltheorie.  Op  deze  manier  wordt  het 
mogelijke een duurzaam ontwikkelingspad richting het ‘finale netwerk’ uit te stippelen, zodat de 
moeilijkheden door de terughoudendheid van de partners omzeild kunnen worden. De voorgestelde 
methode kan eveneens toegepast worden in andere situaties dan de gezamenlijke ontwikkeling van 
hub  netwerken.  In  veel  gevallen  waar  een  consortium  voor  meerdere  (infrastructurele) 
investeringen staat, zullen de deelnemers immers een trapsgewijze benadering met winstdeling in 
de tussenliggende stappen nastreven. Meer in het bijzonder kan de procedure van nut zijn voor 
horizontale  samenwerking  door  middel  van  gezamenlijke  onderhoudsfaciliteiten,  gedeelde 
distributiecentra en intermodaal transport. 
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